

5749

W

THE
WASHINGTON TREATY DEBATE!

IN THE
**HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AT OTTAWA,
MAY, 1872.**

REPORTS OF SPEECHES

DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION BY

SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD, ONTARIO.

SIR FRANCIS HINCKS, ONTARIO.

SIR GEORGE E. CARTIER, QUEBEC.

HON. W. McDOUGALL, C.B., ONTARIO.

HON. CHAS. TUPPER, C.B., NOVA SCOTIA.

HON. J. H. CAMERON, ONTARIO.

HON. S. L. TILLEY, NEW BRUNSWICK.

HON. S. CAMPBELL, NOVA SCOTIA.

MR. PATRICK POWER, NOVA SCOTIA,

MR. McDONALD, NOVA SCOTIA.

MR. R. A. HARRISON, ONTARIO.

Reprinted from the "Daily Mail,"
King Street, Toronto, June, 1872.

INTRODUCTION.

THE debate on the Treaty of Washington, in the House of Commons, was the severest crucial test to which the talents of Canadian statesmen have ever been put. The leading speeches, in defence of the Treaty, deserve to be put into a more permanent form than that of a daily or weekly journal. For a whole year, the Treaty had been subjected not merely to fair criticism but to almost every kind of misrepresentation. During all this time, the Government, delaying its defence till the question should come before Parliament, maintained a profound silence, which, to its enemies and the opponents of the Treaty proved exceedingly provoking. When the defence did come, it was complete; the defeat of the Opposition was overwhelming; every Province giving a majority for the Treaty Bill, and two of them being unanimous in its support.

The ground on which the opposition to the Treaty had chiefly rested was, that it gave to the Americans the liberty of shering in our coast fisheries, for twelve years, without securing in return a general reciprocity of trade. This circumstance makes it necessary to review the prior course of the principal critic on this question of Reciprocity; for in this way can best be tested the sincerity of the opposition urged to the Treaty, on this ground. And this leads us to enquire, how the first mutterings of dissatisfaction with the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, came to find utterance; by what process the people of the United States, at first so favourable to that Treaty, came to be hostile to it.

In 1859, MR. GALT, as Finance Minister of Canada, found it necessary to secure an increase of revenue. The necessity was urgent. The gaping chasm of an annual deficit, which threatened to get wider and wider, had to be closed; at least it was imperative to make the attempt. Practically, there was but one resource: an increase of the traffic. This was obtained without in any way interfering with the Free List of the Reciprocity Treaty. A Canadian Opposition journal thereupon told the Americans that they ought to look on the raising of the Canadian tariff as a grievance; that they might well take the ground, that the spirit of the Treaty had been violated, and insist on bringing it to a termination before the expiration of the ten years, during which it was stipulated it should remain in existence. There had always been some American interests and a section of a political party opposed to the Treaty. The Canal interest of New York dreaded the diversion of trade to the St. Lawrence, which the freedom of that river invited; and the abolition party, with Mr. GREELEY, for their spokesman, desiring to add Canada to the Union as a counterpoise to the South, thought their object could best be attained by starving this country into compliance, through a refusal of reciprocity. This interest and this party at once seized upon the idea which Mr. BROWN had given them. They said he was right in suggesting that the raising of the Canadian tariff was in contravention of the spirit of the Treaty. They took steps to give effect to this idea as soon as possible, and succeeded in inducing the American Government to appoint MR. ISRAEL HATCH, who was thoroughly in their interest, to enquire into the operation of the Treaty and re-

port thereon. Lord LYONS, British Ambassador at Washington, in a despatch to Sir EDWARD HEAD, then Governor-General of Canada, adduced the clearest proof of the use to which Mr. BROWN's suggestion to the Americans had been put:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17th, 1860.
SIR.—With reference to the despatch which I had the honour to address to Your Excellency on the 6th instant, respecting the appointment of Mr. Israel H. Hatch, to inquire into matters connected with the United States Revenue establishments on the Canadian Frontier, I beg leave to enclose an article which appeared in the Washington newspaper, *Constitution*, of the day before yesterday, under the heading: *News and Miscellaneous Items*.

This article pretends to be derived, in substance, from the *Toronto Globe*, and to express Canadian sentiments on the Reciprocity Treaty. The writer seems to anticipate, and to be disposed in some sort to justify, the abrogation by the United States of that Treaty.

As the *Constitution* is the organ of President Buchanan's administration, and is in fact the official paper, I thought it right to express to General Cass, and to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Appleton, my disapproval of the article, and to request that it should have been allowed to appear in it.

Neither General Cass nor Mr. Appleton had observed the article; but Mr. Appleton, at my request, looked for it and read it. He pointed out to me that it appeared in a part of the paper not likely to be carefully perused, and said that it must have been inserted from inadvertence; he added that I might at all events assure Your Excellency that the Government were not to be regarded as acquiescing in the position whatever of the spirit of the United States Government.

I have &c., LYONS.
The Right Honourable SIR EDWARD HEAD, Bart, &c., &c., &c.

"Canadian sentiments of the Reciprocity Treaty."
"In noticing the appointment of Mr. Hatch by the President, to examine into the operation of the Reciprocity Treaty upon revenue and trade between Canada and the United States, there is no reason to suppose that the Canadian tariff is in violation of the spirit and intent of the Treaty, and operates injuriously to American interests. Consequently, the *Globe* anticipates a partial or total abrogation of the Treaty, although it was agreed that it should remain in force ten years. It is supposed that the United States will maintain the ten years' clause might be rightfully set aside, upon the ground, that the Treaty has been broken by the invasion of higher law; that we were contemplated by either party when the Treaty was entered into."—*Washington Constitution*.

MR. HATCH, who had been chosen as the instrument to elaborate Mr. BROWN's idea, did his work only too faithfully. He reported directly against the Treaty. The Americans did not, however, venture quite so far as their Canadian mentor had hinted they might go: they did not try to break up the Treaty till the ten years were over. It is nevertheless true that the first inception of American hostility to the old Reciprocity Treaty came from a Canadian source.

Let us follow Mr. BROWN's Reciprocity policy, after his suggestion to put an end to the Treaty of 1853, had been successful. He stated in his explanation in the House of Commons, June 15, 1866, that he had resigned his position as a member of the Coalition Government of 1854, "entirely on the question of Reciprocity." What around did he then take? That Canada should make no proposal for a renewal of Reciprocity; that "from them, (the Americans) and not from us, the suggestions must properly come—indeed could only come." (*Globe's Report*.) The American Government was willing to renew negotiations from Legislative Reciprocity; to stipulate that reciprocity should be arranged by legislation instead of resorting to a new Treaty. But Mr. BROWN and his journal would not accept the boon in this shape; and they (*Globe*, February 21, 1866) resorted to misrepresentation to defeat this new proposal, which came from the American Government; the only way: MR. BROWN had said, negotiations could properly be revived:

"Did any human being ever before hear of such a thing as Legislative Reciprocity? Was it ever named in this discussion until it was whipsawed in the ears of our delegates at Washington, and they fell victims to it? Did the mind of man ever before conceive such a mode of regulating the international trade of its states as being contingent to so each other and placing their relations upon a permanent and personal basis? How long could such an arrangement, under any circumstances, last? And what trade could be

ably prosecuted under so flimsy a pretext for its security? Who would put his money in any undertaking, the prospects of which rested on an arrangement that might be swept away in a week? Who would lay out his farm, who would put seed in the ground, who would raise flocks and herds for a market that might be closed to him at harvest time? What commercial advantage possibly derivable from Legislative Reciprocity could compensate for the political evils it would entail on the country?"—*Globe*, February 21, 1866.

The pretence that Legislative Reciprocity was a thing unheard of showed that MR. BROWN's cause required a resort to misrepresentation. On this question of American trade England had previously insisted on this very mode of proceeding, in preference to negotiation. In a despatch of MR. CANNING addressed to MR. GALLATIN, and bearing date, Jan. 27, 1827, the writer enters fully into the reasons which led the British Government to prefer offers of reciprocal legislation to any new attempts to bring about a mutual agreement on the subject of commercial intercourse by diplomatic arrangement. He was

"At a loss to understand on what ground it was assumed at Washington, that there would be, at all times, an unabated disposition on the part of the British Government to make the trade of its West India colonies the subject of diplomatic arrangement. The circumstances of the case were entirely changed. England had long since ceased to produce any material approximation of opinions on that subject."

"But an attempt at an adjustment had been made, with an evident conviction on both sides, that there existed between them an unconquerable difference of principle; and it was by that difference, rather than by any decided irreconcilability of interest, that a satisfactory arrangement was rendered hopeless. The nature of the difference has been sufficiently discussed; it lies in the determination of the United States to dispute, and in that of Great Britain to maintain the established distinction between general and colonial trade."

"Great Britain had, therefore, an obvious motive for doing whatever she might think right to do, in relation to the trade of her colonies, and in the immutability of her own legislation than by any compact with a state with which she disagreed in opinion, and which she considered as a colonial state. Indeed, that it would have been impossible to construct a preamble to a treaty on that subject, in the enumeration of which two so intersecting parties should have concurred."

"But there was yet another reason for avoiding further negotiations upon the subject. The *Ribbles*, when the trade with the West Indies had been open at all, it had been opened chiefly, though not exclusively, to the United States."

"To no other country had it been opened by specific and positive convention. But a time had now arrived, when, from motives of general policy, Great Britain thought it advisable to allow access to her colonies to all foreign powers, without exception, on conditions tendered alike to all. Such India-imposed opening could only be effected by some process common to all those who were invited to take advantage of it; impartiality was thus maintained towards all parties, and the power of control over our colonies was at the same time, retained in the hands of the Mother Country."

This policy of Legislative reciprocity, which MR. BROWN, in 1866, said had never been heard of before that year, even as a proposition, had proved entirely successful nearly forty years before. Here are the facts:

By the Imperial Act of 1825, foreign vessels were permitted to import into any of the British Provinces goods the produce of the countries to which they belonged, and to export them thence to any foreign country. But these privileges were to be conceded only on a compliance with the conditions of Reciprocity which formed the principle of the Act. The benefits of the measure were limited "to the ships of those countries which, having Colonial possessions, shall grant the like privilege of trading with those possessions to British ships; or which, not having Colonial possessions shall place the commerce and navigation of this country, and of its possessions, upon the footing of the most favoured nation."

In case any question should arise as to the construction of the Act, as to what constituted a complete compliance with its conditions, power was given to the Government to grant, by order in Council, some or all the privileges although the conditions had not, in all respects, been fulfilled. To the United

States the Act was partially applied: owing to a want of Reciprocity, on their part, some of the privileges were once withdrawn. In August, 1827, an order in Council was published in the *London Gazette*, notifying the American Government that, so far as they related to British possessions in the West Indies, South America, the Bahama Islands, the Bermuda or Somer Islands and Newfoundland, they would be withdrawn on the 1st of December, then ensuing; and on the western coast of Africa, Cape Colony, the Mauritius, the Island of Ceylon, New Holland and Van Diemen's Land, on the 1st of March, 1827.

The British offers of conditional reciprocity were not intended to be, and were not in fact, perpetual. Only a year was, at first, given for compliance; and no foreign country was to be deemed to have complied unless it did so by the 5th July, 1828. And when any foreign country complied, the fact was to be declared by order in Council.

The Americans finally accepted the proffered conditions, and repealed their discriminating tonnage and customs duties. Such was the effect of the legislative reciprocity inaugurated by England. MR. BROWN, to defeat a like proposal made by the American government, in 1866, condemned it as unheard of, untried, and a dangerous thing.

Besides, legislative reciprocity was not unknown to Canadian legislation. A mutual reduction of duties between Canada and France had, a few years before been carried into effect by legislation after prior arrangement.

Whether MR. BROWN has by force of these facts, established a claim to be considered a special advocate of reciprocity, the public can judge. The fishermen do not want the spurious sympathy so officiously offered to them on the opening of the shore fisheries to Americans. They are well content to share those fisheries on condition of having the American market opened to them. MR. POWELL's speech puts the question in its true light, and should forever silence the cavils of the self-constituted champions of the fishermen.

The approbation of the Treaty was more or less qualified by nearly all its advocates. They accepted it not because it is a perfect instrument, but because it is the best settlement that can be obtained. Those who urge the rejection of the Imperial policy on the Treaty should, if they desire to be consistent, undertake to show that they are in a position to carry out an antagonistic policy; to show that Canada is not only strong enough, but quite ready, to set up for herself, and to commence her independent career by wresting from the United States concessions which England has not been able to obtain. But in shrinking from the consequences of their own policy, they do but proclaim their charlatanry and want of statesmanship; as an anomaly of which, thinking men of all parties have not been slow to take note.

The following speeches tell their own story; they require neither explanation nor eulogy from us. Whoever peruse them with attention and without prejudice will, we are satisfied, agree with the majority of the Canadian House of Commons on the question of the Treaty, as shown by the division list.

THE V
Debate
at
Reports
tion by
ets Min
Wm. M
per, C.E
Tilley J
Campb
(Rep
On Frid
DONALD
MR. S
to bring
effect on
negotiated
and Crea
of the Bill
validity, as
the treaty
manner se
country. T
other day
causes of
fishermen
the inshore
to continue
I confined
cause the
was wh
of the
sanction
As, howev
otherwise d
fully on a
as, an exa
been laid
finic that
subjects
ktion—hav
Art, in c
make the
obligatory
so that in
during the
same cour
in, provid
pension of
as they pr
from fishi
also provid
the Treaty
the inland
the rivers
preserved
fisheries of
into Canada
provides a
bonding sy
longer peri
fourth clau
shipment of
Treaty shal
citizens of
istence of
Bill provid
whenever
clamation
giving effect
Bill in this
might be to
the ground
tions of tra
commenced
mittee of
not apply
those claus
Fishery Act
to the gen
provides th
and fishoil,
bonding sy
however, as
taken, beca

THE WASHINGTON TREATY.

Debate in the House of Commons at Ottawa, May, 1872.

Reports of Speeches delivered on the occasion by Sir John A. Macdonald; Sir Francis Hincks; Sir George E. Cartier; Hon. Wm. Macdougall, C.B.; Hon. Chas. Tupper, C.B.; Hon. J. H. Cameron; Hon. S. L. Tilley; Mr. McDonald, N.S.; Hon. Mr. Campbell, N.S.; and Mr. R. A. Harrison.

(Reprinted from the Daily Mail.)

On Friday, May 3rd, Sir JOHN A. MACDONALD rose and said:—

Mr. Speaker, — I move for leave to bring in a Bill to carry into effect certain clauses of the Treaty negotiated between the United States and Great Britain in 1871. The object of the Bill is stated in the title. It is to give validity, so far as Canada is concerned, to the treaty which was framed last year in the manner so well known to the House and country. The Bill I proposed to introduce the other day was simply a bill to suspend those clauses of the Fishery Acts which prevent fishermen of the United States from fishing in the inshore waters of Canada, such suspension to continue during the existence of the treaty. I confined it to that object at that time, because the question really before this House was whether the fishery articles of the treaty should receive the sanction of Parliament or not. As, however, a desire was expressed on the outside that I should enter into the subject fully on asking leave to bring in the bill, and as, on examining the cognate Act which has been laid before Congress at Washington, I find that all the subjects—even those subjects which do not require legislation—have been repeated in that Act, in order, one would suppose, to make the Act of the nature of a contract and obligatory during the existence of the Treaty, so that in good faith it could not be repealed during that time, I propose to follow the same course. The Act I ask leave to bring in, provides in the first clause, for the suspension of the Fishery laws of Canada, so far as they prevent citizens of the United States from fishing in our inshore waters. The Bill also provides, that during the existence of the Treaty fish and fish oil, (except fish of the inland lakes of the United States and of the rivers emptying into those lakes, and fish preserved in oil), being the produce of the fisheries of the United States, shall be admitted into Canada free of duty. The third clause provides for the continuance of the bonding system during the twelve years or longer period provided by the Treaty and the fourth clause provides that the right of transhipment contained in the 30th clause of the Treaty shall, in like manner, be secured to citizens of the United States during the existence of the Treaty. The last clause of the Bill provides that it shall come into effect whenever, upon an Order in Council, a proclamation of the Governor-General is issued giving effect to the Act. In submitting the Bill in this form, I am aware that objection might be taken to some of the clauses, on the ground that having relation to the questions of trade and money, they should be commenced by resolution adopted in Committee of the Whole. That objection does not apply to the whole of the Bill—to those clauses which suspend the action of our Fishery Act. But it would affect, according to the general principle, the clause which provides that there shall be no duty on fish and fish oil, and also the clauses respecting the bonding system and transhipment. I do not, however, anticipate that that objection will be taken, because in presenting the Bill in this

form I have followed the precedent established in 1854, when the measure relating to the Reciprocity Treaty was introduced in Parliament. It was then held that the Act, having been introduced as based upon a Treaty which was submitted by a message from the Crown, became a matter of public and general policy, and ceased to be merely a matter of trade; and, although those hon. gentlemen who interested themselves in parliamentary and political matters at that date will remember that the Act which was introduced by the Attorney-General for Lower Canada in 1854 (Mr. Drummond) was simply an Act declaring that various articles, being the produce of the United States, should, during the existence of the Treaty, be received free into Canada, and that the Act repealed the tariff *pro tanto*, it was not introduced by resolution, but after the Treaty had been submitted and laid on the table, and after a formal message had been brought down by Mr. Morin, the leader of the Government in the House, to the effect that the bill was introduced with the sanction of the Governor-General. I do not, therefore, anticipate that objection will be taken by any hon. member, and I suppose the precedent so solemnly laid down at that time will be held to be binding now. Should objection, however, be taken, the clauses of the bill respecting the suspension of the Fishery Act and transhipment are sufficient to be proceeded with in this manner; the other portion may be printed in *italic*, and can be brought up as parts of the bill or separately as resolutions, as may be thought best. The Journals of the House state that on the 21st of Sept., 1854, Mr. Chauveau submitted a copy of the Treaty which was set out on the face of the journals. On the same day Mr. Drummond asked leave to bring in a bill to give effect to a certain treaty between Her Majesty and the United States of America, and on the 22nd, on the order of the day for the second reading of the bill, Mr. Morin, by command, brought down a message from the Governor-General signifying that it was by His Excellency's sanction it had been introduced, whereupon the House proceeded to the second reading. That bill was simply one declaring that various articles mentioned in the treaty should, during the existence of the treaty, be admitted into this country free of duty. The House, now, Mr. Speaker, if they give leave that this bill shall be introduced, and read a first time, will be in possession of all of those portions of the Treaty of Washington that in any way come within the action of the Legislature. Although the debate upon this subject will, as a matter of course, take a wide range and will properly include all the subjects connected with the Treaty in which Canada has any interest, yet it must not be forgotten that the Treaty as a whole is in force, with the particular exceptions I have mentioned, and the decision of this House will, after all, be simply whether the articles of the Treaty extending from the 18th to the 25th shall receive the sanction of Parliament, or whether those portions of the Treaty shall be a dead letter. This subject has excited a great deal of interest, as was natural, in Canada ever since the 8th of May, 1871, when the Treaty was signed at Washington. It has been largely discussed in the public prints, and opinions of various kinds have been expressed upon it—some altogether favourable, some altogether opposed, and many others of intermediate shades of opinion. And among other parts of the discussion has not been forgotten the personal question—relating to myself—the position I hold and held as a member of the Government, and as one of the High Commissioners at Washington. Upon that question I shall have to speak by-and-by; but it is one that has lost much of its interest from the fact that by the introduction of this Bill the House and country will see that the policy of

the Government of which I am a member is to carry out, or try to carry out, the Treaty which I signed as a plenipotentiary of Her Majesty. Under the reservation made in the Treaty, this House and the Legislature of Prince Edward Island have full power to accept the fishery articles or reject them. In that matter this House and Parliament have full and complete control. (Hear, hear.) No matter what may be the consequences of the action of this Parliament; no matter what may be the consequences with respect to future relations between Canada and England, or between Canada and the United States, or between England and the United States; no matter what may be the consequences as to the existence of the present Government of Canada, it must not be forgotten that this House has full power to reject these clauses of the Treaty if they please, and maintain the right of Canada to exclude Americans from our inshore fisheries, as if the Treaty had never been made. (Hear, hear.) That reservation was fully provided in the Treaty. It was made a portion of it—an essential portion—and if it had not been so made the name of the Minister of Justice of Canada would not have been attached to it as a plenipotentiary of England. (Hear, hear.) That right has been reserved, and this Parliament has full power to deal with the whole question. I will by-and-by speak more at length as to the part I took in the negotiations, but I feel that that reservation having been made I only performed a duty—a grave and serious duty, but still my duty—in attaching my signature to the Treaty as one of Her Majesty's representatives and servants. (Hear, hear.) Now, Sir, let me enter into a short retrospect of the occurrences which transpired some years before arrangements were entered into for negotiating the Treaty. The Reciprocity Treaty with the United States existed from 1854 to 1866, in which latter year it expired. Great exertions were made by the Government of Canada and a great desire was expressed by the Parliament and people of Canada, for a renewal of that Treaty. It was felt to have worked very beneficially for Canada. It was felt to have worked also to the advantage of the United States, and there was a desire and a feeling that those growing interests which had been constantly developing and increasing themselves during the existence of the Treaty would be greatly aided if it were renewed and continued. I was a member of the Government at that time, with some of my hon. friends who are still my colleagues; and we took every step in our power, we spared no effort, we left no stone unturned, in order to gain that object. The House will remember that for the purpose of either effecting a renewal of the Treaty, or, if we could not obtain that, of arriving at the same object by means of concurrent legislation, my hon. friend, the member for Sherbrooke (Hon. Sir A. Galt) at that time Finance Minister, and the present Lieut.-Governor of Ontario went to Washington on behalf of the Government of Canada. It is a matter of history that all their exertions failed; and after their failure, by general consent—a consent in which I believe the people of Canada were as one man—we came to the conclusion that it would be humiliating to Canada to make any further exertions at Washington, or to do anything more in the way of pressing for a renewal of that instrument; and the people of this country with great energy addressed themselves to find other channels of trade, other means of developing and sustaining our various industries, in which I am happy to say they have been completely successful. (Hear, hear.) Immediately on the expiration of the Treaty our right to the exclusive use of the inshore fisheries returned to us, and it will be in the remembrance of the House that Her

Majesty's Government desired us not to resume that right, at least for a year, to the exclusion of American fishermen, and that the prohibition of Americans fishing in those waters should not be put in force either by Canada or the Maritime Provinces. All the Provinces, I believe, declined to accede to the suggestion, and it was pressed strongly on behalf of the late Province of Canada that it would be against our interests if for a moment after the Treaty ceased we allowed it to be supposed that American fishermen had a right to come into our waters as before; and it was only because of the pressure of Her Majesty's Government, and our desire to be in accord with that Government, as well as because of our desire to carry with us the moral support of Great Britain, and the material assistance of her fleet, that we assented, with great reluctance, to the introduction of a system of licences for one year at a nominal fee or rate. This was done avowedly by us for the purpose of asserting our right. No greater or stronger mode of asserting a right and obtaining the acknowledgment of it by those who desired to enter our waters for the purpose of fishing could be devised, than by exacting payment for the permission, and therefore it was that we assented to the licensing system. (Hear, hear.) Although in 1866 that system was commenced, it did not come immediately into force. We had not then fitted out a marine police force, for we were not altogether without expectation that the mind of the Government of the United States might take a different direction, and that there was a probability of negotiations being renewed respecting the revival of the Reciprocity Treaty, and therefore, although the system was established it was not rigidly put into force, and no great exertion was made to seize transgressors who had not taken out licences. In the first year, however, a great number of licences were taken out; but when the fee was increased so as to render it a substantial recognition of our rights, the payments became fewer and fewer, until at last it was found that the vessels which took out licences were the exception, and that the great bulk of the fishermen who entered our waters were transgressors. In addition to the fact that our fisheries were invaded, that we were receiving no consideration for the liberty, and that our rights were invaded boldly and aggressively, it was now stated by the American Government, or members of the American Cabinet, that the renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty was not only inexpedient but unconstitutional, and that no such renewal could or would be made. The Government of Canada then, in 1870, after conference with the Imperial Government, and after receiving the promise of the Imperial Government that we should have the support of their fleet in the protection of our just rights, a promise which was faithfully carried out, prepared and fitted out a sufficient force of marine police vessels to protect our rights, and I am glad to believe that that policy was perfectly successful. Great firmness was used, but at the same time great discretion. There was no harshness, and no seizures were made of a doubtful character. No desire to harass the foreign fishermen was evidenced, but on the contrary, in any case in which there was doubt, the officers in command of the seizing vessels reported to the head of their department, and when the papers were laid before the Government they, in all cases, gave the offending parties the benefit of the doubt. Still, as it would be remembered, some of the fishermen made complaints, which complaints, although unjust, I am sorry to say, were in some instances, were made and supported on oath, of harshness on the part of the cruisers, and an attempt was made to agitate the public mind of Canada, and it was at that time a feeling on the part of a large portion of the people of Nova Scotia, which feeling, I am however happy to say, has since disappeared, that the action of Canada was unfriendly. Her Majesty's Government were, of course, appealed to by the authorities of the United States on all these subjects, and complaints were bandied

from one Government to the other, and proved a source of great irritation. While this feeling was latent in the United States there was, on the other hand, a feeling among our fishermen that our rights were, to a very great degree, invaded. In order to avoid the possibility of dispute—in order to avoid any appearance of harshness—in order, while we were supporting our fishery rights, to prevent any case of collision between the Imperial Government and the United States, or between the Canadian authorities and the United States, we avoided making seizures with the bays or in any way bringing up the headland question. This was very unsatisfactory, because, as it was said by the fishermen, "if we have these rights we should be protected in the exercise of them," and it was therefore well that that question should be settled at once and for ever. In addition, however, to the question of headlands a new one had arisen of an exceedingly unpleasant nature. By the wording of the Convention of 1818, foreign fishermen were only allowed to enter our waters for the purposes of procuring food, water and shelter, but they claimed that they had a right, although fishing vessels, to enter our ports for trading purposes, and it was alleged by our own fishermen that, under pretence of trading, American fishermen were in the habit of invading our fishing grounds and fishing in our waters. The Canadian Government thought it therefore well to press, not only by correspondence, but by a delegate, who was a member of the Government, upon Her Majesty's Government, the propriety of having that question settled with the United States, and, consequently, my friend and colleague the Postmaster-General went to England to deal with that subject. The results of his mission are before Parliament. At the same time that he dealt with the question I have just mentioned, he forced upon the consideration of Her Majesty's Government the propriety of England making on our behalf a demand on the United States Government for reparation for the wrongs known as the "Fenian raids." England agreed to press upon the United States both these matters, and to ask that all the disputed questions relating to the in-shore fisheries, under the Convention of 1818, should be settled in some mode to be agreed upon between the two nations, and also to press upon the United States the wrongs sustained by Canada at the hands of citizens of the United States who had invaded our country. Before Her Majesty's Government had actually, in compliance with their promise, made any representation on these two subjects to the United States Government, England had been engaged on her own behalf in a controversy of a very grave character. The House is aware that what is commonly known as the *Alabama* claims was a subject of dispute between the two countries, involving the gravest consequences, and that, hitherto, the results had been most unsatisfactory. An attempt had been made to settle the question by what was known as the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, but that treaty had been rejected by the United States authorities. So long as this question remained unsettled between the two nations there was no possibility of the old friendly relations that had so long existed between them being resumed. I have said that it was of the first importance to her that those amicable relations should be restored. It was not only her desire to be in the most friendly position towards a country which was so closely associated with her by every tie, by common origin, by common interest, by common language, but it was also her interest to have every cloud removed between the two nations, because she had reason to feel that her position with respect to the other great powers of the world was greatly affected by the knowledge which those other nations had of the position of affairs between the United States and herself. The prestige of Great Britain as a great power was affected most seriously by the absence of an *entente cordiale* between the two nations. Two years ago England was, as a matter of course, greatly interested in the great and serious questions which were then convulsing Europe, and was in danger of being drawn by some complication into the hostile relations of some of the conflicting powers; and she felt—and I speak merely what must be obvious to every hon. member of the House—that she could not press or assert her opinion with the same freedom of action so long as she was aware, and as long as other nations were aware, that in case she should be unfortunately placed in a state of hostility with any nation whatever, the United States Government would be forced by the United States people to press the very time when she might be engaged in mortal conflict with another nation, for a settlement of those *Ala-*

bama claims. Hence, Mr. Speaker, the great desire of England, in my opinion, that that great question should be settled, and hence, also, the intermingling of the particular questions relating to Canada with the larger Imperial questions. And, Sir, in my opinion it was of greater consequence to Canada than to England, at least as a great consequence, that the *Alabama* question should be settled. (Cheers.) Sir, England has promised to us and we have all faith in that promise, that in case of war the whole force of the Empire shall be exerted in our defence. (Cheers.) What would have been the position of England, and what would have been the position of Canada, if she had been called upon to use her whole force to defend us when engaged in conflict elsewhere? Canada would, as a matter of course, in case of war between England and the United States, be the battle ground. We should be the sufferers. Our country would be devastated, our people slaughtered, and our property destroyed; and, while England would, I believe, under all circumstances faithfully perform her promise to the utmost (cheers), she would be greatly impeded in carrying out her desire, if engaged elsewhere. It was therefore as much the interest of this Dominion as of England that the *Alabama* and all other questions that in any way threatened the disturbance of the peaceful relations between the two countries should be settled and adjusted, and, therefore, although to a consistent policy I agree with the respects that fell from the Minister of Finance when he made his budget speech, that, looking at the subject in a commercial point of view, it might have been better in the interest of Canada that the Fishery and Fenian questions should have been settled free and apart from the Imperial question, I am pleased, and I was pleased, that the fact of Canada having asked the United States to make these demands upon the United States gave an opportunity for re-opening the negotiations with respect to the *Alabama* and other matters. It was fortunate that we made that demand, for England could not with due self-respect have insisted or re-opened the *Alabama* question. She had concluded a treaty in London with the representative of the United States, and that treaty, having been rejected by the supreme Executive of the United States, England could not herself have re-opened negotiations on the subject. And, therefore, it was fortunate, I say, for the peace of the Empire, and for the peace of Canada, that England was called upon to make demands upon the United States, as it afforded the opportunity of all these questions being made again the subject of negotiation. The correspondence which is before the House between the Secretary of State of the United States and the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, has shown how that result was arrived at. As the invitation was made by the British Ambassador, and as the fishery question, the United States Government, I have no doubt, though I do not know it as a matter of fact, by a quiet and friendly understanding between the two powers, replied, according to the request, on condition that the larger and graver matters of dispute were also made matters of negotiation. Hence it was, Sir, that the British Ambassador, when he signed the Treaty of Washington was satisfied, Sir, I have said that it was of the greatest consequence to Canada, and to the future peace and prosperity of Canada, that every cloud which threatened the peace of England and the United States should be dispelled. I was struck with an expression that was made to me by a distinguished English statesman, that the powers in Europe who are not so friendly to England heard with dismay that the *entente cordiale* between the two nations was to be renewed (hear, hear); and you have seen mentioned in the public press the active exertions that were made by one power, or by the representative of one power, for the purpose of preventing that happy result (hear, hear); and although Mr. Conness has been disavowed by the Government of Russia in the same way as poor Vivovich was on a previous occasion, when he was the organ of Russia in the East, I cannot but feel that he was punished only because his zeal outran his discretion. I can vouch for his active exertions for the purpose of preventing this Treaty of Washington, and the sanction of the Senate of the United States. (Hear, hear.) While England was strongly interested in the settlement of these questions, both for herself and for Canada, the United States were also interested, and made overtures in a most friendly spirit. I believe that there was a real desire on the part of the people of the United States to be friendly towards England. I believe that the feeling of irritation which had been

caused by the unhappy events of the war, and by the escape of the *Alabama*, had almost entirely disappeared, and I hope and believe that the people of the United States were then and are now strongly in favour of establishing permanently a friendly feeling between the two nations. Then, besides, they had a further interest in settling all matters in dispute; for so long as the United States and England were not on friendly terms—so long as they were standing aloof from each other—it affected very considerably the credit of the United States securities in Europe. Not only the funds of the United States as a whole, but the securities of every State of the Union, and of all American enterprises seeking the markets of the world were injuriously affected by the unsatisfactory relations between the two countries. They were, therefore, prepared to meet each other in this negotiation. To proceed with the history of the circumstances immediately preceding the formation of the Joint High Commission at Washington, I will state that on the 1st of February, 1871, a communication was made to me by His Excellency the Governor-General on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, asking me in case there was going to be a Joint Commission to settle all questions between England and the United States, whether I would act as a member of that Commission. I gave the date because it had been asked for. The communication was verbal and founded upon a telegraphic communication to His Excellency which contained the substance of being of a nature which the House can readily understand ought not properly to be laid before this House. This communication was, in the first place, for myself alone. I was not allowed to mention it for the time to any one else. My reply was that I would be greatly embarrassed by any intimation of secrecy towards my colleagues and asking me, under no circumstances would I accept the position without their consent. I subsequently received permission to communicate it to them, and I received their consent to act upon the Commission. Before accepting, however, I took occasion, for my own information and satisfaction, to ask through His Excellency the Governor-General whether there was any difference existed between England and Canada with regard to the fisheries. The answer was a very short one by cable, and it was satisfactory to myself. It was extended in the despatch of the 16th February, 1871. It shortly stated that of course it was possible for Her Majesty's Government to pledge themselves to any foregone conclusion; that was a matter for negotiation, and it was of course out of the question on the part of either Government to give cast-iron instructions to their representatives, because that would do away with every idea of a negotiation. The despatch went on to say that Her Majesty's Government considered our rights in the waters of the United States; that they also believed that our claims as to the headlands were just, but that those claims might properly be a matter of compromise. It went on further to state that Her Majesty's Government believed that, as a matter of strict right, we could exclude the American fishermen from entering our ports for purposes of trade and commerce, and that we could only enter our waters, in the language of the Treaty, "for wood, water, and shelter," but that this, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would be a harsh construction of the treaty, and might properly be a subject for compromise. On reading that despatch I could have no difficulty as a member of the Canadian Government in accepting the proposition to which my colleagues assented plenipotentiary to Washington, because, as a matter of law, our view of those three points was acknowledged to be correct, and the subject was therefore devoid of any embarrassment from the fact of Canadians setting up pretensions which Her Majesty's Government could not support (hear, hear.) When the proposition was first made to me, I felt considerable embarrassment and great reluctance to become a member of the Commission. I pointed out to my colleagues that I was to be one of five; that I was in a position if being overruled continually in our discussions and that I could not by any possibility bring due weight from my colleagues. I felt also that I should not receive from those who were politically opposed to me in Canada that support which an officer going abroad on behalf of his country generally received and had a right to expect. (Hear, hear.) I knew that I would be made a mark of attack, and this House well verified that my anticipations have been verified. I knew that I should not get fair play. I knew that the same policy that

had been carried out towards me for years and years would continue, and, therefore, it was a matter of great consideration for myself, whether to accept the appointment or not. In that position, Sir, a sense of duty prevailed (cheers), and my colleagues pressed upon me also that I would be wanting in my duty to my country if I declined the appointment—that if, from a fear of the consequences, from a fear that I would sacrifice the position I held in the opinion of the people of Canada, I should shrink the duty, I would be unworthy of the confidence that I had received so long from a large portion of the people of Canada. (Cheers.) "What," said my colleagues, "would be said, if in consequence of your refusal, Canada was not represented, and her interest in these matters allowed to go by default?" England, after having offered that position to the first Minister, and it having been refused by him, would have been quite at liberty to have proceeded with the Commission and the settlement of all these questions without Canada being represented on the Commission, and those very men who attack me now for having been there, and taken a certain course, would have been just as loud in their complaints, and just as bitter in their attacks, because I had neglected the interests of Canada, and refused the responsibility of asserting the rights of Canada at Washington. (Cheers.) Sir, knowing as I said before, what the consequences would be to myself of accepting the office, and facing the attacks that would be made upon me, I addressed a letter to His Excellency the Governor-General, informing him of the great difficulties of any position, and that it was only from a sense of duty that I accepted the position. On proceeding to Washington I found a general desire among the two branches into which the Joint High Commission was divided, to express a mutual desire, I should say, on the part of the United States Commissioners as well as on that of the British Commissioners—that all questions in dispute should be settled so far as the two Governments could do so. There was a special desire that there should be a settlement of everything. It was very rare that the Commissioners or the Government through their representatives to make a treaty, but in the United States there is a power above and beyond the Government; the Senate of the United States, which had to be considered. It was felt that a second rejection of a treaty would be most disastrous for the future of both nations; that it would be a solemn declaration that there was no prospect for solution of the questions between the two nations. An American statesman said to me, "the rejection of the treaty now means war." Not war to-morrow or at any given period, but war whenever England happens to be engaged in other troubles and attacked from other sources. (Hear, hear.) You may therefore imagine, Mr. Speaker, that I was, as you may well imagine, the solemn considerations pressing upon my mind, as well as upon the minds of my colleagues in Canada, with whom I was in daily communication, if by any unwise course, or from any rigid or preconceived opinions, we should risk the destruction for ever of all hope for a peaceful solution of the difficulties between these two great nations, that I was determined not to forget that I was their chosen representative. I could not ignore the fact that I was selected as a member of that Commission from my acquaintance with Canadian politics. I had continually before me not only the Imperial question but the interests of the Dominion of Canada, which I was there specially to represent; and the difficulty of my position was that if I gave undue weight to the interests of Canada, I might justly be held in England to be taking a purely colonial and selfish view, regardless of the interests of the Empire as a whole, and the interests of Canada as a portion of the Empire; and, on the other hand, if I kept my eye solely on Imperial considerations, I might be held as neglecting my special duty towards my country. Canada. It was a difficult position, as the House will believe, a position that pressed upon me with great weight and severity at the time, and it has not been diminished in any way since I have returned, except by the cordial support of my colleagues, and I believe also, of my friends in this House. (Cheers.) In order to show that I did not for a moment forget that I was there to represent the interests of Canada, I must ask you to look at the despatch of the 16th February, 1871, which reached me at Washington a few days after I arrived there. It will be seen that Lord Kimberley used this expression:—"As at present advised, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the rights of the British and American from fishing in the waters within

the limits is beyond an adequate consideration, it is more the more like a privilege, the suggestion is made and there is made a note through the college had recd from Her rights we could not advise all refer as to the range of her province of what was made the 10th I was so much concerned notice I which I the right but I too the British my own Canada, a Government at once the despatch that Her any into to part consent of that I table as that, it might be outvoted mission, by Her M of Canada her own decision. supposed session or ment. It in his de the Reel Acts of Wick Le were sure, as were not Act of B be necessary to one sent if Her M had cho the flow, the the United would rights that it beyond the records of the Canadian State rights dispute that I circum without any fair play England the com has no so the to come to the con inter the subject parti to the the c

the limit of three marine miles of the coast is beyond dispute, and can only be settled for a definite consideration. Should this consideration take the form of a money payment, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that such an arrangement would be more likely to work well than if any conditions were annexed to the exercise of the privilege of fishing within the Canadian waters." Having read that despatch, and the suggestion that an arrangement might be made on the basis of a money payment, and there being an absence of any statement that such an arrangement could only be made with the consent of Canada, I thought it well to communicate with my colleagues at Ottawa; and, although we had received again and again assurances from Her Majesty's Government that those rights would not be affected, given away or ceded without our consent, it was thought advisable, in consequence of the omission of all reference to the necessity of Canada's assent being obtained to any monetary arrangement, to communicate by cable that Canada considered the Canadian fisheries to be her property, and they could not be disposed of without her consent. That communication was made by the British Government on the 10th of March, and that that Government was so a member; and not only did that communication proceed from the Canadian Government to England, giving them fair notice that the Canadian Government, of which I was a member, would insist upon the right of dealing with her own fisheries, but I took occasion to present to the head of the British Commission at Washington, that my own individual opinion, as representing Canada, should be laid before Her Majesty's Government. The answer that came back at once by cable was extended in full in the despatch of the 17th March, 1871, and it was most satisfactory, as it stated that Her Majesty's Government had never any intention of giving up the right to part with those fisheries without the consent of Canada. Armed with this I felt that I was relieved of a considerable amount of embarrassment. I felt that, no matter what arrangements might be made, no matter whether I was outvoted by my colleagues on the Commission, or what instructions might be given by Her Majesty's Government, the interests of Canada were safe, because they were in her own hands and reserved for her own decision. Now, Mr. Speaker, it must not be supposed that this was not a substantial concession on the part of Her Majesty's Government. It is true that Lord Kimberley stated, in his despatch of 17th March, that when the Reciprocity Treaty was concluded, the Acts of the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Legislatures relating to the fisheries were suspended by Acts of those Legislatures, and that the fishery rights of Canada were now under the protection of a Canadian Act of Parliament, the repeal of which would be necessary in case of the cessation of those rights to any foreign nation. I do not know of any one who has denied that; but it is also true that if Her Majesty, in the exercise of her power, had chosen to make a Treaty with the United States, ceding not only those rights, but ceding the very land over which those waters flow, that the Treaty between England and the United States would have been obligatory and binding, and the United States would have held England to the matter, and that Canada after all her promises, still that Treaty would be a valid and obligatory Treaty between England and the United States, and the latter would have the right to enforce its provision, over-ride any Provincial laws or ordinances, and take possession of our waters and rights. It would have been a great wrong, but the consequence would have been the loss of our rights for ever; and so it was satisfactory that it should be settled, as it has been settled beyond a doubt, appearing upon the records of the Conference at Washington. Now, the recognition of the proprietary right of Canada in our fisheries forms a portion of the State papers of both countries. Now, the rights of Canada to those fisheries are beyond dispute, and it is finally established that England cannot and will not under any circumstances whatever, cede those fisheries without the consent of Canada; so that, in any future arrangement between Canada and England, or England and the United States, the rights of Canada will be respected, as it is conceded beyond dispute that England had not the power to deprive Canada of them; so that we may rest certain that, for all time to come, England will not, without our consent, make any cession of those interests. Now, Mr. Speaker, to come to the mode of treating the various subjects which interest Canada more particularly, I will address myself to them in detail; and, first, I will consider the question of most importance to us, the

one on which we are now specially asked to legislate, and which interests Canada, as I have just mentioned particularly, and which interests the Maritime Provinces especially—I mean the articles of the Treaty with respect to our fishery rights. I would, in the first place, say that the protocols which accompany the Treaty; and which are in the hands of every member, do not give, chronologically, an every day account of the transactions of the Conference. Although, as a general rule, I believe the protocols of such conferences are kept from day to day, it was thought better to depart from the rule on this occasion, and to record only the conclusions arrived at. While the protocols substantially contain the result of the negotiations ending in the Treaty, they must therefore not be looked upon as chronological dates of the facts and incidents as they occurred. I say so, because the protocol which relates more especially to the fisheries would lead me to suppose that at the first meeting, and without previous discussion, the British Commissioners stated "that they were prepared to discuss the question of the fisheries either in detail or generally, so as either to enter into an examination of the respective rights of the two countries under the Treaty of 1818 and the general law of nations, or to approach at once the settlement of the question on a comprehensive basis." Now, the fact is, that it was found by the British Commissioners, when they arrived at Washington and had an opportunity of ascertaining the feeling that prevailed at that time, not only among the fishery states of America, but among the public men of the United States, whom they met there, and from their communication with other sources of information, that the feeling was universal that all questions should be settled beyond the possibility of dispute in the future; and more especially that, if by any possible solution of the difficulty respecting the fisheries could be arrived at, a satisfactory arrangement made by which the fishery question could be placed in abeyance as in 1854, it would be to the advantage of both nations. It must be remembered that the Commission sat in 1871, and that the exclusion of American fishermen from our waters was enforced and kept up during the whole of 1870, and that great and loud complaint was unfounded, complaints had been made of American fishing vessels had been illegally seized, although they had not trespassed upon our waters. Per. was interested had been using every effort to arouse and stimulate the public mind of the United States against the people of the United States against Canada, and that the Canadian authorities; and it was felt and expressed that it would be a great bar to the chance of the Treaty being accepted by the United States if one of the causes of irritation which had been occurring a few months before should be allowed to remain unsettled. Collisions would occur between American fishermen and Canadian fishermen, and the latter resisting those claims that thereby feelings would be aroused, and all the good which might be effected by the Treaty would be destroyed by quarrels between man and man engaged on the fishing grounds. This feeling prevailed, and I, as a Canadian, knowing that the people of Canada desired, and had always expressed a wish to enter into a reciprocal arrangement with the United States, as stated to the British Commissioners; and they had no hesitation, on being invited to do so, in stating that they would desire by all means to remove every cause of discussion respecting these fisheries by the restoration of the old reciprocity treaty of 1854. An attempt was made, and that great and loud member, Sherbrooke (Sir, T. Galt) and Mr. Howland, both of Canada to renew that Treaty, but it failed, because the circumstances of the United States in 1865 were very different from what they were in 1854, and it appeared out of the question and impossible for the United States to agree to a Treaty with exactly the same provisions, and of exactly the same nature as that of 1854; so the British Commissioners, believing that a treaty similar to that of 1854 could not be obtained in words and in detail, thought that it might be obtained in spirit, and this view was strongly pressed upon the Joint Commission. This will appear from the protocol. It will also appear from the protocol that the United States Commissioners stated that the Reciprocity Treaty was out of the question; that it could not be accepted without being submitted to both branches of Congress; that there was not the slightest possibility of Congress passing such an act; that the agreement by the two Governments to a Treaty including provisions similar in spirit to the Treaty of 1854 would only insure the rejection of that Treaty by the Senate; and, therefore, that

some other solution must be found. I believe that the United States Commissioners were candid and were accurate in their view of the situation. I believe that had the Treaty contained all the provisions or the essential provisions of the Treaty of 1854 they would have ensured its rejection by the Senate. When I speak of the Conference that were held on the fisheries, I would state for the information of those members of the House who may be unacquainted with the use in such matters, that the Commissioners did not act at the discussion individually. The Conference was composed of two units—the British Commission and the United States Commission. If a question arose in conference on which either of the two parties, the British or American branch, desired to consult together, they retired, and submitted their views to their colleagues as a whole without reference to the individual opinions of the Commissioners. As an individual member of the British Commission, and on behalf of Canada, when it was found that we could not obtain a renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty, I urged upon my English colleagues that the Canadians should be allowed to adopt the exclusive enjoyment of the inshore fisheries, and that means should be used to arrive in some way or other at a settlement of the disputed question in relation to the fisheries, so as to settle the headland question and the other one relating to trading in our ports by American fishermen; and I would have been well satisfied, acting on behalf of the Canadian Government, if that course had been adopted by the Imperial Government; but Her Majesty's Government felt, and so instructed their Commissioners, and it was so felt by the United States Commissioners, that the leaving of the chance of collision between the American fishermen and the Canadian authorities a matter of possibility would destroy or greatly prejudice the great object of the negotiations, which was to restore the amicable relations and the friendly feeling between the two nations; and therefore Her Majesty's Government pressed that these questions should be allowed to remain in abeyance, and that some other settlement in the way of compensation to Canada should be formed. The protocol shows, Mr. Speaker, that the United States Government, through their Commissioners, made a considerable advance, or at least some advance, in the direction of reciprocity, because they offered to exchange for our inshore fisheries, in the first place, the right to fish in their waters, whatever that might be worth; and they offered to admit Canadian coal, salt, fish, and, after 1874, lumber, free of duty. This offer of reciprocity in these articles. On behalf of Canada, the British Commissioners said that they did not consider that that was a fair equivalent. (Hear, hear.) It is not necessary that I should enter into all the discussions and arguments on that point, but it was pointed out by the British Commissioners that already the United States had passed one branch of the Legislature of the United States making coal and salt free and stood ready to be passed by the other branch, the Senate. It was believed at that time that the American Congress for its own purpose and in the interest of American people was about to take the duty off those articles; and therefore the Commission could not be fairly considered as in any way a compensation, as Congress was going to take off the duty whether there was a Treaty or not. Then as regards the duty on lumber, which was offered to be taken off after 1874, we pointed out that nearly a third of the whole of the time for which the Treaty was proposed would exist without a single benefit to the duty could be taken off our lumber. The British Commissioners urged that that under those circumstances the offer could not be considered as a fair one and that Canada had a fair right to demand compensation over and above these proposed reciprocal arrangements. Now, Mr. Speaker, before that proposition was made, I was in communication with my colleagues in the Canadian Government, who were exceedingly anxious that the original object should be carried; that if we could not get Reciprocity as it was in 1854, that we should be allowed to retain our fisheries, and that the questions in dispute should be settled; but Her Majesty's Government, taking the strong ground that their acceding to our wishes would be equivalent to an abandonment of the Treaty, the Canadian Government reluctantly said that, from a desire to meet Her Majesty's Government's views as much as possible, and not to allow it to be felt in England that from a selfish desire to obtain all we desired, we had frustrated the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to secure peace, we consented that this proposition should be made. And, Sir, that proposition was made to the United

States. Although I do not know it as a matter of certainty, I have reason to believe that if it had not been for the action of this Legislature last session, we would now be passing an Act for the purpose of ratifying a Treaty in which coal and salt and lumber from Canada would be received into the United States free of duty. (Hear, hear.) I have reason to believe that had it not been for the interposition of this Legislature, and I speak now of political friends as well as foes, the Treaty which was offered by the United States would have been the compensation to have been settled by arbitration, and would have constituted a portion of the Treaty instead of it is now. (Applause.) I will tell the House why I say so. The offer was made early by the United States Government. The answer made by the British Commissioners was that, under the circumstances, it was not a fair and adequate compensation for the privileges that were asked, and the British Commissioners, at the suggestion of the Canadian Government, referred the question to Her Majesty's Government whether they ought not—in addition to this offer of the United States—to expect a pecuniary compensation, that pecuniary compensation to be settled in some way or other. That took place on the 25th March, 1871. On the 25th of March I think the final proposition was made by the United States Government, and on the 22nd March, two days before, the resolution was carried in this House, by which the duty was taken off coal and salt and the resolution was carried here. Before the resolution was carried here, no feeling was expressed against the taking off of the duty on Canadian coal and salt into the United States. No one raised any difficulty about it. I am as well satisfied as I can be of a thing which I did not see occur, that the admission of Canadian coal and salt into the United States would have been placed in the Treaty if it had not been for the action of this Legislature on the 25th March. (Hear, hear.) That offer was made, and it was referred to England. The Government stated that they quite agreed in the opinion that in addition to that offer there should be compensation in money, and then on the 17th April the American Commissioners withdrew their offer—as they had thought to do—altogether. And why did they withdraw the offer altogether? One of the Commissioners in conversation said to me, "I am quite surprised to find the opposition that has sprung up to the admission of Canadian coal and salt into our market; I was unprepared for the feeling that is exhibited." I know right well what the reason was. The monopolizers having the control of American coal in Pennsylvania and western New York, so long as the Treaty would open to them the market in Canada for their products, were quite willing that it should carry, because they would have the advantage of both markets; but when the duty was taken off in Canada, when you had opened the market to them, when they had the whole coast of Canada open to them, they had access to ours, whether for coal or salt, the monopolizers brought down all their energies upon their friends in Congress, and through them a pressure on the American Government, for the purpose of preventing the admission of Canadian coal and salt into the American market, and from that I have no doubt the withdrawal by the American Commissioners of their offer. When my friend from Bothwell (Mr. Mills) said last session: "There goes the Canadian national policy," the little was aware of the consequences of the reckless course he had taken. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Hon. gentlemen may laugh, but they will find it no laughing matter. The people of Canada, I think east and west, will not account those who acted so unparliamentarily in the matter. (Hear, hear.) Under these circumstances, Mr. Speaker, I felt myself powerless, and when the American Commissioners made their last offer, which is now in the Treaty, offering reciprocity in the fisheries—that Canadians should fish in American waters, and that Americans should fish in Canadian waters, and that fish and fish oil should be reciprocally free, and that if there should be an arbitration it were found that the bargain was an unjust one to Canada and that she did not receive sufficient compensation for her fisheries by that arrangement—I agreed that it should be remitted to Her Majesty's Government to say what should be done, as was the case with the last session of the Treaty. "The subject was further discussed in the conference of April 18th and 19th, and the British Commissioners having referred the last proposal to their Government and received instructions to accept the Treaty, articles 18 to 25 were agreed to at the conference on the 22nd April." Thus, then, it occurred that these articles from 18 to 25 are a portion of the Treaty. One of these

MR. MACKENZIE—Hear, hear. SIR JOHN MACDONALD—Myhon friend again says "hear, hear." I hope that he will say, and perhaps he will hear something he does not wish to hear. I am sure my hon. friend is right in the navigation of the River Yukon is growing trade, and that the Americans are now sending vessels, and fitting out steamers for the navigation of the Yukon. I will tell my hon. friend that at this moment United States vessels are going to that river, and are underselling the Hudson's Bay people in their own country. It is of the greatest importance to the western country that the navigation of these rivers should be open to the commerce of all British subjects, and that access should be had by means of all these rivers, that there is no necessity at all for the conical cheer of my hon. friend. Sir, I am glad to hear that the old Treaty of Commerce entered into between Russia and England, the former granted to the latter the free navigation of these streams and the free navigation of all the streams in Alaska, but that as a Treaty between Russia and England, and although it may be argued by England that when the United States bought that territory from Russia, it took it with all the obligations of Mr. Spenser, there are two reasons to that question. The United States, I venture to say, would hang an argument upon it, and I can only tell my hon. friend that the officers of the United States have exercised authority in the way of prohibition and obstruction, and have offered the pretext that the United States now hold the country, and that they will give any choice and will, and therefore, as this was a Treaty to settle all old questions and not to raise new ones, it is as well that the free navigation of the rivers I have mentioned should be settled once between England and the United States, as before it had been between England and Russia. Before leaving the question of the St. Lawrence, I will make one remark and will then proceed to another topic, and that is, that the Article in question does not in any way hand over or divide my proprietary rights in the River St. Lawrence, or give any sovereignty over it or confer any right whatever except that of free navigation. Both banks belong to Canada, and the management of the inland navigation of the River of Canada. The only stipulation made in the Treaty is that United States vessels may use the St. Lawrence on as free terms as those of Canadian subjects. It is not a transfer of territorial rights, it is simply a permission to "navigate" the river by American vessels, that navigation shall ever remain free and open for

purpose of commerce only—"to the citizens of the United States, subject to any taxes and regulations of Great Britain or of the Dominion of Canada, not inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation." Now, Mr. Speaker, I shall allude to one subject included in the Treaty, which relates to the navigation of our waters, although it was not contemplated in the instructions given to the British Commissioners by Her Majesty's Government—in fact, the subject was scarcely known in England—and that's what is known as the St. Clair Flats question. It is known that the waters of the River St. Clair and the waters of Lake St. Clair divide the two countries; that the boundary line which divides them is provided by Treaty; that the Treaty of 1842 provides that all the channels and passages between the islands lying near the junction of the river St. Clair with the lake shall be equally free to both nations, so that all those channels were made common to both nations, and are so now. Canada has made appropriations for the purpose of the improvement of these waters. There were also appropriations made—I forget whether by the United States, by the State of Michigan, or by private individuals—for the purpose of improving these waters, and the United States made a canal through the St. Clair Flats. The question then arose whether this canal was within Canadian territory or within that of the United States. I have no doubt that the engineering officer appointed by the United States to choose the site of the canal and to construct it, acted in good faith in choosing the site, believing that it was in the United States, and from all I can learn, subsequent observations proved that to be the case.

Mr. MACKENZIE—Hear, hear.

Sir JOHN MACDONALD—My hon. friend says "Hear, hear," and I have no doubt he will give us an argument, and an able one too, as he is quite competent to do, to show that the Treaty of this canal is in Canada. An argument might be founded in favour of that view from the language of the report of the International Commissioners appointed to determine the boundary between the two countries—that is, if we looked at the language alone and combined with that language the evidence of those accustomed to navigate those channels. I admit that an argument might be based on the language of the report when it speaks of the old ship channel, and that from the evidence and statements that have been made as to the position of that channel might have left it a matter of doubt whether the canal or a portion of it was within the boundary of Canada. The Commissioners not only made a report, but they added to it a map to which they placed their signatures, and to any one reading the report with the map, and holding the map as a portion of the report, the canal will appear to be entirely in the United States. It might, but for the Treaty of Washington, have been unfortunate that it is so, because it might perhaps have impeded the navigation of the Flats by Canadian vessels. But the question is whether under the old Treaty and the report and map made according to its provisions, (which report and map form, in fact, a portion of such Treaty) the canal is within the United States boundary or not. When the point was raised that the map was inconsistent with the report, Her Majesty's Government, I have no doubt under the advice of Her Majesty's legal advisers, said it was a point that would not admit of argument, that the two explained and defined the meaning of the language of the report, so that Her Majesty's Government declined to argue a proposition so unworthy of being urged, that the map was not binding or obligatory upon them. But, Sir, "out of the nettle danger we pluck the flower safely." The House will see by looking at the clause referred to, that it is a matter of no consequence whether the canal is in the United States or Canada; because for all time to come the canal is to be used by the people of Canada on equal terms with the people of the United States. In the speech of my hon. friend to which I have referred, he says that the canal is only secured to Canada during the ten years mentioned with reference to the fishery articles of the Treaty. I say it is secured for all time, just as the navigation of the St. Lawrence is given for all time. The United States have gone to the expense of building the canal, and now we have the free use of it. If the United States put on a toll there, we pay no greater toll than United States citizens, and it is of the first and last advantage to the commerce of both nations that the deepening of these channels should be done with, and I can tell my hon. friend moreover, that in this present Congress

there is a measure to spend a large additional sum of money on this canal out of the revenues of the United States for that object. So much for the St. Clair Flats. Now, Sir, as to some of the other subjects which have been gained by the Treaty. I would call the attention of the House to the 29th article, which ensures for the whole time of the existence of the Treaty, for twelve years at least, the continuance of "the bonding system." We know how valuable that has been to us, how valuable during the winter months when we are deprived of the use of our own harbours, and the St. Lawrence. The fact that the American press has occasionally called for the abolition of the system is a proof of the boon which they consider it to be. They have said, at times when they thought an unfriendly feeling existed towards them in Canada, that if Canadians would be so imprudent as they should be deprived of this system and allowed to remain copped up in their frozen country. If the United States ever conceived the folly of injuring their carrying trade by adopting a hostile policy in that respect—and they have occasionally, as we know, adopted a policy towards us adverse to their commercial interests—they could do so before this Treaty was ratified. They cannot do so now. For twelve years we have a right to the bonding system from the United States, over all their avenues of trade, and long before that time expires, I hope we shall have the Canadian Pacific Railway reaching to the Pacific Ocean, and with the Intercolonial Railway reaching to Halifax, we shall have an unimpeded line of one seaboard to the other. (Cheers.) This Sir, is one of the substantial advantages that Canada has obtained by the Treaty. Then, Sir, the 30th article conveys a most valuable privilege to the railways of Canada, that are running from one part of the country to another; and I must take the occasion to say that if this has been taken upon the consideration of the American Government and the American Commissioners at Washington, much of the merit is due to the hon. member for Lincoln (Mr. Merritt.) He it was who supplied me with the facts; he it was who called attention to the great wrong to our trade by the Act of 1861, and, impressed by him with the importance of the subject, I was enabled to urge the adoption of this article, and to have it made a portion of the Treaty. Now, Sir, that this is of importance you can see by reading the Buffalo papers. Some time ago they were crying out that entrance had been made by this wedge which was to ruin their coasting trade, and that the whole coasting trade of the lakes was being handed over to Canada. Under this clause, if we choose to accept it, Canadian vessels can go to Chicago, can take American produce from American ports, and carry it to Windsor or Collingwood, or the Welland Railway, or any other American port, and can be in bond from those and other points along our railways, giving the traffic to our vessels by water and our railway by the land to Lake Ontario, and can then be re-shipped by Canadian vessels to Oswego, Ogdensburg, or Rochester, or other American ports, so that this clause gives us in some degree, of relaxation of our extreme, almost harsh, exclusive coasting system of the United States. (Hear, hear.) And I am quite sure that, in this age of railways, and when the votes and proceedings show that so many new railway undertakings are about to start, that this will prove a substantial improvement on the former state of affairs. There is a provision that, if in the exercise of our discretion we choose to put a differential scale of tolls on any vessels passing through our canals, and if New Brunswick should continue her export duties on lumber passing down the River St. John, the United States may withdraw from this arrangement; so that it will be hereafter, if the Treaty be adopted, and this Act passed, a matter for the discretion of the Government of Canada in the first place, and of the Legislature in the next, to determine whether it is expedient for them to take advantage of this boon that is offered to them. As to the expediency of their doing so I have no doubt, and I have no doubt Parliament will eagerly seek to gain and establish those rights for our ships and our railways. (Hear, hear.) The only subject of peculiar interest to Canada in connection with the Treaty—the whole of it of course is interesting to Canada as a part of the Empire—but speaking of Canada as such, and of the interest taken in the Treaty locally—the only other subject is in a manner of disposing of the San Juan boundary question, which is settled in a way that no one can object to. I do not know whether many hon. members

have ever studied that question. It is a most interesting one, and has long been a cause of controversy between the two countries. I am bound to uphold, and I do uphold, the British view with respect to the channel which forms the boundary, as the correct one. The United States Government were, I believe, as sincerely convinced of the justice of their own case. Both believed they were in the right; both were firmly grounded in that opinion, and such being the case there was only one way out of it, and that was to have it to be settled by impartial arbitration. I think that it might be said that no more distinguished arbitrator could have been selected than the Emperor of Germany. In the examination and decision of the question he will have the assistance of as able and eminent jurists as any in the world, for there is nowhere a more distinguished body than the jurists of Germany, who are especially familiar with the principles and practice of international law. Whatever the decision may be, whether for England or against it, you may be satisfied that you will get a most learned and careful judgment in the matter, to which we must bow, if it is against us, and to which, I am sure, the United States will bow if it is against them. (Hear, hear.) I think, Sir, I have now gone through all the articles of interest connected with Canada. I shall now allude to one omission from it, and then I shall have done, and that is the omission of allusion to the settlement of the Fenian claims. That Canada was deeply wronged by those outrages, known as the Fenian raids, is indubitable. England has admitted it, and we all feel it. We felt deeply grieved when those raids were committed, and the belief was general, in which, I must say, I share, that sufficient vigilance and due diligence were not exercised by the American Government to prevent the organization within their territory of bands of armed men openly hostile to the Government of England, and an end to incursions by men who carried war over our border, slew our people, and destroyed our property. It was, therefore, proper for us to press upon England to seek compensation at the hands of the American Government for these great wrongs. As a consequence of our position as a colony we could only do it through England, and had no means or authority to do it directly ourselves, and consequently we urged our case upon the attention of England, and she consented to open negotiations with the United States upon the subject. In the instructions it is stated that Canada had been invited to send in a statement of her claims to England, and that it had not done so, and I dare say it will be charged—indeed I have seen it stated in some of the newspapers—that that was an instance of Canadian neglect. Now, it is not an instance of Canadian neglect, but an instance of Canadian caution. (Hear, hear.) Canada had a right to press for the payment of those claims, whatever amount they might be, and money to repel the incursions had been taken out of the public treasury of Canada, and had to be raised by the taxation of the country. Not only had they a right to press for that amount, but every individual Canadian who suffered in person or property, because of those raids, had rights to compensation. It was not for them to be asked to put a limit to those claims and to state what amount of money would be considered as a satisfactory liquidation of them. It has never been the case when Commissions have been appointed for the settlement of such claims to hand in those claims in detail before the sitting of the Commission. What has happened is that the principle should be established, that the demand should be made by England upon the United States, that that demand should be acquiesced in, that the question of damages should be referred to a tribunal like that now sitting at Washington for the investigation of claims connected with the civil war in the South, the time should be given within which the Canadian Government and every individual Canadian who suffered by those outrages, should have an opportunity of filing their claims, of putting in an account, and of offering proof to establish their right to indemnity. The Canadian Government carefully avoided, by any statement of their views, the placing of a limit upon those claims in advance of examination by such a commission, and I think the House and country will agree that we acted with due discretion in that respect. (Hear, hear.) Now, one of the protocols will show the result of the demand for indemnity. The demand was made by the British Commissioners that this question should be referred to a tribunal of arbitration, the Commission, but the United States Government refused, taking the ground that the consideration

of these claims was not included in the correspondence and reference. In doing that they took the same ground that my hon. friend the member for Sherbrooke, with his usual acuteness and appreciation of the value of language, took when the matter was discussed in this House before my departure for Washington. He said then that he greatly doubted whether, under the correspondence which led to the appointment of the High Commission, it could be held that the Fenian claims were to be considered, and although my hon. friend the Minister of Militia, though far from it, might fairly have held that those claims were included, I myself could not help feeling the strength of the argument advanced by the hon. member for Sherbrooke, and I stated at the time that I thought there was great weight in the objection which he pointed out. The American Commissioners, as the event proved, raised that objection, maintaining that the point was not included in the correspondence in which the subjects of deliberation were stated, and when it was proposed to them by the British, the American Commissioners declined to ask their Government for fresh instructions to enlarge the scope of their duty in that respect. Now we could not help that. There was the correspondence to speak for itself, and it was a matter of considerable doubt whether those claims were included in it. The British Ambassador represented that he had always thought that the correspondence did include them, and he was struck with surprise—perhaps I ought not to say surprise, but he was certainly surprised at the impression that it had been regarded by all parties that they were covered by the correspondence. Still, let any one read those letters, and he will find it is very doubtful. As it was doubtful, and as objection was raised on that ground, the British Commissioners had no power, as the American Commissioners to determine the doubt in their favour, and force these claims upon their consideration. The consequence was that they were omitted from the deliberation of the Commission. Whose fault was that? Certainly not ours. It was the fault of Her Majesty's Government in not demanding in due language, in terms which could not be misunderstood, that the investigation of these claims should be one of the matters dealt with by the Commission. (Hear, hear.) It was a great disappointment to my colleagues in Canada that the objection was taken, and that all hope of getting redress for the injury done by those Fenian raids was destroyed. The American Government at Washington was concerned, in consequence of the defective language of the correspondence, and the defective nature of the submission to the Commissioners. Now, England was responsible for that error. England had promised to make the demand, and England had failed to make it. Not only that, but Her Majesty's Government took the responsibility of withdrawing the claims altogether, and Mr. Gladstone fully assumed all the responsibility of this step, and relieved the Canadian Government from any share in it, when he stated openly in the House of Commons that the Imperial Government had seen fit to withdraw the claims, but that they had done so with great reluctance and sorrow for the manner in which Canada had been treated. Canada, therefore, had every right to look to England for that satisfaction which she failed to receive through the inadequacy of the correspondence to cover the question. England, by taking the responsibility of declining to push the claims, put her, if in the position of the United States, in a very fair and reasonable right to look to her to assume the responsibility of settling them. She did not decline that responsibility, and the consequence has been that, although we failed to obtain redress from the United States for those wrongs, we have had an opportunity of securing compensation from England which would not have been offered to us if it had not been for the action taken by this Government. (Hear, hear.) But, Sir, we are told that it is a great humiliation for Canada to take this money, or rather this money's worth. Why, it is our due; we are entitled to it, and we must have it from some one. England refused to ask it for us from the United States, and she accepted the responsibility which that refusal involved. She was wise in accepting that responsibility. She must take the consequences, and she is willing to do so. But the Canadian Government, on the other hand, are unwilling that the compensation which England thus acknowledged was due to us, but she should take a direct and open way of settling it, willing that it should be the payment of a cer-

not included in the cor-
rence. In doing that
ground that my hon.
Sherbrooke, with his
appreciation of the value
of the matter, was dis-
satisfied before my depart-
ure said that he had
other, under the cor-
re to the appointment
it could be held that
re to be considered, and
friend the Minister of
it might fairly be
was included. I
help feeling the
argument advanced
for Sherbrooke, and I
I thought there was
objection which his
American Commissioners,
raised that objection.
point was not includ-
ed in which the sub-
ject was stated, and when it
was the British, the Ameri-
cans declined to ask their
instructions to enlarge
duty in that respect.
I said that. There was
a question for itself, and
I made a double doubt whether
it could be included in it. The
represented that he
that the correspond-
ent, and he was struck
I thought not to say
not the expression
was certainly under
it, but their pocket, and
farthing to pay it. (Cheers.) At the
time the Imperial Government, by giving us
this guarantee, grants us a boon the value
of which, in enabling us to construct, the
great works of public improvement we have
undertaken, was explained the other day so
ably, and in a manner that I would not
attempt to do. By my hon. friend
the Finance Minister. Besides the double
advantage to ourselves in getting the
endorsement of England without disadvantage
to the English people, there is to be considered
the great, the enormous benefit that accrues
to Canada from this open avowal on the part
of England of the interest she takes in the
success of our great public enterprises.
(Cheers.) No one can say now, when she send-
ing out one of her distinguished statesmen
to take the place of the nobleman who now
so worthily represents Her Majesty in the Do-
minion—no one can say, when England isaid-
ing us, endorsing a loan spreading over so
many years, and which will not be finally ex-
tinguished till most of us are here, will they
be gathered to our fathers, that one can
say, under these circumstances, that she has
any idea of separating herself from us and
giving up the colonies. (Cheers.) The
solid, substantial advantage of being able to
obtain money on better terms than we could
on our own credit alone is not the only ben-
efit that will result from this, for it
will put a finish upon the hopes of all
dreamers or speculators who desire or be-
lieve in the alienation and separation of the
colonies from the mother country. That is
a more incalculable benefit than the mere
advantage of England's guarantee of our
financial stability—great and important as
it is. (Loud cheers.) And, but it is said
that it is a humiliation to make a bargain of
this kind! Why, Sir, it was no humiliation
in 1841 to obtain an Imperial guarantee for
the loan necessary to construct the canals
originally. It was not considered a humili-
ation to accept a guarantee for £1,400,000 in
1865 for the purpose of building
fortifications; nor was it a humiliation
to obtain £4,000,000 upon a similar
guarantee to construct the Intercolonial
Railway. Why is it a humiliation, then, in
this case to accept the guarantee, when
England voluntarily comes forward and ac-
cepts the responsibility for withdrawing our
claims in respect to the Fenian raids? It was
by no prompting from us that that responsi-
bility was assumed, for Mr. Gladstone rose
of his own motion in the House of Commons
and by accepting the responsibility admitted
that it should take a tangible shape. It did
take such a shape, and I say a most satis-
factory shape, in the guarantee of £2,500,000
immediately, and we may say of £4,000,000
in all ultimately. (Cheers.) But I hear
it objected that Canada ought not
to have made a bargain
She should have allowed the Fenian claims to
go, and dealt with the Treaty separately, ac-
cepting or rejecting it on its merits. Sir,
Canada did not make a bargain of that kind;
but she went fairly and openly to Her Ma-
jesty's Government, and said, "Here is a
Treaty that has negotiated through
your influence, and which affects important
commercial interests in this country. It is

unpopular in Canada in its commercial
aspect, but is urged on us for Imperial
claims and for the sake of the peace of the
Empire; but the pecuniary interests of Can-
ada should be in the opinion of the Canadian
Government be considered, and the undoubted
claim of Canada for compensation for the Fenian
raids has been set aside. We may
well, therefore, call upon you to strengthen
our hands by showing that you are unwilling
to sacrifice Canada altogether for Imperial
purposes solely." Sir, we asked that for
Canada, and the response was immediate and
gratifying, except that England did not ac-
cept the whole of our proportion to guaran-
tee a loan of £4,000,000. But I am as cer-
tain as I am standing in this House, and I am
not speaking without book, that, had it
not been for the unfortunate cloud that
arose between the United States and En-
gland, which threatened to interrupt the
friendly settlement of all questions
between them, but which I am now happy
to speak of as having passed away, I think
more good and prove of infinitely greater
advantage than any amount of mere money
compensation we could reasonably expect.
This was a mode of disposing of the question
in the highest degree satisfactory to both coun-
tries, and one which does not in the least com-
promise our dignity or our self-respect.
(Hear, hear.) The credit of Canada, thank
God, is well established. Her good faith is
known wherever she has had financial deal-
ings. Her Majesty's Government can go to
the House of Commons and ask for authority
to guarantee a Canadian loan with a well-
grounded assurance that the people of En-
gland will never be called upon to put their
hands to their pockets, but that they will be
farthing to pay it. (Cheers.) At the same
time the Imperial Government, by giving us
this guarantee, grants us a boon the value
of which, in enabling us to construct, the
great works of public improvement we have
undertaken, was explained the other day so
ably, and in a manner that I would not
attempt to do. By my hon. friend
the Finance Minister. Besides the double
advantage to ourselves in getting the
endorsement of England without disadvantage
to the English people, there is to be considered
the great, the enormous benefit that accrues
to Canada from this open avowal on the part
of England of the interest she takes in the
success of our great public enterprises.
(Cheers.) No one can say now, when she send-
ing out one of her distinguished statesmen
to take the place of the nobleman who now
so worthily represents Her Majesty in the Do-
minion—no one can say, when England isaid-
ing us, endorsing a loan spreading over so
many years, and which will not be finally ex-
tinguished till most of us are here, will they
be gathered to our fathers, that one can
say, under these circumstances, that she has
any idea of separating herself from us and
giving up the colonies. (Cheers.) The
solid, substantial advantage of being able to
obtain money on better terms than we could
on our own credit alone is not the only ben-
efit that will result from this, for it
will put a finish upon the hopes of all
dreamers or speculators who desire or be-
lieve in the alienation and separation of the
colonies from the mother country. That is
a more incalculable benefit than the mere
advantage of England's guarantee of our
financial stability—great and important as
it is. (Loud cheers.) And, but it is said
that it is a humiliation to make a bargain of
this kind! Why, Sir, it was no humiliation
in 1841 to obtain an Imperial guarantee for
the loan necessary to construct the canals
originally. It was not considered a humili-
ation to accept a guarantee for £1,400,000 in
1865 for the purpose of building
fortifications; nor was it a humiliation
to obtain £4,000,000 upon a similar
guarantee to construct the Intercolonial
Railway. Why is it a humiliation, then, in
this case to accept the guarantee, when
England voluntarily comes forward and ac-
cepts the responsibility for withdrawing our
claims in respect to the Fenian raids? It was
by no prompting from us that that responsi-
bility was assumed, for Mr. Gladstone rose
of his own motion in the House of Commons
and by accepting the responsibility admitted
that it should take a tangible shape. It did
take such a shape, and I say a most satis-
factory shape, in the guarantee of £2,500,000
immediately, and we may say of £4,000,000
in all ultimately. (Cheers.) But I hear
it objected that Canada ought not
to have made a bargain
She should have allowed the Fenian claims to
go, and dealt with the Treaty separately, ac-
cepting or rejecting it on its merits. Sir,
Canada did not make a bargain of that kind;
but she went fairly and openly to Her Ma-
jesty's Government, and said, "Here is a
Treaty that has negotiated through
your influence, and which affects important
commercial interests in this country. It is

Canada. If England has sacrificed the in-
terests of Canada, what sacrifice has she
not made herself in the cause of peace? Has
she not, for the sake of peace between these two
great nations, rendered herself liable, leaving
out all indirect claims, to pay millions out of
her exchequer? Has she not made all
this sacrifice, to only Englishmen and
English statesmen can know, for the sake
of peace, and for whose good has she made it?
Has she not made it principally for the sake
of Canada. (Loud cheers.) Let Canada be
served from England—let England not be
responsible to us for us—and what could
she do for the United States? Let En-
gland withdraw herself into her shell and
what can the United States do? England
has got the supremacy of the sea. She is
impregnable in every point but one, and that
point is Canada; and if England does call
upon us to make a financial sacrifice, does
find it for the good of the Empire
that we, England's first colony, should
not speak anything away, I say that we
would be unworthy of our proud position
if we were not prepared to do so. (Cheers.)
I hope to live to see the day, and if I do
not that my son may be spared
to see Canada the right arm of
England—(cheers)—to see Canada a power-
ful auxiliary to the Empire, not as now a
cause of anxiety and a source of danger,
and I think that, if we are worthy to hold
that position as the right arm of England,
we should not object to a sacrifice of this
kind when so great an object is attained,
and the object is a great and lasting one.
It is said that amities between nations cannot
be perpetual. I say that this Treaty, which
is going to remove so many difficulties and
angers, if it is carried into effect, removes
almost all possibility of war. If ever there
was an irritating cause of war it was from the
occurrences arising out of the escape of those
vessels, and when we see the United States
people and Government forget their irritation,
forget those occurrences, and submit such a
question to arbitration, to the arbitration
of a disinterested tribunal, they have
established a principle which can never
be forgotten in this world. No future ques-
tion is ever likely to arise that will cause such
great irritation as the escape of the *Alabama*
did, and if they could be got to agree to
leave such a matter to the peaceful arbitrament
of a friendly power, which will have a
cause of quarrel can in the imagination of man
occur, that will not bear the same pacific solu-
tion that is sought for in this? I believe
that this Treaty is an epoch in the history
of civilization; that it will set an example
to the whole world that must be followed;
and with the growth of the great Anglo-
Saxon family, and with the development
of that right reason to the south, I believe
that the principle of arbitration will be
advocated and adopted as the sole principle
of settlement of differences between the En-
glish speaking peoples, and that it will have
a moral influence in the world; and
although it may be opposed to the anteceden-
tary of other nations, that great moral prin-
ciple now being established, that the Anglo-
Saxon family will spread itself over all
the civilized world. (Cheers.) It is not much
to say that it is a great advance in the history
of mankind, and I should be sorry if it were
recorded that it was stopped for a moment
by a selfish consideration of the interests of
Canada. Had the Government of Canada
taken the course which was quite open to
them to recommend Parliament to reject
these articles, it might have been a matter of
some interest as to what my position would
have been. I am here, at all events, advocat-
ing the ratification of the Treaty, and I
may say, notwithstanding the taunts of hon.
members opposite, that although I was
chosen for the position of a Commissioner,
certainly because I was a Canadian, and
presumably because I was a member
of the Canadian Government, yet my com-
mission was given to me as a British
subject, as it was to Sir Stafford North-
cote and other members of the Commission.
I went to Washington as a plenipotentiary,
Her Majesty's servant, and was bound by
Her Majesty's instructions, and I believe
have been guilty of dereliction of duty if I
had not carried out those instructions. And,
Sir, when I readily joined under the circum-
stances in every word of that Treaty with
the exception of the fishery articles; and
when I succeeded in having inserted in
the Treaty a reservation to the Government
of the United States of Canada, on all rights
except or refuse that portion of it, I had no
difficulty as to my course. (Cheers.) I did
not hesitate to state that, if that clause had
not been put in, I would have felt it neces-
sary to resign my commission. I was
perfectly aware in taking the course I did
of signing the Treaty that I should be sub-
ject to reproach. I wrote to my friends in
Canada, from Washington, that well I knew

the storm of obloquy that would meet me
on my return, and before even I crossed
the border I was complimented with
the names of "Judas Iscariot," "Bene-
dict Arnold," &c. The whole vocabu-
lary of Billingsgate was opened against me,
but here I am, thank God, today with the
conviction that what I did, was for the best
interests of Canada, and after all the benefits
I have received at the hands of my country-
men, and after the confidence that has been
accorded me for so many years, I would
have been unworthy of that position and that
confidence if I were not able to
meet reproach for the sake of my
country. I have met that reproach and I
have met it in silence. I knew that a pre-
mature discussion would only exasperate
still more the feelings of those who
were arrayed against me, and of those
who think more of their party than
their country. (Loud cheers.) I do not
speak particularly of this, for gentleness of
position, but I say that the policy of the Opposi-
tion is regulated by "a power behind the
throne" which dictate what policy must
be. (Loud cheers.) No one ever saw a
patriotic policy emanate from that source
except on one occasion, and that was when
that source was induced by myself to forget
party struggle and to give feelings for the
common good of the country. (Loud cheers.)
I have not said a word for twelve months;
I have kept silence to this day, thinking it
better that the subject should be discussed
on its own merits. However, I was watch-
ing! If the Government should come out in
favour of the Treaty, then it was to be taken
as being a betrayal of the people of Canada.
If they should come out against the Treaty,
then the first Minister was to be
charged with opposing the interests of the
Empire. Whichever course we might take
they were lying in wait ready with some
mode of attack. But silence is golden,
Mr. Speaker, and I kept silence. I believe
the sober second thought of this
country, according to the soundest
thought of the Government, and we
came down here and ask the people of
Canada, through their representatives, to
accept this Treaty; to accept it with
all its imperfections; to accept it
for the sake of peace, and for
the sake of the great Empire of which we
form a part. I now beg leave to introduce
the Bill, and to state that I have the per-
mission of His Excellency to do so.
The hon. gentleman resumed his seat
amid loud and continued applause from
all parts of the House, at 9:45, having spoken
for 10 hours and a quarter.

In the House, on Wednesday, May 8th,
Mr. MACDOUGALL said that, from the
peculiar position he occupied towards par-
ties in this House, he felt bound at the ear-
liest opportunity to state the views which he
entertained with respect to the course that
ought to be pursued upon the ratification of
the Minister of Justice, and the second reading
of this bill. With regard to the amendment
that had been offered by the hon. member
for West Durham, he judged from the tenor
of the speech with which it had been pre-
faced, and from the language in which it
was couched, that it amounted practi-
cally to a declaration that this
House should reject the Treaty of
Washington. (Hear, hear.) Now, from the
first day on which he (Mr. Macdougall)
had had an opportunity of perusing
and considering the provisions of that treaty,
he had come to the conclusion in his own
mind, without any hesitation, without
any doubt—and he had had opportunities
of knowing something of the discussions
that had preceded the important delibera-
tions which resulted in the treaty—that
it would be his duty as a
representative of the people in this House to
give his support to the treaty. He believed
upon examination of its various clauses and
conditions, that it was a treaty framed in the
interest of the people of this country, apart
altogether from the questions which had been
discussed as to much length and with such ability
by the hon. gentleman who had preceded him
(Hear, hear.) After all the discussion that
had taken place upon it, after all the opin-
ions that had been expressed in this House
and the country, after all that had been said
about it by the public press of England and
the United States, and after all the discussion
after every point had been fully brought out
that could be suggested, his firm, deliberate
conviction was that the treaty made between
England and the United States was, so far
as the clauses which affected the
people of this country were concerned,
a good, a desirable, and a beneficial
treaty. (Cheers.) That was the only
entertainment, and it was not one which would

course which the hon. gentleman had pursued, and that those who on the Opposition side of the House, arraigned him in their heart of hearts had no doubt of it. (Cheers.) They did not believe that he had not laboured to obtain the most favourable arrangement possible; but it suited their purpose to find fault, to pick flaws in what he had done, to bring up speeches and passages, and arguments, that the Government had put forward in the cause of Canada, and to adopt these arguments as if they were apt to solve the case after its settlement—in the same way as when it was under negotiation. For what reason had they done that? Was it to promote the better settlement of the case? Was it to make it more favourable to this country? By no means. It was not for the purpose of advancing the welfare of the Dominion; but it was to gain a paltry, despicable, political advantage. (Loud cheers.) That was the clear object of the Opposition and no man could truthfully say that it was not so. Now he could fiercely stand up and say that the Opposition were unworthy and an unpatriotic course to take. (Renewed cheers.) The Opposition had duties to perform as well as Ministers. They were under obligations and responsibilities which could no more be avoided than the responsibilities of the Government. This was well understood in England, where the Opposition, led by Mr. Disraeli, had a large and able minority. The Government in England in regard to this Treaty, though the Opposition led in this House by the member for Lambeth. But what course had the Opposition in England pursued when the Treaty was before them? They criticised it mildly and carefully; they considered it with reverence and bated breath; they made suggestions as to this course and that course; and, looking at the whole of the discussion, it was evident that they felt the responsibility of the great crisis that would come upon the country if they rejected it, and they refused to make use of the opportunity presented to them, or to impend the interests of the empire for the sake of any mere party advantage. (Cheers.) He had heard a great deal about the "party," and what the "party" had said, and what the "party" had agreed to. When he heard this, he could not help looking at the hon. member for Chateaugay, who, he had reason to believe, not from private conversations but from what he had seen in the public press, favoured the adoption of this Treaty, and he had told them so much about his "party," had consulted with that hon. member, or with any other hon. gentleman belonging to the great liberal party of the Dominion, except such of them as were disaffected with the Treaty, in that little corner of Ontario in which he and they lived, and moved, and had their abode. (Laughter and cheers.) He (Mr. Macdougall) had not been told anywhere that there had been a general consultation of the Liberal party on the subject. But two or three of them, it seemed, had put their heads together in some back room, decided to their own satisfaction that there were reasons why the Treaty should not be adopted, and then went forth to preach to the people that there was a bad Treaty, endeavouring to array their virtues against it, and continuing to find fault from that day to this. (Laughter and cheers.) And here they had a fitting conclusion of the scene. Here they had a resolution, moved not honestly in his judgment, or with a view to divide the House fairly and squarely against the Treaty, but to distract attention from the merits of the Treaty, and to amend that amendment that could be interpreted in different ways, that meant nothing when proposed here, and that was simply a parliamentary manoeuvre which might afterwards be turned to some account before the people in an election contest. He did not concern in such tactics as these. He was prepared in his place in Parliament openly and honestly to say what he thought, and to maintain the position he had taken upon the question, under his responsibility as a representative of the people. At a very early moment after the publication of the Treaty, he had sat down deliberately to consider the question, putting his views in the formal shape of a letter, which he had addressed to the Government, and he had done this because he felt that it was for them he should speak in this House, upon a question that so gravely affected their interests; and after some weeks, when they had time to reflect upon the subject, he went among them and publicly advocated, as strongly as it was in his power to do, the acceptance of this Treaty, without reference to the existence of the Government, or to the existence of any exigencies. He had yet to learn that one individual who had ever given him this vote

having been specially adapted in whole or in part within such jurisdiction to violate us." Secondly, "not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or of the recruitment of troops." Thirdly, "to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties." It had been said that these rules referred solely to maritime operations, and did not refer to invasions by land. He thought otherwise. In the latter case, in addition to the municipal law of the country, there was the law of nations, and the first time defining the words the great principle that it was the duty of a neutral to restrain its people from levying or carrying on warlike operations upon a country with whom they are at peace; the principle on which those rules had been framed applied to invasions by land as well as by water. They had in the Treaty of Washington the duties stated clearly and distinctly for the first time defining the words. They had two of the leading nations of the world solemnly stating the duties of neutrals. Surely it was a great point gained for Canada to have the United States Government thus formally committed to such obligations. Canada has a long frontier exposed to incursions by ruffians of every kind; they thought that England had taken a great security responsibility, it must be clear to the mind of every man acquainted with the facts, that England assented to this Treaty, because, in the first place, she had possessions in America; because she was responsible for the Government of her people in America; because her flag waved over a portion of this continent; and because she expected to have for those reasons, and for those reasons alone, the Government of England agreed to such an arrangement as has been made in the Treaty of Washington. If England had not had possessions in North America, would she have admitted that she was guilty of negligence in allowing the escape of the *Alabama*? She would have done nothing to prevent her from escaping. She would have been wrung from any Government, Tory or Radical, if England had not been an American as well as a European power, and it was for that reason he was disposed to say that the Imperial Government was responsible, and after they had given so much consideration to the interests of Canada, they had much to be thankful for. Parliament to be so sensitive. It did not become political leaders to make objections for mere local or party, or selfish purposes, or with the sole object of embarrassing the Government. He had been associated with some of them in the past. He had discussed and been a party to the settlement of many of those political questions which the now deceased Mr. Macdougall had happily, because they were known or heard of in Canadian history. While the hon. gentleman who is at present one of the leaders of that party, was at college and pursuing his profession, he (Mr. Macdougall) was spending his time and what little money he had in fighting the battles of the Reform party. What statute book could shield England were brought forward at present, a declaration of war. On what page of the statute book could they find a single record of what they had done? What had their master otherwise achieved, either while occupying a seat in that House, or in conducting his organ, the *Globe*? They might speak of him (Mr. Macdougall) with contempt. They might endeavour to unnerve his abilities, but they could not prevent him from meeting them before the people without fear. He had met a whole caravan of them where they had two or three thousand honest yemen listening to their expiations of what they had done and would do. He was a humble spectator, unacknowledged until they thought no bad left the ground, and then the sun of the party was put up to attack. He had been allowed to speak a few words in reference to the matters under discussion; but they showed no disposition to allow him to speak, and there was a whispering consultation as to what should be done. He asked the chairman to put the motion: hands were held up, and in compliance with the call of the meeting he was allowed to speak. He discussed the Treaty of Washington, and asked if it was not expedient, on the part of those who had called the meeting, to give a hint as to the course they proposed to adopt. From what he saw and heard, he felt satisfied that if a vote had been taken a majority would have endorsed his views. The hon. gentleman answered, but they did not touch the subject. He was a man of great reserves, and question thirty years old. That speech was reported in full by the

short-hands representative of the *Globe*, but the cautious Editor would not permit the public to see it. Mr. Macdougall then referred to the result of the elections of last year, and the defeat of the Ontario Government when one-tenth of the House was unrepresented. He emphatically denied that such could properly claim to be the leaders of the Reform party. Since they had acceded to power they had, in every action, reversed the very policy they had advocated, and he instanced their conduct on the railway question, and their great departure from principle in forming a Coalition—(cheers)—and he believed that the honest Reformers throughout the country were sick at heart in them. The hon. member for West Durham afterwards took to speak as representing the Reform party of Ontario; but he (Mr. Macdougall) believed that he was merely the head of a faction. (Cheers.) He would not speak of the provisions of the Treaty respecting our canals, as he thought there was not a man here who did not agree in the expediency of improving the navigation, in so far as regards the trade of the west. That policy had been stamped upon the banner of every administration since he had been in Parliament. Some people objected that the Treaty of Washington would throw open the canals on the same terms to Americans as to our own people, and this, too, in the face of our votes in favour of an expenditure of millions to fit them for the trade of the west. (The canals!) (Cheers.) But we are told that to give the right of navigation is to make a base surrender. He could not see that that would be any great surrender of honour or dignity. He was satisfied the English Government would look after that. Had not American vessels of war been admitted through the canals by the Lake Superior and Erie? Could men what injury the country could sustain from that admission of American vessels in time of peace; and if we could not protect our rivers and canals in the time of war, the Treaty would neither help nor hinder us. The desire of some hon. gentlemen was to raise a captious opposition, to find fault and to act against the interests of the Empire. He would rather listen to them and consider the views which prevail with many English statesmen, that Canada had arrived at a period of anarchy, and that our system of government should therefore, as a family arrangement, be reconstructed; but so long as the present constitution remains in force, we should not attempt to assert an independence and to act against the interests of the Empire. He would rather listen to them and consider the views which prevail with many English statesmen, that Canada had arrived at a period of anarchy, and that our system of government should therefore, as a family arrangement, be reconstructed; but so long as the present constitution remains in force, we should not attempt to assert an independence and to act against the interests of the Empire.

The Imperial Government should be left in the hands of Imperial Ministers. (Loud cheers.)

On Monday, May 14th,
SIR FRANCIS HINCKS said it was not without some reluctance that he, as a member for the Province of Ontario, rose to continue the debate, because he really thought that, so far, the members from that Province had monopolized the discussion; nor had he risen because he concurred with a remark of the hon. gentleman who had preceded him, that it was the duty of every hon. member to speak upon this subject. He was anxious to review the matter before the House and the country, and to state his estimate, and which he believed the Government entertained, upon this important question. There were three points to which he would address himself, these being,—first, as to who were the parties who were responsible for this Treaty; in the second place, he proposed to discuss the merits of the treaty itself; and finally, he proposed to consider what was the duty of the House in regard to it, whether it should be of opinion that the Treaty had merits or demerits. With regard to the first point, the responsibility of the treaty, he contended that, throughout all the discussions in the Imperial Parliament, there had been no question whatsoever. It was a thing of course, he thought, that the two parties responsible for the same act, which could only have been performed by one of them. It was perfectly unheard-of in all diplomatic relations, that parties who derived their power from, and were responsible to, a Colonial Legislature, should be placed in a position to dictate or exercise any control over the Imperial Government. He saw no sinner acting under instructions from Her Majesty's Secretary of State. Upon this point he would refer very briefly to the opinions of two distinguished noblemen who had taken part in an important debate in the House of Lords on this Treaty; the first was the Earl of Derby, who had said:—
“I now pass to the larger question of the Treaty itself. I think that the Government on it as the Treaty of the Government and of the Government exclusively. I join in

all that has been said in praise of the gentlemen who undertook, at the request of the noble Earl and the Cabinet, that arduous public duty; but, under all the circumstances, bound as they were by their instructions, I pass over the parties who were engaged in negotiating the Treaty, and fix the responsibility exclusively on those who advised them.

Again, Lord Cairns, formerly Lord High Chancellor of England—

"In the observation which I make upon this document, I would speak of the Treaty as one having been entered into by the Government."

"This is a Treaty which, in form, was negotiated through the medium of Commissioners. So far as the British Commissioners were concerned, we have the clearest evidence, from these protocols, that every clause of that Treaty was communicated to the Government at home, and by them assented to. (Hear, hear.) It is, therefore, a Treaty upon which the Government did not merely give a final approval, but for the daily composition of which they were virtually responsible." No, was the House to disregard these statements, and hold the first Minister of Canada responsible in the absence of all arguments to support such a pretension; for there really had been no argument; and the doctrines which had been laid down by the hon. member for West Durham would have been laughed to scorn, if they had been urged in the Imperial Parliament. (Hear, hear.) The speech of the hon. gentleman was the ingenious argument of a lawyer to bolster up a bad cause. He had attempted to found some sort of argument upon a minute of Council, in which it was suggested that a commission should be appointed, composed of one Commissioner from England, one from the United States, and one from Canada. That was a proposition that had certainly come from Canada; but he (Sir Francis) hesitated not to say that the commission then suggested was of a totally different character from the Joint High Commission which sat at Washington.

It had never been contemplated that this commission should have such extensive powers as the Washington Commission. The idea of a mixed commission originated in 1866 with Mr. Adams, who was then Minister from the United States, in England. In that proposition, which had been adhered to throughout from beginning to end, it was never contemplated to give the commission any power except to make suggestions for the approval of the Governments of England and the United States. In point of fact the main object of the commission was to try and define the headlands by laying the lines down upon the charts. The commissioners were not to negotiate a new treaty; they were to interpret the then existing treaty—the treaty of 1818, and they were to endeavour to lay down the limits beyond which the American fishermen might not go. After performing this duty they were to submit their recommendations to the respective Governments of Great Britain and the United States. The latter part of the minute of Council, which he questioned very much whether the honourable member for West Durham had read, showed what the idea of those who proposed the Commission was. It showed clearly that, in case of disputes, there was some third party, some impartial arbitrator, to whom the question was to be referred in case of difference. It was therefore quite clear that the Commission then proposed was of a totally different character from that which sat at Washington. (Hear, hear.) On a previous occasion he had stated that the First Minister could not, as a man of honour, have acted on the Commission entertaining the views which hon. gentlemen opposite entertained. It would then have been his duty to have told the Secretary of State that he intended to act on his responsibility, and that if he happened to differ from the views of the English Commissioners he should resign. If he had made such a stipulation, England would never have been bound. But even assuming that England might have assented to his occupying such a position, it would have been her duty to have advised the United States Government on the subject, and if such had been done the United States Government would at once have broken off the negotiations. The way to look at the question is to consider what the member for West Durham would have done in the circumstances. Would he have taken a place on the Commission, deceiving the Government which had done him the honour to appoint him, taking a part in the negotiations, and then, at the last moment, declaring that he would not sign the Treaty? The first Minister had well stated that there was one case in which he

would have been justified in refusing to agree to the Treaty, namely, if the articles relating to Canada had not been left to the decision of Canada, but this had been agreed to before the Commission commenced its labours. As to the navigation of the St. Lawrence he did not intend to speak at length on that point, as one of his colleagues intended to address himself to that subject; but he must say that the arguments of the Opposition on this question were perfectly futile. No member could say that it was any injury to Canada to cede the navigation up to Montreal. Was the river not open to the flags of the whole world? It was said, constantly, that in the negotiations everything was conceded to the United States. The same charge had been made in the House of Lords of England, but the Opposition there, as could be seen from the speeches of Lords Derby, Cairns and Salisbury, had treated the matter in a very different way from the Opposition here. They had not entered into the matter in a spirit hostile to the interests of the nation; but, condemning the Treaty where they considered it open to condemnation, they offered no furious opposition. It may be said both in England and in Canada that the English Commissioners had conceded everything to the United States without discussion, but he would cite the following language from Lord de Grey's speech, to prove that no effort had been spared to obtain for Canada what she desired. "My noble friend seems to think that we English members of the Commission were engaged in not insisting on obtaining for Canada the re-employment of the Reciprocity Treaty. In reference to this, the members of the Commission were most anxious to conform to what they believed to be the wishes of the people of the two countries, and we put this question of Reciprocity in the forefront of our arguments, fighting it by day and point by point, until it was clearly and unequivocally of a different description must be made."

With reference to the complaint of the member for West Durham, that after the remarks of the First Minister that the protocols gave no idea of all the discussions between the Commissioners on the various subjects it was impossible to know what we were believing. He (Sir F. Hincks) would refer to some remarks of Earl Granville on this point: "At their first meeting the American and the British Commissioners came to an agreement that they would keep secret their discussions and that though accounts of them would be communicated to their respective Governments, yet they were to be considered as confidential and not to be published. I may add that I have not the slightest doubt of the wisdom of the course pursued by the Commission. They had 37 long sittings, and I will venture to say that if every one of the ten Commissioners had thought it incumbent on them to show their patriotism and power of debate the 37 sittings could have been multiplied up at least ten times while the result of the negotiations would have been substantially the same. The noble Earl thinks that when the Commissioners proposed anything it was immediately accepted. This, however, was by no means the case. The Americans, in perfect good faith, made many propositions. To some the English Commissioners at once declined to accede; others were referred to the Imperial Government, and the decisions and counter propositions made by the English Government were received and considered by the Americans frankly and fairly. It was not correct, therefore, to assert that everything had been conceded, and that no efforts were made to carry out the views of Canada."

With regard to the merits of the Treaty, it was not, of course, altogether acceptable to the Government; but there were left to deal with as they thought fit, and it was necessary to confirm what had been previously stated by the First Minister in reply to the member for Hastings, he could say most unhesitatingly that no pressure of any kind had been brought to bear on the Government from England; but that all the advice that had been tendered had come from the very best friends of British connection in England. A great deal had been said about the cessation of territorial rights, and the compromise of honour; as to the latter, however, there was not a gentleman opposite who would not be prepared to concede everything if they could only get a little more. If it was a question of honour only, what difference was there between the question of territorial rights to be given by the United States and ours to them? The moment the despatch was received suggesting the idea of a money payment for the fisheries, the Government at once pressed their opinion that a settlement should not be made on that basis. Admitting that the Treaty had great defects, what had been the duty of the Government, and what was the duty of the House? for

the same reasons that influenced the Government should have the same influence with the House. He would have been glad if the miscreant articles had been excluded, and if, when the Imperial Government had the opportunity, they had decided to withdraw from all further negotiations respecting the fisheries. But the circumstances were materially changed when the Imperial Government took the responsibility of confirming the Treaty. It was certainly not a little surprising that the most violent opposition against the Treaty proceeded from those least interested in it. To show how highly intelligent and impartial observers at a distance viewed the question, he would cite the remarks of the Earl of Derby in the debate already referred to—"Upper and Lower Canada appear to have made what is probably not a bad bargain, but I am afraid whatever advantages may arise out of it there will be a good deal of soreness and bitter feeling left in the minds of the people of the Maritime Provinces, who, there is no denying, have been to a certain extent thrown overboard. The idea in England was, of course, for the fisheries to be made up for by the Maritime Provinces; but how different has been the result. In Quebec he had no doubt the opposition would not be formidable. He could not doubt that the new members for Chateaugay and Hochelaga would support the Treaty. But little did Earl Derby imagine the howl that would proceed from the Grits of Ontario on the subject of the dictation of the *Globe* newspaper, which was so powerful that hon. gentlemen opposite dared not disobey it. He would not have referred to this matter again but that the hon. members for Lambton and West Durham had stated that they had declared their views in anticipation of that newspaper. Let any one take up the file of the *Globe*, and they would see how much the Treaty was the subject of discussion as early as the 11th May, before either of these hon. gentlemen had spoken on the subject, and how these hon. gentlemen had followed suit, and obeyed instructions received from their master."

Mr. MACKENZIE—You followed suit on the 28th July.

SIR FRANCIS HINCKS said the remark just made by him of something he desired to say. It had been stated more than once from the other side of the House that the Government had followed suit in their despatch of July 28th. He read an extract from that despatch, stating that the Treaty of 1854 had met with the approbation of Canada; whereas the fisheries articles of the present Treaty were adopted against the advice of the Canadian Government. How could it be said that the Government followed suit, when they so distinctly protested at the very time that the Treaty was under consideration and before it had been signed? When, however, the Imperial Government agreed to the Treaty, a pressure was brought to bear on them, and they refused to perform their part, and they have now taken the position towards both England and the United States. The arrangement was considered by all parties in England to be a fair and reasonable one; and, as had been truly said by the First Minister, if Canada had to make a sacrifice, had not England to do so also, and if Canada refused to ratify the Treaty she would be placed in a very disagreeable position towards England. It must be borne in mind that, before the negotiation, the matter of the protection of the fisheries was in a very unsatisfactory position, and that for some years previously difficulties had arisen as to the amount of protection necessary, while constant danger was to be apprehended from collisions with American fishermen. The question of the fisheries was a principal cause of the difference between the two countries. Earl Granville in stating the grounds of his anxiety as to the state of our relations with the United States, observed—"There was also the question (in my opinion the most urgent of all) of the American fisheries, of which the noble Earl has given some description. With regard to this subject, there was not only questions between the United States and Canada, but serious difficulties between ourselves and Canada as to the amount of police service we were to do for them in addition to and perfectly separate and independent from the obligation to defend the Dominion if it was attacked from without." He (Sir Francis Hincks) would now refer to the advice given to Canada by a gentleman who was pre-eminent in the field of the subsisting controversy between Great Britain and Canada; one who stood very high in the estimation of all who had the high honour and privilege of his acquaintance. He referred to the Earl of Carnarvon, formerly Secretary of State for the Colonies, and in referring to Lord Carnarvon's speech he would observe that His Lordship had not

concealed his objections to the Treaty, either from an Imperial or a Colonial view. He criticized it with the greatest severity, but after doing so he added—"On the other hand, I should feel, as a Canadian, that this is essentially an Imperial question in all its bearings, and I should feel, above all, that Canada is a part of the Empire, having cast its lot for good or ill when the great Confederation of the Dominion was accomplished. Canada then assumed her place in the Empire of this country, prepared not only to fulfil her duties and responsibilities, but to make sacrifices if such were necessary. I know there are those who prophesied that Canada was incapable of bearing the slightest strain on her material interests, but I did not agree with those prophesies. They have, I think, been grievously disappointed. No doubt this fishery question will press hard on some of the maritime provinces. But, on the other hand, I have that confidence in the loyalty of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, that, looking at this as an Imperial question, even if it involves sacrifices, they will make them cheerfully for the sake of the Empire, and the very national feeling may have ebbed in this country, I believe it swells very high in Canada. I believe that there is a far higher estimate of public duty in Canada than in this country. I therefore trust that Canada, in the wise and judicious exercise of the power she enjoys, will not take it on her to withhold her consent. She has never an opportunity for showing her magnanimity, and also great political wisdom. These measures are not to be weighed by mere appearances at the moment, or tested or estimated by immediate results. There are reasons which should induce the Dominion of Canada, and every part of the maritime provinces, as well as the western districts, to feel that at some future day great advantages will accrue from the ratification of the Treaty. The fishery question has been a source of great offence and irritation to Canada, and there are other questions. I have no apprehension whatever as to the future if these questions are met by an united Empire, and in the spirit of moderation, good sense, and kindly feeling on all sides. The only fear I have is that England and Canada may have difficulties separate and single handed, and my one great hope, wish, and earnest desire is that Canada may now act in the spirit of an integral part of this great United Empire. He (Sir Francis Hincks) believed that the great majority of this House and of the people in every section of the Dominion would respond to the sentiments expressed by the Earl of Carnarvon on their behalf. He was sorry to hear the remarks of the honourable member for Sherbrooke the other night, although he was gratified at the conclusion he had arrived at—to support the Treaty. But he owned he could not understand how he had arrived at that conclusion, and he referred to it because he did not desire that the speech of that hon. gentleman should be considered as a basis for representing the views of the Government. He (Sir A. Galt) admitted that the adoption of his favourite scheme of independence would be a sacrifice, and he thanked him for that admission. But when he proceeded to urge that for the sake of England we ought to make that sacrifice, he (Sir F. Hincks) must contend that we had not been called upon to make it. He denied most emphatically that public opinion in England was in favour of separation. The wisest and best statesmen in England and the masses of the people were in favour of colonial connection. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. MACKENZIE—That is not what the Secretary of State for the Provinces says.

SIR FRANCIS HINCKS—He (Mr. Howe) had referred to the authorities, and he did not know him to state that he did; and even if it were true that he held those opinions—and he differed from him (Sir Francis) on that point—the hon. gentleman opposite were quite welcome to that fact that they did so differ. He firmly believed that the feeling in favour of severing the connection did not exist in England to any great extent. He would make an appeal to the remarks with reference to the Fenian claims. He contended that we had a right to expect reparation from England, after she had failed to procure it for us from the United States. He had contended, on a former occasion, that the correspondence relating to the formation of the Commission fairly included the Fenian claims as one of the subjects to be dealt with. Sir Francis Hincks had read portions of the correspondence in support of his position. The Minister of Justice had always thought that there was some doubt, and that there was something to be said on the American side of the question. However, when England consented to withdraw the Fenian claims, she assumed the responsibility of it, although in a very guarded manner.

bury to the feelings of his country he was bound to resign his position as a minister. Unless, therefore, his hon. friend the member for West Durham could show that the first minister had sacrificed his honour and patriotism he could not be regarded as having the power to withdraw from the commission. (Hear, hear.) This was the first time that the hon. member in the colony had been asked or required to deal with Imperial interests. It was true that at the time of the revolutionary war Henry Oswald, a gentleman engaged in the Canadian trade, had been appointed a plenipotentiary to negotiate terms of peace; but Mr. Oswald was not a colonist in the ordinary sense of terms; nor was he a member of the colonial assembly. He was not in any case exactly like this, the general principles of international law, which guide diplomacy, must apply. If anything more were required, it would be found in the action of the House itself. On both sides of the House last session it had been stated that the Commissioner should not be fettered by instructions, and that he should be left free to deal with the matter as he thought proper. The House had taken this course for the best of reasons; because it could give no instruction which could interfere with the instruction of the Imperial Government, and because the power likely to be exercised over him by the Imperial Government was a power which he would be willing, and was able to check, by requiring that the Imperial Act should be carried into effect by the approval of the House. That had been done, and these articles of the Treaty could not be legally carried into effect until they were pronounced upon by the Parliament of Canada. Now what were the acts the House was called upon to consider? What were the acts the acceptance of which it was said would be sacrificing the interests of the colony? The hon. member was asked with the fisheries. What was the history of those fisheries? If they looked into it they found that the United States had rights in them from 1783 to 1818. Those rights were abrogated by the war of 1812, but were altered under the Treaty of 1818, and continued so altered till 1854, when increased facilities were given to American fishermen to fish in our waters under the Treaty of 1854. That Treaty expired in 1859, but since then the rights of Americans to resort to our waters had been recognized by the licensing system, and by the permission that was accorded to them of purchasing fish and transferring from one set of vessels to another for transport to American ports. Since the Americans had resorted there our fisheries had been swarmed for years again. (Hear, hear.) The facts disclosed distinctly, clearly, emphatically, and without the possibility of denial, that since then the increase in the trade on the part of our colonies, had been greater than ever before. (Hear, hear.) There was, therefore, nothing, as far as the fisheries were concerned, which showed that we had been injured. There was nothing which showed against us and favourably to the United States. If it was favourable to them why should the United States fishermen require a bounty. (Hear, hear.) But they have not got it, and they are not likely to get it; and until the bounty is granted the argument can have no effect; but in the meantime we have the fetters of the United States, who, I suppose, know their own interests. The hon. member for the member for West Durham or Lambton did, saying that their rights are interfered with, and that they are suffering the degradation and humiliation which we are told is cast on Canada; and that they are crying out for a bounty, while our fishermen are perfectly satisfied. One fact is said to be worth a thousand arguments, and these are the facts that we have in the case of the Maritime Provinces except from the fact of their press, and the expressed opinions on the subject; but he believed the general feeling down there was in accordance with the views expressed by the Governments of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland; and that the views expressed in the English House of Lords were entirely mistaken; and that the Government of the Maritime Provinces were in favour of the Treaty which was fixed from 1854 had existed before, it existed from 1864 to 1866; but now, because we had not so wide a range of commodities free we had in addition a money grant. It was said that as far as length of time was concerned, the United States had not had reciprocity in being for a longer time than they had been denying it. He thought that it was worth showing that the losses which it was thought the Maritime Provinces would sustain had not been sustained. We were told by the member for West Durham in his speech

in the Federal consti-
States bordering upon
all vessels from the
only thing that he
been better in the
been that, in return for
St. Lawrence for ever,
a similar right to the
Michigan. But what
one by giving the free
St. Lawrence? Had we
ships of any country
and Montreal in
were glad to see those
and it was greatly to be
tion that it should be
claimed that they had
natural right, indee-
and, and that which
right we allow them as
ference to the Fenian
ly mentioned a curious
of peace, and in
Maine and the United
was another case of very
appended also between
of States, and in which
war with the United
sider that in any par-
honour was sullied.
dependence terminated,
of peace, and in
claimed that they
should make reparation
who, following the
determined to leave the
whose property had
the United States agreed
several States of the
to restore the property
and fought against
determined true to their
that they would do
to obtain from the
of that principle.
they would carry
to State of the Union
of Pennsylvania,
the Penn family
to the British
England saw that the
not apparently en-
flowed the matter to go
commissioners of en-
herself and paid the
declared herself
our claims. The
the same with us with
our claims. Our claim
Great Britain, and
doubt, was that unad-
due consideration,
land had telegraphed
United States that his
using the last Fenian
their warmest thanks.
from that time he was
bought a reconnaissance
he would rather pay
allow them again
United States; but
of international law
at any future time
per so to do. We
men. member for
should not give up
who she not be pre-
shed when she sent
and when she deman-
strages committed by
have we forgotten as
in the troubles of
tion the case of the
land was ready to do
good by the U. S. and
now. We should
required to make a
We could not do
we remained a por-
We had duties
rm, and sacrifices to
not and would not
took upon ourselves
the duty. He be-
come during his life
during the life of his
even then. (Loud
great national changes
were, where was
ally but to that great
the same speech and
in Europe? Germany
Russia always re-
had been striving
to make satellites of
France with its suc-
don Charlemagne to
in the dust with the
ack. Austria was
tioned, Greece in
in continued revo-
lution of the Papal
did entangling. Each
had caused the ar-

culture of so much of her blood and trea-
so unforunately and so unceasingly were
lost all at an end. She was standing
ally alone in this chaos and triumph of
Kingdoms. She felt, as we should all feel:
To do the duty that lies nearest us
is earth's chief wisdom.
nearest duty was peace. She feared no
loss to her honour. She was as ready as
light to

"Rise and battle with the nations
In the inveterate armour of youth."
He believed that her greatest triumphs
were in peace. A great American states-
man had said that the tap of her drum, fol-
lowing the sun, circled the earth with the
marital airs of England. That was an
illustration of war. But let us seek an il-
lustration of peace. The electric wire around
the globe, the iron band spanning our
continent from ocean to ocean, the power of
steam carrying our ships into every
sea, and then let it be said,
as a national boast, that England's
power went round the world in the
peace of peace, and not of war.
It is said in the interest of civilization,
enlightenment, and religion, that Canada
did not stand in the way of peace,
and progress; but that England having
sought us our Dominion and brought
us men of different races, languages and
religion together—though different, all
agreeing to acknowledge the supremacy of
the great land from which Christianity
enlightenment and civilization had gone
out to the ends of the world—that
Canada has placed neither obstacle nor im-
pement in the path of these new arrange-
ments with the United States, but offers to
her people to-day that treaty of peace and
good will, as one that it will be hereafter
regard as the collection and highest prize
of wisdom that we assisted to ratify.
(Loud cheers.)

On Monday, May 13th—
The Hon. Mr. B. A. (Hear, hear, hear) said that he was
accustomed to occupy the time of the
House, and did so now with reluctance; but
as he considered the subject under considera-
tion to be of great importance and one in
reference to which a good deal of misappre-
hension seemed to rest, and as it was a sub-
ject upon which he could perhaps throw
some light, he felt that he might not be
wasting his talent. No one regretted
more than he did that this Treaty was not
more general in its provisions. He wished
urgently as any one that it was more like
the one at Reciprocity Treaty, which proved
advantageous to the United States as
well as to these provinces; but as this could
not be obtained, and he believed was not
obtainable, he was in favour of accepting
the Treaty even as it was, and the following
were some of his reasons; they were not
merely theoretical, but the result of
years of practical experience and careful
observation. (Hear, hear.) In the spring
of each year some 40 or 50 vessels resorted
to the Magdalen Islands for herring, and he
knew the number to be greater. These vessels
were of various sizes, and he was con-
vinced so that the quantity taken was gene-
rally in the neighbourhood of 50,000 barrels.
During the existence of the Reciprocity
Treaty no United States vessels went after
these fish. All the vessels engaged in that
fishery belonged to some one of the provinces
now forming this Dominion. Since the abro-
gation of the Treaty and the imposition
of a duty of a dollar per barrel by the United
States, the case had become entirely changed.
Vessels still went there, but they were
no longer all American. Now, under this
Treaty we would get that important branch
of trade back again. The lower provinces,
Nova Scotia in particular, had a large her-
ring trade with Newfoundland. Vessels
went there with salt and other supplies, and
brought back cargoes of herring in salt.
Employment was thus given to the cooper
and labourer in preparing these fish for ex-
port, and as the business was prosecuted
entirely in the winter months when other em-
ployment was difficult to obtain, it always
proved a great boon to the industries. We
lost this trade also when we lost the Reciprocity
Treaty, but it would return to us if the
Treaty now offered for our accept-
ance. A little more than two years ago, two
vessels belonging to the Province of Quebec
went to Halifax from Labrador. They had
between them 3,400 barrels of herring. Not
finding sale for them in Halifax, they pro-
ceeded to New York, where they sold. The
proceeds on these two cargoes amounted to \$3,400.
Under the Treaty of this kind, this
\$3,400 would go into the pockets of the owners
and crews of the vessels, instead of into
the United States Treasury, and cases of this

kind occurred almost every day. The same
reason applied to the mackerel fishery, but
with still greater force, the duty being two
dollars per barrel. There was another fea-
ture connected with this fishery, which
ought to have a good deal of weight with
this House in favour of the Treaty. Ameri-
can vessels, doing the coast and mackerel
fisheries were manned in great part by
natives of some part of this Dominion. The
chief cause of this was that, as the hands
fished on shares, viz., one-half of what they
caught, those employed on board of United
States vessels got theirs in free of duty,
whilst the men employed in the vessels of
this Dominion paid duty on theirs.

A hand catching twenty-five barrels of
mackerel to his share on board of a United
States vessel would receive \$50 more than he
would receive for the same quantity taken in
one of our own vessels. A consequence of
this was that the best men went on board
the American vessels, and our vessels had to
put up with the less capable. Indeed, should
the present state of things continue
much longer, our people would be
compelled to give up the hook and
line fishing altogether, for it was
impossible that they could continue to com-
pete against the duty and their other disad-
vantages. (Hear, hear.) During the exist-
ence of the Reciprocity Treaty the number
of vessels of this kind, and the mackerel
fishery had increased to about sixty in
the county of Lunenburg alone. Since the
termination of the Treaty the number has
been gradually falling off, until during last
season no more than half a dozen vessels en-
gaged in that business, and he believed that
should this Treaty not be ratified, there
would not be a single vessel fitted out in
this county for the mackerel fishery, the ap-
proaching season. (Hear, hear.) He had
been assured by vessel owners in Mavro au
Bouche, an outcropping settlement at the
eastern end of the county of Antigonish,
and also by those on the western side
of the Strait of Canso, in the county
of Guysboro, from both of which places
the mackerel and herring fisheries had
been formerly prosecuted, that the busi-
ness will not more than pay expenses, and
that, unless something was done to re-
lieve them, fish from the present duty,
they would be obliged to abandon the
business altogether. This need create no
surprise when it is considered that at the
present value of mackerel and herrings
the duty is fully equal to fifty per cent.
Owing to the advantages offered by the
American vessels over our provincial vessels
engaged in fishing, not only were our best
men induced to give their skill to the Ameri-
cans in fishing, but in many cases they re-
mained away, and their industry was lost to
the provinces. They went to the States
in the vessels, the last trip in order to get
settled up for the season's work, and gene-
rally remained there to man the fishing and
other vessels of the Republic. Why, a very
large proportion of the inhabitants of
Gloucester and other fishing towns of Mas-
sachusetts and Maine were natives of some
of the provinces of this Dominion. Now
with this Treaty the inducements to give
up their industry and go to the States re-
moved, and our own vessels would be able
to select good hands who would remain at home,
the temptation to emigrate as he had
just explained being removed. He had heard
it said that the consumer paid the duty.
Now whilst this might be the case with some
articles, it was not so with the article of our
fish. In our case in this business our fish-
men fished side by side with the Americans,
and, both carrying the proceeds of their
catch to the same market, where our men
had to contend against the free fish of the
American fishermen. Let him illustrate
this. An American and a provincial vessel
took 500 barrels of mackerel each, both ves-
sels were confined to the same market
where they sold at the same price. One had
to pay a duty of \$1,000, and the other had
not to do so. Who then paid the \$1,000?
Most certainly not the purchaser or con-
sumer, but the poor, hard-worked fisherman
of this Dominion, for this \$1,000 was deduct-
ed from his account of sales. Those who
contended that in this case the consumer
paid the duty ought to be able to show that,
if the duty is fully paid off by the United
States, the selling price of the fish would be
reduced by the amount of the duty. There
was nothing in the nature or existing cir-
cumstances of the trade to cause any person
who understands to believe that this would
be the case, and therefore it would be
seen that at present our fishermen laboured
under disadvantages which made it almost
impossible for them to compete with their
rivals in the United States, and that the re-
moval of the duty as proposed by this
Treaty would be a great boon, and en-

able them to do a good business
where they now were but struggling
or doing a losing trade. (Hear, hear.)
There was another point connected with this
matter that might perhaps have an impor-
tant bearing on the fishing interests here-
after. Should the island of Cuba, to which
we now exported a large portion of fish and
lumber, our vessels bringing home sugar and
molasses in return, become independent,
under United States protection, as was in-
tended had the rebellion in that island suc-
ceeded; or what was more likely, should it
become a part of those States by purchase or
otherwise, with the present American tariff
to meet us, we would be completely cut off
from the trade of that island. But with this
Treaty in existence, we would not only be
secured from this contingency, but we
would have that market open to us on much
better terms than at present. The House

was told that our fishing grounds, &c., would
be protected against all outside encroach-
ment. This was much more easily said than
done. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear, hear.) Newfoundland
would accept the Treaty. Prince Edward
Island would also, in all probability,
do so. Great Britain wished us to accept
the Treaty, and should we refuse to do so
she would not be likely to send one gun to
assist in protecting our fisheries, if she
would even send one to protect us under any
circumstances. (Hear,

gree. He was in favour of it because it would render unnecessary the great expense, and it might be the still greater responsibility of protecting that interest; and because it would make for us friends and customers of forty millions of people. (Cheers.)

On Tuesday, the debate was resumed by Dr. TUPPER, who said he could not but feel that he would ill discharge his duty if, upon so momentous a question, he did not give to the House the views he entertained. The hon. gentleman who had just taken the seat had stated that his constituents of both parties were strongly opposed to the Treaty, but (Dr. Tupper) thought that both the House and the country should not look upon the great question under discussion from a party point of view. If there ever had been a question submitted to the Parliament and people of Canada which ought, for any character and nature, to have elevated the statesmen of all parties and classes above mere low, grovelling, or party grounds, it was the question under discussion. It was not a question of party in Canada any more than it was in England. What was the case there? A member of the late cabinet had been invited by the Government of the day to give his assistance and co-operation in reference to the Treaty, and he had given his services as freely and unreservedly as if he had been called upon by a Government of which he was a member. When the Treaty was submitted to Parliament, great as the opportunities were for the Opposition to oppose it, they forgot what was due to party, looking only to what was due to their common country. Reading the proceedings which had taken place in the Imperial Parliament yesterday, what did they find? A common sentiment of joy and satisfaction pervaded both sides of the House, on the announcement by the Premier that the cloud which had overshadowed these proceedings was to be dispelled. Not that gentlemen on both sides of the House in the Imperial Parliament regarded with the same favour the general features of the Treaty, but because men of all parties felt that whether it was perfect or imperfect there were general leading features in it which commended it to the candid consideration of all men. It was only a few years ago that the great country lying along the side of Canada was engaged in a deadly struggle. The South had risen, and the North was prepared, at any sacrifice of blood and money, to preserve the Union intact; and, when engaged in that deadly combat, it became known that cruisers were being built in Great Britain for the purpose of taking part in that struggle, representations were made to the Imperial Government, and they put forth their hand to prevent the departure of those vessels. Subsequently, however, the *Alabama* escaped, and in order to avoid the possibility of further difficulty, they themselves purchased the other vessels. Was it wonderful that this admission on the part of Great Britain should have excited a people, who had felt that the struggle had been increased in its intensity, and should cause them to demand redress from a Government, whose want of vigour and effort had exposed them to so great and increased danger? Nor could England turn a deaf ear to a demand for reparation made by forty millions of people, lying alongside of Canada. At the time the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty was rejected, the United States took the attitude that they would not ask for a re-opening of the negotiation in this matter; which meant that they had an undoubted claim, and intended to hold it until circumstances best suited their presenting it against England; that they would treasure up their wrath against a day of wrath; that when England was engaged in some Continental struggle the United States would find their opportunity of enforcing what they considered their just claims against her. That view, and a knowledge of the fact that England had a weak point on this continent, had undoubtedly influenced the Imperial Government in endeavouring to bring the question to a final and amicable settlement.

Great and important as the Treaty was to the British Empire at large, it was more so to Canada; and he believed it was not alone important to England or Canada. He looked upon it as a gigantic stride in the progress of civilization. England having admitted, as she did admit, that she had a duty to perform in reference to these cruisers was not humiliated by the expression of regret which formed a part of the Treaty. He thought that England would be amply repaid for any cost or trouble she had been put to in the settlement of these questions, by the establishment of that new principle of international law which was to govern such

matters in the future. He had said that Canada had no small interest in this matter. He would not repeat the elaborate argument that had been used by the First Minister, showing the great value of this Treaty to us; but he would say we must look at our position. While Canada was united with England, he believed that we could defend ourselves against any power that would be brought against us; but when we looked at the great strength of the country near us and measured the chances of a contest with it, everybody must feel that while England could bring all her great naval power to bear and would come out of the struggle without discredit, we would not be able to live out such a conflict, except with the same gory fields that had destroyed France; and it would ill become Canada, regarded as she was by England as a vulnerable point, at such a time to raise her hands and say, "We think you have humiliated and disgraced yourself and your country, and we have no party to this Treaty which you have made." But it was not only a question of peace or war. Everybody knew that no country in the world had a deeper interest than Canada had in the relations between England and the United States; everybody knew that a mere cloud of war between those nations would strike a fatal blow at our credit, that would stop that bright career of prosperity which we now enjoyed. He would now refer to the point more immediately under our consideration—the fishery articles of the Treaty. The Treaty provided that that portion of it which dealt with the property of Canada should receive the sanction of the Canadian Parliament. There could be no question that this House enjoyed the free and unrestricted right to decide on the question. There could be no question that England, while she had exhibited the deepest anxiety in this matter, while she had shown for long years the greatest anxiety and the greatest apprehension in relation to anything that could involve us in trouble with the United States, had, in the person of the Throne itself, and from the independent benches of both Houses of Parliament that Canada had the full and unrestricted right to decide for herself in this matter. But was the fact that no pressure had been brought to bear upon us to prevent us from giving that consideration to the question which the interests of the Empire required, that we should treat with contempt and indifference the great and vital interest that England had in the decision at which we arrived? While we came to the consideration of this question in a free and unrestricted manner, he had no hesitation in saying that the man who wished to preserve the connection between the two countries, and who valued the inestimable privileges as British subjects we enjoyed, should come to the consideration of this question, feeling that, although we had the question in our own hands, it could not be approached without the conviction that every word that was uttered in this House that was calculated to irritate and annoy the English Government would tend to weaken the tie upon which our future greatness and prosperity depended. (Hear, hear.) We should not forget that this question of the fisheries for sixty years had been a constant source of irritation to England, since the war of 1812. From the time of that war, which did away with the former Treaty, from that time to the present, there had been constant difficulties and annoyances in relation to this question. It had not only been a subject of controversy, but that controversy had drawn us into the very verge of war. He asked the House if, under these circumstances, when we were only small, disjointed and weak provinces, England threw her mighty arm over us, and our property, and gave us her protection—did we ask if that formed no claim to consideration, when she now asked us to accept a proposal that she believed was the best consideration she could obtain for our fisheries? He would not follow the various arguments that had been used on both sides of the House. He was satisfied that the House of Commons could not be more convinced of the soundness of the position of the Government in asking Parliament to ratify the Treaty by the able and exhaustive speech of the First Minister, than by the laboured—able of course—but laboured efforts of hon. gentlemen opposite to criticize that speech. He considered that they had been fully repaid, to say the least, for going into the length. He would refer to one point, however. It had been said that his hon. friend the First Minister had thrown a doubt over our position in relation to the fisheries. He

had no hesitation in saying, and no one had followed that hon. gentleman's remarks more closely than he had, and that he had been entirely misrepresented. It would be impossible for him to do the greatest service in the language to draw such a conclusion from his remarks. He (Sir John) had said that pretensions had been set up by American jurists of no mean standing, whose opinions had received a certain amount of consideration from the press of the United States; but he had not uttered at any time a single sentence that would lead to the belief that he doubted the entire sovereignty of this country over the inshore fisheries. But everybody acknowledged that the Government of the United States had now admitted our rights in a fuller degree than they had ever done before, not only by their offer to admit the products of our fisheries into their markets free, in consideration of these fisheries, but by their making it a subject of permanent arbitration to say how much they should pay in addition for such privileges. Whether or doubt, therefore, might have been raised, had now been set aside. It had been alleged that we were ceding territorial rights for a money consideration. There never was a more unworthy attack made to influence the minds of the people of this country than the attempt made to show that this was a question of ceding territorial rights for money. He would refer to the State papers which had been brought down to show the position the Government had taken on this question, and which the hon. gentlemen opposite had signified their approval of. It had been called a "capitulation," but the same page of the Treaty which gave to the people of the United States the right to enjoy the inshore fisheries, contained a concession of precisely the same character on the part of the people of the United States, and they had ceded their territory to us as much as we had to them. What strengthened his confidence in the wisdom of the course pursued by the Government was the important deliberative assembly, the presence of hon. gentlemen opposite. In the Treaty he had said upon this subject they had not addressed themselves to such arguments as sensible men would have urged in grave matters of international policy; but had resorted to quibbles of a character so contemptible as to be altogether unworthy of the attention of an intelligent deliberative assembly. (Hear, hear.) He would not attempt to follow them by proposing the absurdity of those quibbles, nor to imitate the hon. member for Peel who, in his eloquent address which had so charmed the House, and let a flood of daylight into the sophistries of the hon. member for West Durham, and thoroughly exposed their fallacy. He would say, however, to that hon. gentleman, could he fail to see, with his eyes, what he was doing, what this argument proceeded so logically from point to point, that that which had been presented to the House by hon. gentlemen opposite as an astounding discovery proved to be nothing more than the most idle vapouring, entirely unworthy of the consideration of the House. They had spoken of the article of the Treaty affecting the navigation of the river, as something like a mighty surrender of the river. Well, what did that surrender amount to? What was Canada really parting with? What did the House understand as to that point, after all the laboured efforts that had been made to prove that the St. Lawrence ought not to be surrendered? Did not hon. gentlemen opposite know that as long ago as 1828 the United States had demanded the right to navigate that river, and that they had put forth this claim, not in the shape of a privilege which they were asking, not as a concession which should be granted to them, but as a right to which they were entitled; and when it was refused by England as a right, as hon. gentlemen would see, by referring to the State papers, that the United States declined to accept it as a concession? In what position were they now? Were they any better than before? The concession, if concession it could be called, had been made; but they had been compelled to acknowledge, by giving reciprocal privileges to Canadians, that they had no right to the St. Lawrence. Hon. gentlemen opposite said that what the Americans conceded was of no advantage, because there was no value to Canada in the navigation of the rivers of Alaska, and that even if there was it was conferred in any case by the old Treaty with Russia. But he held that, if that Treaty was still binding a hundred times over, the article in this Treaty was nevertheless of substantial value, because it coupled the right to navigate the St. Lawrence the right also to navigate the rivers of the Territory of Alaska. It thus showed, and would always continue

to show, proof of the fact that what the United States asked from Canada on the one hand, they were obliged to give to Canada on the other. If it was, then, yielding a privilege to admit them to the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, they were committed to the same policy by giving us the same right in regard to the rivers he had mentioned. These were the quibbles with which the House had been entertained in the absence of all argument on the part of hon. gentlemen opposite, in reference to this important question. (Hear, hear.) It has been stated by the hon. member for Sherbrooke in the course of his speech, that the Treaty of 1871 conceded less to the United States than the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. He (Dr. Tupper) dared say that this had taken many by surprise; but the hon. gentleman had good reasons for saying what he did. Hon. gentlemen opposite had said that the right to navigate the St. Lawrence was the lever, or one of the principal levers we had, in order to effect reciprocity; but whatever lever we had for application in that direction was not in the use of the river itself in its natural state, but in the use of the canals which rendered the navigation practicable. Well, it was to be observed that the canals which the Treaty of 1854 gave up to the Americans were preserved by the Treaty of 1871, to be used by the Canadian Government, and people as a lever for obtaining Reciprocity at such time and in such a manner in future as might be considered advisable. (Hear, hear.) He would now come to the question of the fisheries, that other lever which was to be used in conjunction with the St. Lawrence to obtain a Reciprocity Treaty, and he would ask gentlemen who talked so lightly about this question if they quite understood what it free entry of fish and fish oil into the American market meant? If anything could enlighten the House upon that point it was the able and interesting argument which had been presented by the hon. member for the county of Halifax, Mr. Power. That hon. gentleman had imparted an amount of information upon the subject which the House had listened for in vain from other hon. members, and he had been able to do so for this reason: that there was not a man in the House, he (Dr. Tupper) was bold enough to say—even in the presence of the members who more particularly represented the enterprising fishing interests in the Province of Quebec—there was not perhaps a man in the whole of Canada, who was better acquainted with the question, or who was a higher authority in every thing that related to it, than that hon. gentleman who had made a large fortune out of the fisheries of the coast, and who was a man who had devoted his whole life to enterprises connected with the fisheries of the Maritime Provinces, who had given them the most careful study and attention, and who had become possessed of every information concerning them. When he, therefore, told the House that the Treaty, instead of being a sale and betrayal of our fishery rights, was a concession which would enrich the fishermen of this country, promote its prosperity, and increase its advancement in every way, he (Dr. Tupper) would place that state of things in the random assertions of hon. gentlemen opposite. (Hear, hear.) It was indeed a more convincing argument that the right step had been taken than anything that was in his (Dr. Tupper's) power to say. Hon. gentlemen opposite affected to treat this matter of the free entry of fish and fish oil into the United States as insignificant, and pretended to deal with it as if it amounted to nothing in considering the advantages and disadvantages of the Treaty. But what were the facts? In the small Province of Nova Scotia, the total catch of fish last year amounted to over \$5,000,000, and the duty that this Treaty would remit on the mackerel and herring alone caught by the fishermen of that Province last season would amount to over \$600,000, and that was the mode in which the fisheries had been "sold," as the fresh water gentlemen on the other side of the House were inclined to assert. (Laughter.) Well, how had they been "sold," and how had the cry upon that point arisen? Everybody knew that the member for West Durham had sounded a note of alarm last year, and endeavoured to agitate the people of this country in regard to the Treaty, and he (Dr. Tupper) would have a word to say as to the time and manner in which this work of alarm had been commenced and carried out. The hon. member Mr. Lambton had repudiated a statement that had been made by the First Minister, in which it was charged that hon. gentlemen opposite had followed

of the fact that States asked from the hand, they were ob- Canada on the other, yielding a privilege to the free navigation of the river. (Hear, hear.) The policy by giving us regard to the rivers he had the equitable which had been in the absence of part of hon. gentlemen (Dr. Tupper) to this important (Hear, hear.) It had been stated for Sherbrooke in the United States than in 1854. He (Dr. Tupper) had taken many by gentlemen had good that he did. Hon. gen- said that the right to the river was the principal lovers we had property; but what was the objection in that direc- of the river itself in the use of the canal navigation practically. He observed that the Treaty of 1854 had given the river to the United States, to be used by the people and as a lever of commerce as might be con- (Hear, hear.) He would mention of the fisheries, which was to be used in St. Lawrence to obtain fish, and he would say so lightly about this and fish oil into the market? If any gentleman the House had been able and inter- had been presented by the hon. member for St. Lawrence, Mr. Fox, that imparted an amount of subject which the House had been able to do so for this was not a man in the House was bold enough to presence of the members of the House, represented the interests in the House there was not perhaps of Canada, who was bethe question, or who was in everything that re- that hon. gentleman who fortune out of the fish- the position of a fish- to the whole life to the fisheries of the who had given them his attention, and who of every information then he, therefore, told Tupper, instead of being of our fishery cause which would an of this country, and increase its ad- vantage, he (Dr. Tupper) against the random of the fishermen. (Hear, hear.) A more convincing step had been taken in his (Dr. Tupper's) gentlemen opposite as to the free trade to the United States as to nothing in con- and disadvantages. But what were the small Province of Nova Scotia of fish last year 9,000, and the duty that on the mackerel and by the fishermen of that would amount to over the mode in which "sold," as the fresh the other side of the coast. (Laughter.) been "sold," and how point arises? Every- member for West- ended a note of and endeavored of this country Treaty, and he (Dr. Tupper) said that this work of men and carried on. It had been made by which it was charged opposite had followed

the wake of the *Trenton Globe* in opposing the Treaty; that, instead of having opinions their own upon so great and important subject, there was a power behind them which marked the course they should pursue; that they were unable to resist this influence, and that, if it had not been for its impetuous exercise, they would not be found in opposition to the Treaty to-day. The hon. member for West Durham had adopted the same line in relation to that statement; but what were the facts? Let him (Dr. Tupper) examine them for a moment, for they were of the deepest possible significance. The hon. member for West Durham had declared that the Opposition was prepared to pursue a patriotic course in relation to this question, and that it would have come to the support of the Minister if he had refused to carry out a negotiation which was injurious in its effects to the interests of this country. That statement sounded very well, and he (Dr. Tupper) had no doubt from the sincerity of the man in which it was made that the hon. gentleman had brought himself to believe that such would have been his course in the case if the First Minister had acted in that way. He thought, however, that the history of the case would scarcely bear out that assertion. On looking into that history what did they find had happened? Early in the month of May the *Globe* newspaper published a statement that the Treaty had been signed, and on the 18th it published the Treaty in *extenso*, together with an editorial, which contained the patriotic and significant remark "that the whole question was now before the country," and that it "trusted it would be discussed in a manner free from partisan bias, and worthy of its great importance." He did not pretend to quote the language employed, but he did not hesitate to state that when the Treaty was first published in the *Globe*, with far-seeing eyes, discovered clouds on the horizon, first in one direction and then in another. An election was pending in Nova Scotia, and the party there which was opposed to the Dominion Government was taking ground against the Treaty. The Legislature of Nova Scotia, the Legislature of New Brunswick, and the Legislature at the same time, and on the first week, without waiting for full information on the question, it came to a hasty decision, condemning in advance the provisions of the Treaty. That took place on the 18th, and on the following day, the 19th, the *Globe's* patriotic aspirations in relation to the mode in which the question should be approached and dealt with were scattered to the winds; and then came out an article of a column in length, in which the most fiery denunciations possible were showered on the Treaty. Up to that time the hon. members for Lambton and West Durham had been silent on the subject.

DR. MACKENZIE.—No. DR. TUPPER thought that it was so; and that, if the hon. gentleman examined the papers in the library, he would find that the statement was borne out by the record. The speech of the hon. member for West Durham, in which he announced his opposition to the Treaty, was not delivered until after the *Globe's* article in its denunciation of the Treaty, and that was the true account of the matter, and if it was the case— DR. MACKENZIE.—No; it is not the case. DR. TUPPER.—If that was the case, the hon. gentleman did not deserve much credit as a patriot, either in treating the question as a mere question of fact, or for their proffer of support to the Government, provided a difference was being pursued. (Hear, hear.) The hon. member for West Durham had said that the Government had expressed its disapproval of the Treaty, the Opposition, making those speeches at that early period, desired to give the Government information that they were one with it, and that, if it were the case, the Treaty, it might rely on their support. He (Dr. Tupper) thought there was room for very grave doubt on that point; for when his colleague the Minister of Public Works went down to Quebec, and in a public speech there stated that the Government had protested against the Treaty, what had happened? If there was any sin- gle statement of the hon. member for West Durham, if he and the *Globe*—that organ of the opinions of hon. gentlemen opposite—felt anxious, as was pretended, to strengthen the hands of the Government in resisting this great in- justice to the country, what would they have said as soon as the announcement of the Minister of Public Works was made? The hon. member for West Durham has saved. We feared the Govern- ment was committed to the Treaty, but now we are glad to find that it is free and untrammelled, with perfect liberty to deal with it in the interests of the country may be deemed best." Was that what they had said? No, far from it; but the hon. gentleman went back to his newspaper, and the moment it was found that the hands of the Government were not tied, and that it would not announce itself in favor of the ratification of the Treaty, a column of violence was ex- pressed, in which the Government was as- sailed for pursuing what was called a "vacillating course" in relation to the question. (Cheers.) Instead of treating it as a cause for congratulation by the country that the Government was protesting against Canada being com- pelled to make concessions without what was considered a just equivalent, the hon. gentleman opposite showed their animus against the Ministry, and proved that it was not as much the rejection of the Treaty they desired as the opportunity to use it, as they had used everything else that had come to their hands, however gigantic might be the interests involved, and however deeply these interests underlaid the safety and welfare of the union, the policy of the Ministry of the Dominion. They wanted to employ it as an engine for accom- plishing their own political purposes, irrespective altogether of the good of the country; and they played fast and loose with the question, dealing with it not as it would serve the interests of the people of the Dominion, but as it would give them the chance of aiming a deadly blow at those who had the administration of affairs in this country was committed. (Cheers.) The hon. member for West Durham had said, in relation to the fisheries, that their value was about seven millions. He (Dr. Tupper) would ask the House to examine with him for a moment whether their value had been lessened or increased by anything contained in the Treaty, and he admitted, indeed, with hesi- tation in saying, that when the Treaty first appeared there was a feeling of disappointment among the people of the country, which was shared in also by the Government, because there was not a renewal of the reciprocal arrangements of the Treaty of 1854. Everybody knew that that Treaty had still higher degrees of it had been beneficial to the people of the United States; and there was a general desire that there should be a renewal of arrangements that had proved so mutually advantageous. When the Treaty of last year was first published, then, it undoubtedly excited a good deal of disappointment in this respect. What were the reasons that had caused this failure to obtain what so many in both countries thought desirable? It seemed to be forgotten to a great extent by the press and the people in discussing the question, that, between 1854 and 1871, a great change had taken place in the relative commercial positions of the two countries. The fisheries of the Dominion, which the Americans, to fish in our waters, granted in 1854, was at that time an extremely valuable concession, an enormous one, indeed, which had greatly increased the prosperity of the American fishing trade, there being then nothing to prevent competition with the fishermen of the Maritime Provinces. But what was the case now? Was not every- thing changed? The fisheries of the Dominion were now a great burden to the country. Why, upon the terms on which the right was granted—the condition that the duty on fish should be removed, and Canadians admitted on an equal footing to the American market—where were the fishermen of the United States? Was it not known that they were almost in a state of overt rebellion? The hon. gentleman had asked for proof that they were opposed to the Treaty? Well, the proof, there was plenty of it, was to the fore. Public meetings had been held in Boston, as well as throughout the fishing dis- tricts, at which Congress had been memorialized to prevent this injury to the American fish- ing interest. It had also been placed on record, those meeting that the Treaty struck a fatal blow at the interest, inasmuch as, while in 1854 American fishermen were able to compete with Canadians, because they had no high taxes to pay, and the cost of outfit was much less than at present, the war and the burdens it had left behind had so changed their position in relation to this question, that every Canadian fisherman, who had a fish in the sea, had his own door with all the advantages of cheap equipment, and if he belonged, as no one doubted, to the same courageous and adventurous class as the Americans, would enter into the competition with an advantage of 40 or 50 per cent. in his favour. (Hear, hear.) That was the ground the Americans had taken, who were most concerned in this. Dr. Tupper had said that there was a man in this House, no matter from what Province he might be, whether from Ontario or Quebec, Nova Scotia or New

Brunswick, who would say that the Canadian fisherman was deserving of any con- sideration, if he was not able with that premium in his favour to meet the competi- tion not only of the United States, but of the world? (Hear, hear.) Why then, instead of the Treaty surrendering our fish- men and fisheries to the destructive competition of the foreigners, the result would be—and mark his words, the facts would soon show it—that the American fishermen who employed their industry in the waters of Canada would become like the American lumbermen who engaged in that trade in the valley of the Ottawa; they would settle upon Cana- dian soil, bringing with them their character for enterprise and energy, and would become equally good subjects of Her Majesty, would give this country the benefit of their talents and their enterprise and their capital. (Cheers.) Was there anybody who could doubt as to the effect of removing the duty which was now levied of two dollars per barrel upon mackerel and one dollar upon salmon, of taking off this enormous bounty in favour of the American fishermen, and leaving our fishermen free and unrestricted access to the best market for them in the world? Was there any one who could doubt that the practical result would be to leave the Canadians, in a very short time, almost without any competition at all? And yet hon. gentlemen opposite are prepared to believe that the Act which would produce such a state of things as that was a surrender, a "base sur- render," as they pretend, of our fish- eries of this country. The newspaper press of Canada, and especially the press representing hon. gentlemen opposite, had for a long time held out the idea that Parliament and the Government man- aged to get a very striking and unusual fishermen of Nova Scotia and the other provinces against the operation of this Treaty, which, it was held, would be ruinous to them in every way. Gradually, however, light began to break in upon them, until at last they discovered this extraordinary fact, that while the clauses of this Treaty which related to Canada were held by every intelligent fisherman to be a great boon, something which would take the taxes off them and relieve them from hundreds of thousands of dollars tribute that they were now compelled to pay to a foreign nation, the fishermen of the United States were, on the other hand, just as much aware to the Treaty that our people were anxious that it should be carried into effect. (Hear, hear.) How different would the future be under this Treaty from what it would certainly be if the present state of af- fairs were to continue. What was the re- sult now? Why, many of our fishermen were compelled to go to the United States, abandoning their homes in Canada, in order to get a living upon an equal footing with the Americans; and not only was their industry lost to this country, but when the fishing season was over they went to man the American navy, so that the very bone and sinew of the Dominion were placed in a position in which, in case of a collision, they would be compelled to act against us and against the country which had been a great blessing to them. It was hardly necessary that he should refer at greater length to a point in regard to which our interest was so plainly marked out; but he would say a word or two upon a remark that had fallen from the hon. member for Lambton, who had asked the Min- ister of Justice why it was that the sea-side fisheries, which were so valuable, had been given up, while the fresh water fisheries had been preserved. If the hon. gentleman would take a trip to the Maritime Provinces, where they did not see so much of him as they would desire to see of one who was so distinguished among the public men of Canada, he would probably be able to learn something upon this and other points which would be advantageous to him. The fisheries of the great lakes and those of the sea were entirely distinct, and had been so dealt with in the Treaty, for this reason, that to a great extent the products of the lake fisheries were sold as fresh fish in the United States, upon which there was no duty levied.

DR. MACKENZIE.—No, no. DR. TUPPER.—More than that. The system now adopted by the Americans to some extent was to employ middle men who bought up the fish in their fresh state, packed them in ice, and sent them off to the American market while still in that condition; so that while there was no duty on fresh fish, salted fish were liable to an almost prohibitory duty. Dr. Tupper had said that the principle was apparently antagonistic should have prevailed in the Treaty. The hon. gentleman from North Huron, who had spoken so forcibly to-night,

had said he would like to know what ex- planation the Commissioners could give for refusing to accept free salt, free coal, and free lumber from and after 1874, and their sub- sequent acceptance of the less liberal offer. The answer was a very simple one, and had already been fully given to the House. It was not necessary that he (Dr. Tupper) should add a single word to what had been so eloquently said in reference to his hon. colleague the First Min- ister; but after all that had been said by hon. gentlemen opposite, as to the mode in which he had discharged the great duty and trust committed to him, he could not refrain from making some allusion to it. He did not be- lieve, notwithstanding all the complaints that had been made, that there was a single man of character among those who sat op- posite, who, in his Sovereign had tendered to him an invitation to serve upon that Commission, would have felt for a moment that there was any feeling of patriotism, any sense of public duty, which would make him shrink from accepting the commission, or restrain him from discharging the duty it involved. (Hear, hear.) He would go even a step further, and say that he had too high an opinion of the patriotism and loyalty of hon. gentlemen opposite, at least the leaders of them, to suppose for a moment that there was a man of character among them who would assume the responsibility of saying that the members of that Commission should have undertaken to question the instructions which, under the weight of the authority and sanction of the Crown, had been sent out from England, as the result of the best de- liberations of English Government, and as to what was best for the safety and welfare of the whole Empire. He would say further, that if the question had been put to the Commissioner from this country in this manner, "Will you sign this Treaty, to which the entire people and press of England attach the most vital consequences, which is regarded as being of the utmost importance for the future well-being of the Empire, and provided everything which you take ex- ception is left to the decision,—whether to accept or approve, to confirm or reject—of your own free, unrestricted, and uncontrolled Parliament?"—supposing the case had been put in that way, he had too high an opinion of hon. gentlemen opposite to believe so extravagant that he could find a man in their ranks who, in any such great crisis in the affairs of his country, and having regard to the momentous question not only of the Imperial relations with a foreign power, but of the relations of this colony with the Mother Country, would, if he had been in the position of a Commissioner, have taken the fearful responsibility upon his shoulders. He would say, though you do reserve for our Parliament a final decision upon the matter, I will refuse to sign the Treaty, although it may be fatal to the hopes of a friendly settlement of the questions between the two countries, may be expected to place the Empire in peril, and may throw England back and destroy all hopes of a peaceful solution of existing difficulties. (Cheers.) If Dr. Tupper could believe there was a man amongst them who would be willing to have assumed such a load of responsibility. If there was he felt assured that that man would not, on his re- turn, have received an enthusiastic recep- tion from the people of this country, but rather that the finger of scorn would have been pointed at him as a traitor, not only to the high position of a Commissioner of the Empire, but a traitor to the people of Canada as well. (Loud cheers.) The hon. member for Huron had asked the meaning of the refusal of free coal, and free salt, and free lumber after 1874; and yet the acceptance of free fish and fish oil at a later period. The matter was perfectly intelligible. The hon. gentleman complained that he did not find arguments in the protocols on the matter. He could not know the facts. He could not know that the protocols were not prepared till the last thing, so as to give the general principles on which the results were based. The hon. gentleman ought to be satisfied with the extract from the speech in the House of Lords of the chairman of the Commission, quoted by the Minister of Finance, showing that reciprocity had been struggled for in the most determined way possible, and had only been given up when nothing more could be done. A good deal had been said about the "national policy," and he might say that gentlemen opposite had not the excuse they had given for their action in that matter. Hon. gentlemen opposite had treated the fisheries as of less value, when he, night after night, struggled to get Parliament to adopt the principle of

their protecting them and taxing the products of the United States. He had always maintained, as he did now, that there was nothing more necessary to the prosperity of this country than reciprocal trade with the United States, and it was under that impression that, in the discharge of his duty, he struggled with the Government and Opposition, and combined with hon. gentlemen opposite who, he thought, were acting in good faith, to endeavour to secure the adoption of the policy which he considered the only means to secure reciprocity. When the President of the United States declared in his annual message to Congress that the policy of the United States was opposed to reciprocity and that it would be purely in the interest of Canada, he (Dr. Tupper) felt that it must be obtained by the rigid exclusion of Americans from the Canadian fishing grounds and the taxation of their products. That exclusion was tried, and then, when there was every indication of success, gentlemen forgot the duty they owed to their country, and, in combination with those who had been most loud in favour of that policy, struck it down. Hon. gentlemen demanded why they were not told by the Government what the effect of their action was on the Commission. The Government had it not in their power to give such information. What they knew was in the strictest confidence, and they could not state it without bringing dishonour and discredit on the First Minister. He desired to vindicate the Government from the charge of having failed in their duty in this matter, and he was reminding hon. gentlemen opposite that he stood up in his place and implored them to hold their hands from a policy so suicidal; stating that every one must know that the question of the fisheries would be considered at the conference; and that as Canada wanted reciprocal trade no more, and as it was what the First Minister was struggling for, he asked hon. gentlemen if in that crisis they were prepared, for the mere purpose of obtaining a temporary triumph over the Government, to reverse the policy that had been so successfully instituted. But his appeal was in vain; and it was no wonder when the news came that the action of the Canadian Parliament had entirely changed the aspect of the matter in the United States, and that the offer previously made was withdrawn. If the hon. gentlemen wanted to know why the First Minister did not accept the offer when first made, it was this he said:—"You ought to give us more. You gave us more in 1854. If you want the same privileges you then enjoyed, you must give us more and as much as when the hon. gentleman was making a gallant and probably a not ineffectual struggle to advance the great agricultural interests of the Provinces, hon. gentlemen opposite combined to strike down his hand. He had then to adopt the Treaty or to take the responsibility of striking the deadliest blow possible at the interests of the Empire. He was in favour of the Treaty because it was the only means left to obtain reciprocal trade, by allying all enmities between the two countries. This was already found to be the result, and everyone who had visited the United States since the ratification of the Treaty came back in favour of it, for the reason that there was a wonderful difference in the state of feeling in the United States towards Canada. All the acrimonious feeling that formerly existed had been allayed. Let hon. gentlemen study the proceedings of Congress, and they would find the same change evidenced there. The member for West Durham stated that, if Canada had continued the policy of exclusion, the American fisheries would have utterly failed, and they would have been at our mercy. This was a great mistake. Last summer he went down in a steamer from Dalhousie to Pictou, and fell in with a fleet of thirty American fishing vessels which had averaged 300 bbls. of mackerel in three weeks, and had never been within ten miles of the shore; and from this the member for Durham would see that the exclusion of the Americans was not quite as efficacious as he imagined.

Mr. MACKENZIE asked whether they were within the headlines.

Dr. TUPPER said he could not speak as to that; but the question was altogether a capacious one, for it was well known that the headline limit had not been enforced for years. He maintained that the member for West Durham gave up the whole argument when he spoke of bounties being necessary to enable the Americans to compete with the Canadian fishermen. If, however, the hon. member would read the proceedings of Congress, he would find that the question of bounties had been scouted from the very

first, and that it was admitted on all hands that a system of bounties was utterly impossible; but further, the highest system of bounty would give but \$400 to a vessel, while the remission of duty on her cargo would amount to \$1,200; and therefore the bounty could not, under any circumstances, do away with the advantages on the side of Canadian fishermen. He again referred to what he termed the unparliamentary action of members last year.

Mr. HOLTON thought the hon. gentleman was out of order in reflecting on the action of the House.

Sir JOHN MACDONALD said it was not out of order, for the action of the House was always open to appeal.

Dr. TUPPER said he was quite satisfied to find the hon. gentleman acknowledging that a reference to his former action was a reflection.

Mr. HOLTON said, however that might be, the hon. gentleman assumed the responsibility of that action.

Dr. TUPPER said that was under compulsion. If hon. gentleman would read a statement recently made by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means of the United States they would see that it would be impracticable for the United States to adopt a policy that would counteract the advantages derived by Canadian fishermen. He would now ask hon. gentlemen to turn their attention to the effect of the Treaty on the shipping interest of the country. The member for Halifax had told them that he went to visit a fishery in which he was concerned, when the Treaty of 1854 was in force, and found that, out of forty or fifty vessels, scarcely one was American; but that on another occasion, after the abrogation of that treaty, among an equal number of vessels, scarcely one was Canadian.

It must be remembered that our commercial marine amounted to a million tons, and the House would see that, whether in connection with the fishery or the ship-building interest, the value of the Treaty could not be overrated. He would now refer to the state of public opinion in Nova Scotia. Before the Treaty was made the Nova Scotia Government put a very strong resolution in their journals. Since then the Treaty had been promulgated to the world, and had changed the policy of the fishermen in the Province, and now the House there had been in session for over two months, and there had not been no disapproval of the Treaty. He believed that the feeling in Nova Scotia was that Parliament could not inflict a greater wrong on them, and could not paralyze their industries more than by refusing to ratify the Treaty, which promised and protected their great national industries without injuring a single interest, or being counterbalanced by a single drawback; and that a refusal would also tend to prevent the obtaining of reciprocity in the future. He was not so well prepared to speak as to New Brunswick; but the same thing took place there. The New Brunswick Legislature at first strongly opposed the Treaty, but though they had only been six or eight weeks in session, there was not a single hostile resolution placed on their records. As to Prince Edward's Island, the Treaty was as good as accepted.

Mr. MACKENZIE asked whether they had repealed the former resolutions.

Dr. TUPPER said he would not detain the House further, and regretted that he had trespassed so long at so late a stage of the discussion; but the question was one in which not only the interests of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and the whole Dominion were concerned, but also the interests of the Empire, and he would not have done justice to himself if he had not given utterance to his views. The hon. gentleman took his seat amid loud cheers.

On Wednesday, the 15th—

Sir GEORGE CARTIER hoped the House would pardon him for addressing a few words to it at this late stage of the debate, on the important question under discussion. Although the matter had been argued fully on both sides of the House, he thought there were one or two points which had not been touched upon in regard to the favourable consideration of the bill. But before coming to the consideration of the merits of the question, he hoped he might be allowed to bring to the remembrance of the House debates which took place some years ago. It might be remembered that, during the great discussions that had taken place between his party and the Liberal party of Upper Canada on the subject of representation by population, he had on one occasion

made a speech which had afterwards been called by his political opponents, "The great codfish speech." (Laughter.) His object in that speech was to show that when it was urged by Mr. Brown and his party that Upper Canada, having a large population, should have representation by population, his (Sir George's) reply had always been "Give us the representation which will bring to us the Maritime Provinces, and I shall have no objection to representation by population." He at that time remarked that though Upper Canada could boast of many sources of wealth as an agricultural country, and had a population a little larger than Lower Canada, still it was nearly as it were an inland country, not having the valuable fishing resources which Lower Canada in conjunction with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia possessed; and it was to be borne in mind that without the fishing resources of Lower Canada, with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, which did so much to increase the wealth of Upper Canada by raising the value of wheat and other farm products would have never been obtained from the Americans. Had it not been for the fisheries and the "cod fish" of Maritime Provinces the American Government could never have been induced to consent to the Reciprocity Treaty, for except these fisheries Upper Canada had in fact nothing to offer in exchange to the Americans. We might say, as he had said at that time, that the "cod fish" procured the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. He was much taken to task at the time for such expressions of his views, but the accuracy of his assertions as to the value of the Fisheries had been fully vindicated since, by the articles which had appeared for the last ten months in the *Globe*, and by the speeches of several members of the Opposition in which they had been again and again stated that nothing was more valuable than the Fisheries of the Dominion. The reason the Government had offered protests in relation to the Treaty was because that in the proper value of the Fisheries appeared not to have been considered; but the Dominion Government, knowing how valuable they really were, did their duty by remonstrating with the United States, and as much as possible for the cessation of these valuable fishing rights. Hon. gentlemen from the Maritime Provinces must not consider that they were alone interested in this question; for the Province of Quebec, in her Gulf and Labrador fisheries, was equally as much interested as the sister provinces. He was glad to make these remarks at this time, because, as the hon. gentleman from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had spoken as if they were the only Provinces blessed with the wealthy fisheries, while the fact was that the yield of fish in the Province of Quebec compared most favourably with the yield in the other Provinces. (Hear, hear.) The Government then, as far as it was called upon to act respecting this matter of the Treaty, was aware of the immense value of the fisheries, and knew that, to permit the Americans to fish in our waters upon the same footing with our Canadian fishermen, was giving them a great advantage, and they had done all they could, and all it was their duty to do by way of representation and remonstrance, in order that the fisheries should be used as to gain for Canada greater advantages in the direction of reciprocity of trade than those secured by the treaty; failing to obtain that, they had obtained the next best thing. The same contention and remonstrance must have been made by the Commissioners who negotiated the Treaty, since there was a clause in it which provided that there should be a monetary arbitration in case of dispute. If upon arbitration it was shown that the value of the fisheries opened to the enjoyment of the Americans, was greater than the value of the American fisheries thrown open to the Canadians. Several hon. gentlemen opposite had endeavoured to make it appear that the Treaty was a cession of territorial rights. Now, it was merely a tariff arrangement, and nothing else. (Hear, hear.) He used the expression advisedly; it was simply a commercial regulation, with the additional provision that, if we gave to the Americans more than they gave to us during the twelve years the Treaty remained in operation, the excess of value should be ascertained by arbitration, and paid to us as a money compensation. There was no territorial cession, as he had said, and there was no cession of territorial rights, for if it had been proposed it was the duty of this Government to represent to the Imperial Government that there should be no such cession. It was still fresh in their memory

what had taken place in New Brunswick with regard to the Maine boundary, and that were not disposed to allow the Imperial Government or the Commissioners to be in the sight of the fact that they were aware what was going on, and that they were opposed to anything that would bear the appearance of a cession of territorial rights. Thus the Treaty, as was finally concluded, imparted no such cession. (Hear, hear.) He had listened with great pleasure to all hon. gentlemen who had spoken on the other side, and particularly to the hon. member for West Durham, and his colleagues and himself had been struck with the fact that during the first two hours of the gentleman's speech he had drawn all his arguments from documents that had been prepared at the instance of the Government. (Hear, hear.) He was glad to see that the remarks which had been presented to the Imperial Government in order to secure liberal treatment for Canada, were so highly appreciated by the hon. gentlemen opposite, and he held to be so conclusive as to form the principal arguments addressed to the House. It was a matter of surprise to him, however, that the leaders of the Opposition, who had spoken so eloquently and forcibly upon the subject, instead of taking their arguments from the newspapers which had discussed the Treaty in an unfriendly spirit, had drawn all their inspiration from documents which the Government had prepared for submission to the Imperial Government. He acknowledged and felt it to be a high compliment, secondly, that he had looked for arguments to sustain their case in papers that had been written by the Government. (Hear, and laughter.) He would now address himself to some part of the speech of the hon. member for West Durham that had not yet been answered. The hon. gentleman had divided his speech into three topics—first, the cession of territorial rights; second, the equality of the Treaty as far as it concerned the navigation of the St. Lawrence; and third, the Fenian claims. On the first topic he laboured to make it appear that he implied a cession of territorial rights, but he had not succeeded in making out his case. He had acknowledged that no harm was done, and that the power was reserved to the Canadian Parliament and people to reject or confirm the work of the Commissioners. When the hon. gentleman afterwards referred to the navigation of the St. Lawrence, he had laid down a proposition of international law which was entirely incorrect, and knowing, as he did, the legal ability of his hon. friend, it had surprised him to find such a statement put forth. It had urged that, as the fisheries clause of the Treaty had been reserved for the decision of this Parliament, so, too, ought the article relating to the St. Lawrence, because the river from St. Regis downwards flowed between banks which on both sides were Canadian territory. The hon. gentleman had then to the Confederation Act, by giving this Parliament power to legislate upon navigation and shipping, and to legislate upon Canada of legislation with regard to navigation of the St. Lawrence; and therefore, the consent of Parliament to the article of the Treaty should have been sought. That part of the hon. member's argument had not been answered, and Sir (George) would address himself to some of the false legal notions advanced by hon. gentlemen. The reason that the articles of the Treaty providing for the free admission of fish, and fish oil had been reserved for decision of Parliament, was that their operation depended upon the repeal of certain duties, which could only be removed by an Act of the Canadian Parliament. There was also another reason—By the Confederation Act the Dominion Government had a right to make laws within the territorial boundaries of the Dominion. It conceded that the sea within three miles of the shore was part of the territory of the country, and that vessels of other nations had a right to navigate those waters for other purposes of trade than fish. What made it necessary that the assent of Parliament should be obtained to allow vessels to frequent these waters for fishing was that, in order to carry out the law profitably, it was requisite that fishermen would land their nets and use the shore for the purpose of drying and curing; that is to say, to use our territory for that purpose. As it rested with this Parliament to determine who should enjoy such a right as the Fisheries, it was necessary that the consent of Parliament should be obtained before those articles could become operative. From that necessity the hon. member for West Durham had argued by inference that the right to navigate the St. Lawrence ought also to have been

free lands to embark in the pursuits of a foreign country, and drain their own land of that aid and strength which their presence would have secured. (Hear, hear.) There was another evil in connection with this matter, that, not only were they forced to aid in promoting the welfare of another country, but they were, by being so, gradually alienated from the land of their birth, and the more so, inasmuch as the contrasts and comparisons to the detriment of their country to which they belonged; because, in the country to which they departed they derived benefits that were unattainable in their own. (Hear, hear.) Another evil of the present state of things was the impediment thrown in the way of shipbuilding by the depression caused in the business of the fisheries. The Nova Scotia fishermen and mechanics who were able to build vessels that would compete in every important respect with those built by our American neighbours, the commercial impediments thrown in the way of Americans fishing in Canadian waters had an injurious effect upon the ship building interest. It had been said that the concessions obtained by the Dominion were not equivalent to the concessions that had been granted to the United States. Upon that point he regarded what had been said by the Minister of Justice about the privileges of Canadians resorting to American waters for the purpose of procuring bait, as being of great importance. He believed that to be a very valuable and important concession. (Hear, hear.) He did not regard the American import duties on fish as of great value as had been represented, for he knew that frequently American fishermen left our coast and resorted to their own waters, where they received a valuable recompense for changing their venue and base of operations. By the treaty of 1818 American fishing vessels were not permitted to enter our harbours except for the purpose of obtaining wood and water, and after that concession had produced a great deal of dissatisfaction and did injustice to our shore population. During the reciprocity those vessels were constantly in our waters, engaged in a mutually advantageous business with the merchants who lived on shore. Both parties desired a renewal of that relation, which would decidedly be to the advantage of Nova Scotia, and he was desirous to restore to the people of Nova Scotia the advantages of that reciprocal trade, that he was ardently anxious for the ratification of this Treaty. To use a phrase that had been employed on both sides of the House, his constituents had "set their hearts upon it;" and as far as his voice and vote went they would surely have it. He was, he felt, extremely sorry that the Treaty had received the sanction of the House, nor could he satisfy his own mind that such opposition was called for by any interest in the country. If the Treaty was objectionable to the people, how came it that there was no expression of popular feeling against this measure? How was it that there were no petitions presented against it? How was it that the Board of Trade and Chambers of Commerce, which were so well informed of everything connected with the commercial interests of the country, had sent no remonstrance and uttered no objections? (Hear, hear.) Why all this reticence, if, as some hon. gentlemen maintained there was a deep-grounded antipathy to the Treaty throughout the land? Here, he said, was one of the most important questions that could be presented to this Legislature, or was likely ever to come before it, which was declared by some hon. gentlemen to be a betrayal of our rights and fatal to our interests; and yet the great body of the people had not uttered a word against it, but had left it to their representatives to do what it was not common for them to do when great interests were at stake—act for the benefit of the members of their constituents being specially declared. (Hear, hear.) Treating the subject from a broader than a mere local point of view, he held that the maintenance of good will between the people of Canada and of the United States was of the very first importance to both, and also to the people of Canada. It was a matter of the greatest importance of good relations between them had been threatened. Events concurrent with the late civil war in the United States had led to a state of feeling which it was most desirable should not be continued. These two great nations had by this Treaty adopted a mode by which those differences might be healed, by which that unhappy and dangerous state of things was ended, and they had provided a mode by which the horrors and barbarities incident to a state of war would henceforth be avoided, and the mild and

ed by the abolition of
ed States. This state-
continued, was incor-
very had been abolished,
been abolished. There
in the Southern States for
which was especially suited
the, but the business of
the almost wholly in the
ours. It was well known
of American vessels do
to the Magellan Islands,
fortune, Newfoundland,
very similar quality are
the new driven
ing fishes because the
d States on the kind of
the prohibitory. Remove
ed by the Washington
ermen will have these
lustry restored to them.
ement made by the Pre-
to the effect that the
in the United States
of \$600,000 last year,
of Nova Scotia. The
(Mr. Jones) had denied
the duty on mackerel
to the States in 1871
000. That was another
fact that was made to
ment. It was quite
in our fish exported to
year would only have
\$80,000, but that only
was so nearly pro-
vent the export of
He read from a re-
the value of the fish
that year amounted
Of the mackerel, there
mackerel, and 201,600
nty on which, (I shipped
be over \$650,000; so
de by the President of
more than justified by
as small a proportion
e States it was because
from history. Remove
from House, returns of
mackerel will show much
member for Halifax had
head of admitting the
ing grounds, we ought
protective policy, and
been properly enforced
a renewal of recipro-
s doubly inconsistent,
trary to the hon. gen-
er for the last twenty
adicted by a por-
ent now. If his
number of Amer-
increased very largely
years was true, then
the number of their pro-
fouling in spite of
lating labor under in-
on from our waters.
antage they have on
not be afraid to re-
have in the exclu-
fisheries. Our people
te to them onequal
skilled as theirs, and
m to the privilege of
exchange for free ac-
This assertion, that
reciprocity in fishing,
exclusion of the Amer-
was a strange doctrine
ho assumed to be the
that party in Nova
ced the protective
the House he would
in a newspaper, the
the party for which
supposed to speak,
ntrolled by a gentle-
er of that party in
the Province. In
1870, the protective
announced in the
ber was not then in
of that month, the
le, the organ of his
out, his sentiments,
we drive the Americans
protect our national pro-
at their competition, in
rotinate a renewal of
of have been some years
command itself to the
if the arrogation of the
Not so now, how-
used away, and
ought."

of September:—

is, thank heaven they
of conduct will
their Reciprocity. Their
tended fishery pro-
e American people, as

we have already succeeded in raising some of our own,
we may find Congress prohibiting commerce with the
if it does the Dominion will be beggared in
two years.

Such, Mr. Speaker, were the views and
opinion held and expressed on this sub-
ject from the day the licensing system
ceased and the protective party commenced,
down to the time of the sitting of the Joint
High Commission at Washington, by that
party in Nova Scotia of whom the hon.
member for Halifax is the acknowledged
mouthpiece in this House. Then the most
liberal treatment of our neighbours was
sought, and the benefits arising to them
from their trade alone was declared to be
more than an equivalent for the use of our
labour fisheries; and it is passing strange
to find that honourable gentleman now tak-
ing up a cry that it was then said only
"fools" had faith in, urging the removal of
what was then described as the "mad as-
sumption" in the Dominion, and the regu-
lations which were declared to be "in-
humanous," now, when it is proposed to open
our fisheries for a consideration far exceeding
what was then declared to be more than an
equivalent. But it has been said by hon.
gentlemen, the members for Halifax and
Hochelaga, that Nova Scotia has spoken
not since that time, add by the
voice of her Legislature condemned the
Treaty. He (Mr. McD.) denied that state-
ment. The resolution passed by the Nova
Scotia House of Assembly in 1871, was not
in any sense a condemnation of the Treaty.
On the 14th of February in that year, Mr.
Hill in the House of Assembly moved a
resolution requesting the Governor-General
to urge on the Joint High Commission the
recognition of the fishing rights of the Pro-
vinces and that no diminution of them
should be allowed without a full equivalent.
On the 17th the Attorney-General moved as
an amendment a series of resolutions, differ-
ing very little in substance from that moved
by Mr. Hill, but added a little of the
bitterness which that party showed so fre-
quently in treating on Dominion affairs.
The Joint High Commission had not yet sat.
It was not known what course might be
taken by that Commission on this fishery
question; the fisheries might be sacrificed,
or they might not, but it was always in
order in that House of Assembly to have a
fling at Canada, and her statesmen, and so
an amendment with a preamble was moved
to Mr. Hill's resolution that would convey
an insult as well as a remonstrance. By the
amendment it was resolved:—

"That this House cannot contemplate the said com-
mission without serious apprehension in respect of the
invaluable coast fisheries of the Maritime Colonies;
and consider it their duty to the fishermen and other
inhabitants of those colonies to protest against the
proposed transfer of the said fisheries being transferred
to any foreign power, without the consent of the people
of the said Colonies, in any manner
sacrificed to Imperial or Canadian interests."

That resolution passed by a vote of thirty
to three. It certainly did not contain any-
thing that either the hon. member for
Halifax, or the hon. member for Hochelaga,
interpreted by the view that for a year and a
half previous had been expressed by the
party who passed it, could be considered as
condemning the provisions of the Treaty of
Washington. He (Mr. McD.) contended
that all that was demanded by that resolution
was more than secured by the Treaty. The
resolution protested against the fisheries being
sacrificed. They had not been sacrificed.
It protested against the fisheries being trans-
ferred to any foreign power without the con-
sent of the people of the Colonies. They have
not been transferred to any foreign power.
They will be as much our property when the
Treaty goes into effect, as they were when
the resolution was passed. The Treaty
transfers to our neighbours no right, no prop-
erty in them, but leaves the ownership
solely with us; giving to our neighbours not
the right, but the privilege to use them for a
term of years, and leaving with us the right
to resume the exclusive use of them after
those years if then seem to be good
policy to do so; and it also gives the right as
requested by the resolutions to the people of
the colonies through their representatives in
Parliament, to give or withhold their consent
to the arrangements that have been made
respecting the fisheries. But since that re-
solution was passed by the Nova Scotia As-
sembly, an election has been held in that
Province. The Treaty was signed on the 8th
of May, 1871, and published immediately
afterwards. It was never heard that during
the ten days that elapsed between the pub-
lishing of the Treaty and the election, any
objection to it had been taken at a single
meeting in Nova Scotia. It was well known
that on the part of the men supporting the
Provincial Government at that election,
hostility to the Dominion Government was
a main feature of their canvass, and it is

very certain that if they had felt they could
strengthen their position by attacking the
Treaty, they would not have failed to do so.
They did not because they knew it would
be unpopular to do so. The new Assembly
met in February last and remained two
months in session, the men who held the
Local Government in 1871 held it still, and
had a majority in the new House as they
had in that of 1871, yet during that whole
session they said nothing against the Treaty,
never hinted that the fisheries were being
sacrificed, never referred to their resolution
of 1871, or said that all that it asked for was
not more than secured by the clauses of the
Treaty which the bill now before the House
proposes to ratify. With such evidence he
(Mr. McD.) felt he was justified in saying
that neither the people nor the Legislature
of Nova Scotia were opposed to the Treaty
of Washington. There was another remark
made by the member for Halifax, Mr.
Jones, that he (Mr. McD.) could not pass
by in silence. That gentleman had said every
annexationist in Nova Scotia was in favour of
the Treaty. This was an extraordinary state-
ment to come from that quarter. There were
very few annexationists in Nova Scotia;
there were a few in Halifax, and there
was, or had been lately, an annexation
league in that city. It was a well known
fact that among the members of that league
were some of that hon. gentleman's intimate
associates. Its members were to a man his
political friends and supporters, and if
among those who supported him in his gen-
eral political policy there were any who sup-
ported him in his hostility to the Treaty,
they were to be found among those who
were members of that annexation league.
Yet in the face of these facts, the hon.
gentleman had the hardihood to assert that the
annexationists, and few besides, were in fa-
vour of the Treaty. It has been contended
that in addition to what the Treaty proposes
to give us, free markets for our lumber and
coal should also have been received in ex-
change for the use of our fisheries. He
(Mr. McD.) gave it as the opinion of one of
the largest coal owners of Nova Scotia that
the coal interests did not suffer and might
be benefited by the arrangement that the
Treaty proposes. The time would come
and perhaps would soon come, when the
coal and lumber duties in the States
would be removed, as were the coal duties
in England, by force of circumstance, and
when the question will be then settled, upon
its own merits, the settlement will be more
permanent, and therefore better for our lum-
ber and coal interests, than if those articles
had been made free under the Treaty, only
as a make weight or equivalent for some-
thing that we were to receive concerning our
neighbours. It may be that a free market
for our coal and lumber would not be more
than an equivalent for what the Americans
are to receive from us; but would it be wise
for us on that ground to take the responsi-
bility of rejecting the Treaty. Reject the
Treaty, and we don't get free markets for
our coal and lumber, and we lose the Treaty,
and those interests are not benefited. While
our fishermen will be deeply injured. On
the other hand, in accepting the Treaty,
these coal and lumber interests will be
placed in no worse position than they were
before, while the interests of our fishermen will
be largely benefited, the interests of peace and
of the Empire promoted, and a guarantee
given in the amiable feeling already result-
ing from the Treaty, that a more liberal
policy in their commercial intercourse with
us will in the future be adopted by our
neighbours. Had time permitted he (Mr.
McD.) had intended to have spoken of some
other features of the very important ques-
tion opened up by the bill under discussion;
but so late an hour in the morning he
would not trespass further upon the patience
of the House. (Cries of "go on.") He had
spoken only of those features of the measure
that more especially affected the Provinces
from which he came, and he concluded by
saying that, looking from a Nova Scotia point
of view, and more particularly from a Nova
Scotia fisherman's point of view, he would
not hesitate in voting against the several
amendments that had been proposed, and
in favour of the bill to give effect to the
Treaty. (Cheers.)

On Tuesday, May 14th.—

Mr. HARRISON said—Various opinions
have been expressed by the gentlemen who
have already addressed the House as to the
merits of the Washington Treaty, but
in one thing all appear to agree, viz., that
the importance of the Treaty as to the future
of the country cannot be over-rated. This
must be my apology for offering some ob-
servations on the Dominion Government, of which
I may repeat something that has been already

said, but I trust I may also bring something
new to the mind of truth. The discussion
has taken a very wide range, but I always
make it a practice, before entering upon a
discussion, to endeavour, if possible, to ascer-
tain what is the question at issue. The
Government have introduced a bill, and
moved its second reading, to give effect to
certain clauses of the Treaty, and in so doing
they have brought the subject before the
House, and have left the House unfettered to
press its full opinion on its merits, and
thus the utmost freedom of action has been
given. This motion for a second
reading of the bill was met by an amend-
ment moved by the hon. member for West
Durham, in which he states "that before
proceeding further with the said bill, this
House feels bound to declare that while Her
Majesty's loyal subjects, the people of
Canada would at all times make any reason-
able sacrifice in the interests of this Empire,
there are just grounds for the dissatisfaction
prevailing the whole country, at the mode
in which our rights have been dealt with in
the negotiations of Washington, and the
subsequent proposal at our Government
that England should endorse a Canadian
loan as the price of the adoption of the
Treaty, and the abandonment of the claims
in respect of the Fenian raids, which affect
not merely our purse, but also our honour
and our peace."

The effect of this amendment is to narrow
the freedom of action which existed on the
introduction of the Bill, because the work-
ing of the resolution leads to only one
conclusion, which is that it is de-
pendent upon the action of the Government.
It is unquestionably a party move in the
interests of gentlemen forming the Opposition
in this House, who desire if possible to
secure some little political capital with a
view to the elections that are about to take
place throughout the Dominion. The
amendment must be dissected before it can
be well understood. It is an indictment
against the Government, but it is not a
proposition generally found in indictments.
It embraces, very properly, a profession of
loyalty—we always find such motions pre-
faced with such a profession. It contains an
allegation that there is now dissatisfaction
with the Treaty through out the country.
This is an assertion which I deny to be true.
(Cheers.) It then alleges that there are just
grounds for the dissatisfaction, and proceeds
to point out the causes of the dissatisfaction.
These causes are stated to be the mode in
which our rights were dealt with at Wash-
ington, and the proposal of our Government
that England should endorse a Canadian
loan as the price of the adoption of the
Treaty, and the abandonment of the claims
in respect of the Fenian raids, which affect
not merely our purse, but also our honour
and our peace. The honourable member for
Sherbrooke said he should vote against the
amendment because it was an attack on the
Treaty, and if the motion were carried, he
could not see how the gentlemen who pro-
posed it could afterwards bring in and carry
through the Bill. He has observed that he
knows as much of the Opposition as
we in Ontario do. (Hear, hear.) A part
of their tactics has been to oppose
measures, and then when they have got into
power, to pass the same measures themselves.
Gentlemen from Ontario are perfectly aware
that the present Government of that Pro-
vince got into power by their opposition to
the policy of the late Government in a
particular—that particular being grants to
railways. These grants they looked upon
as extravagant, and denounced them as ex-
travagant, as corruption, and as bribery. By
means of these denunciations the gentlemen
were enabled to secure power, and then to
bring in the measures of which they had
previously disapproved of as grants, they
increased them. (Hear, hear.) The hon.
gentleman therefore need not be surprised
if those who attacked the present measure,
should, after securing power by means of the
attack, of themselves carry out the measure.
(Hear, hear.) The amendment was intended
to lead to a trial of strength, to a political
triumph, but the discussion that has taken
place in the House must have satisfied the
member that instead of coming out number
one in the contest, there will be an over-
whelming majority against him. No doubt
the hon. gentleman thought when he placed
his amendment on the journals, that he
represented, to some extent, the feeling of
the Opposition, but he must now be convinced,
from the debate that has taken place, that he
be calculated without proper foundation, and
that the motion which he thought would
catch and carry a number of votes will meet
with an overwhelming defeat, in the House
and the country. Fearing this result he
backs down, and we have an amendment
proposed to the amendment, which is a
very curious thing, having regard to the dif-
ferences between the United States and Great

Britain, concerning the proceedings neces-
sary to give effect to the Treaty of Wash-
ington, it is inexpedient at this time, to pro-
ceed further with the said bill. The truth is
that it is inexpedient to proceed further
with the amendment of the hon.
member for West Durham, and have it
voted down by a large majority. The
reason assigned is no reason why
we should not have a full discussion. While
the Treaty was a fixed fact, and not likely,
in any shape or form, to be corrected or
opened, there may have been reasons in the
interests of the Empire why we should not
fully discuss its merits and mistakes, but
now that it is likely to be, in some degree
opened, it is our duty to express what we
feel to be our honest convictions, so, as if
possible, to influence those who may be called
upon in some form to amend some of its pro-
visions. I do not think the Treaty is as good
as some have represented it, but as bad as
others have represented it, but, whether it
be good or bad, it will be for us that our
Government is not deserving of censure. I
do not agree with the member for Essex that
the Imperial Government is in the same po-
sition. Now that the Treaty is so much extent
open, I feel that I am at liberty to state
what I think of the policy of the Imperial
Government, and I attempt that any one who
reads the correspondence which I have before
me, and notices the many protests of our Gov-
ernment, and the pusillanimous action of the
Imperial Government must come to the con-
clusion that the honour of England has been
furnished. This brings me to another point.
There is some confusion as to where the re-
sponsibility should rest for the short-comings
of the Treaty. Is it the Government of Great
Britain, or is it the Government of Canada,
to throw upon our Government censures which
properly belongs to the Imperial Govern-
ment. The Imperial Government is respon-
sible to the people of England,—the Cana-
dian Government to the people of Canada,—
the Imperial Commissioners to the Crown of
England,—and the United States Commis-
sioners to the Government of the United States.
An effort has been made to disassociate the
Premier of our Government from the other
Imperial Commissioners, and, if possible, to
make him personally responsible for every-
thing objectionable in the Treaty. What I
contend is this,—that the status of a Com-
missioner is to be judged of by his commis-
sion. It is perfectly true that Sir John
Macdonald was, and still is, in the
Canadian Government, but when he
accepted an Imperial Commission, he
became an Imperial, and not a Cana-
dian Commissioner, responsible to the
Imperial Government,—and responsible to
this House only so far as so far only as he
acted in union with the Imperial Govern-
ment. I know the member for Lambton
disputes this, and so I will endeavour, with-
out desiring to give offence to that gen-
tleman, to illustrate my meaning. That hon.
gentleman at present holds a position in the
Government of Ontario. Before he accepted
that position he was President of the Isola-
leek Club in Union with Canada. (Cries of
laughter.) Now, it will not be contended that
any way, responsible for his conduct as
Treasurer of Ontario, to the Insurance Com-
pany. The positions are entirely distinct.
Though, I grant, there may be some connect-
ing interest, some desire on the part of the
hon. gentleman to advantage the Company;
but it is not necessary his duty to do so.
(Laughter.) And so, I say, that our Premier
as a member of an Imperial Commission,
cannot be judged by the House, and is not
responsible to this House for his conduct as
an Imperial Commissioner. It would, more-
over, be most unfair to separate him from
the others, when he was only one in five, and
hold him responsible for the faults of the
four who were not in the same position. I
do not think it necessary to think it necessary
to follow up this point further, as the mem-
ber for Peel has already dealt with it; but we
must bear in mind, in discussing this ques-
tion, the difference between the bodies we
have to deal with, and endeavour to throw
the responsibility for what has been done on
the proper parties. The hon. member for
Lambton drew our attention to the policy
of what is called the "Manchester
School" at home. (Hear, hear.) I now
come to the discussion of the merits of the
Treaty. The principal matters involved are
—the Alabama question—in which Canada is
as greatly interested as England—in-
cidentally, the omission of the Fenian claims
from the negotiations in 1871, and the
fisheries. I differ from gentlemen who

take the ground that these fisheries are not of great value to Canada. I think they are of very great value, not only for the present gain, but for future profit and future renown. I find it stated in a report of the Government of the late Province of Canada, dated 23rd March, 1866, speaking of the fisheries, that the take of fish by provincial fishermen, irrespective of Newfoundland, then amounted annually in value to from four to five millions of dollars, employing upwards of 20,000 men and boys, and providing a nursery of hardy seamen, which would in future make British North America the predominant maritime power on the continent. I entirely subscribe to those opinions, and I also agree with those members who have taken the position that it is not the right of any foreign Power, without our consent, to interfere with these fisheries. I also agree with gentlemen who argue that the only right which the people of the United States have to interfere with these fisheries, is under the Treaty of 1818. That Treaty was a compact between two Powers, Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain thereby gave to the Americans the liberty, in common with our own people, to fish on certain coasts therein described, for ever. They gave them the liberty also, for ever, to dry their nets, and to cure their fish on certain unsettled portions of the territory, and the consideration was an absolute renunciation, on the part of the people of the United States, of any liberty previously enjoyed by them to take or dry fish, or within three marine miles of any coast or bays. Any bays there means all bays. It does not mean bays of twenty or thirty miles in width, but it is a renunciation of all pretence or right to take or dry fish within three marine miles of any of our bays, and this can only mean from a line drawn across those bays. I do not understand that the Minister of Justice took any other ground than this—but he only showed to the House what we all know, that our contention in this respect was not acquiesced in by the United States. A difference of interpretation arose—the headland question arose—the claim to trade arose—and a claim to take fish within three miles of the large bays. These claims were persisted in by the people of the United States, and the consequence was that from day to day, month to month, and year to year, causes of irritation and annoyance arose, causes likely to be productive of ill feeling, instead of that friendly feeling that we are all so anxious should exist between Great Britain and the United States. What are the facts? In the protection of our fisheries we always acted with very great liberality towards the people of the United States, so much so that our own people complained that we did not sufficiently look to their interests. During the American civil war, we charged our international duty, we that was to be done, we endeavoured to prevent our raiders, and where money was due from our territory we took the steps to enable opportunity to offer to restore. Then the United States made charge against the Empire, of which, I believe, we are proud to form a part, of neglect in connection with the escape of the *Alabama*. I happened to be in St. George's Channel when that vessel sailed down the channel. We signalled her, but could get no response. We could get no information about her—we could hear nothing of her—but in a short time afterwards the whole world heard of her. The moment that it became known to the Government of Great Britain that she was intended for hostile purposes, they took measures, though too late, to prevent her escape; I contend that not only has Canada discharged her international obligations properly, but Great Britain has also done so, and that in a way calculated to produce good feeling in the minds of the people of the United States. The Americans, however, as early as 1865, made a demand that England should be liable for the escape and the subsequent depredations of the *Alabama*; but the English Government of the day said they were not liable, as they had faithfully discharged their obligations, and used all proper diligence to prevent the vessel's escape, and they therefore refused to make any reference of the demand to arbitration. In subsequent years, however, we find that the great people, the people of Britain, who in 1865 refused to arbitrate at all, were ready and

willing for the sake of peace, to submit the dispute to arbitration. Feeling arose in the United States, in consequence of this dispute, of so bitter a character, and to so great an extent, that the Reciprocity Treaty between Canada and the United States was put on ice. I have no doubt that the people of the United States thought that by doing this they would ruin this country, that they would shut us out from all channels of trade, and that ultimately they would force us into their union. But the effect has just been the reverse. Instead of making us craven it has made us self-reliant; instead of shutting us out from all channels of trade, it has tended more than anything else to consolidate our Union, and make us one people from one ocean to the other. I am aware that it would be beneficial to have reciprocal trade with the United States, but I do not believe we are likely to get it by begging for it. Let us show to the Americans that we are independent of them, that we can do without them, and then though the financial requirements of the United States make present out of the question, the day will come when it will be for the interest of both parties to have reciprocity in trade; but, I repeat, that the day will not be hastened by our continually whining for it. The hon. member for Sherbrooke said that he thought the true policy of the Government of the country, in regard to the fisheries, was the licensing system, and he much regretted the abolition of that system. That system was tried and found wanting, and if our Government had continued it, they would have been found wanting in their duty to their country.

In 1868 there were 354 licences issued.
In 1867 " 281 "
In 1868 " 596 "
In 1869 " 25 "

And fishing in our waters without leave and without licence forced upon us the policy of exclusion. I have shown as briefly as possible the anxious desire that the people of Great Britain and Canada had for establishing friendly relations with the people of the United States. I have shown their efforts to discharge honestly and faithfully their international obligations. I propose now to look at the other side of the picture, to see whether we were met in a corresponding spirit by the people of the United States. The Fenian question has cropped up again and again, and is a rare question because the people of this country as a unit feel that the Imperial Government have not dealt as they ought to have done with this question. I was sorry to hear the Secretary of State for the Provinces use language which might be construed as a palliation for the crimes of those men. I do not think he intended to do so, and was glad to hear him at once renounce any such language. In 1865, while we were struggling with the Fenians, we could not have a quarrel between the two countries—while Great Britain was doing all she could to bring about and continue that good feeling—the Fenian organization was warmed into life in the United States. The object of the Fenians was known to everybody, there was no secrecy about it—their avowed intention was to attack Canada, a country which had always discharged its duty properly to the United States—to attack Canada, a country in no manner concerned in the disputes between England and Ireland. They were drilled in open day, uniformed, and commanded by American officers, and everything possible was done to bring upon them the influence of the Government of the United States. I was told that the General said: "Nothing at all, or if anything, it encouraged them." The Fenians were allowed to come to our country in 1866, to land on our soil, and desecrate it by shooting down our young men, some of them leaving widows and children; young men of our Universities and of the highest social standing and promise were shot down by those so-called people of the United States. General Barry of the United States army, who endeavoured to discharge his duty, and to prevent the raid, was rewarded by the United States Government by dismissal. Our Government at that time was not idle, it made remonstrance to the Imperial Government. It demanded that a reparation should be had, and that security should be given for the future, and all that could be done in order that Canada might have redress for the great outrage upon her soil. We know from the correspondence that our Government, through the Imperial Government brought the claims of Canada before the Government of the United States. Great Britain, apparently, did not insist in regard to the Fenian claims, upon proper reparation. She did not press our

claims for redress for the past, and security for the future as Great Britain used to do in times gone by, when other men were in power. But what had she done in regard to the *Alabama* claim? In 1865 she refused to submit the questions in dispute to arbitration. In 1865 she was so anxious to have a friendly feeling with the United States that she agreed to leave to arbitration, the very questions that before she had refused to do, and how was she met by the people of the United States? The Senate of the United States rejected the Clarendon-Johnson Treaty; rejected the advances made by England to secure and continue friendly relations between those two great powers. During all this time, through suffering and smarting from gross wrongs, we retaliated in no way; we gave the people of the United States the use of our canals on the same terms as we used them ourselves. And how were we treated, when in an emergency we required to use one of their canals? The House will remember the *Albion*, how she was sent to the bottom, and how she was sent through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal. Had it not been that the *Albion* had previously gone through, the troubles in the North-West might have increased most disastrously, and it was weeks and weeks before permission was given by the Government of the United States for vessels to go through from one part of Canadian territory to another. And when it was given, the volunteers had to be disembarked, all stores and ammunitions had to be unloaded and encamped overland. This was the way in which our liberality in regard to the canals was met. (Hear, hear.) But your Government is not to be blamed, for the omission by Britain to press these Fenian claims, I do not wish to take up the time of the House in reading extracts from the various papers, but you can read some of them without feeling a manly pride. There never was a colony which spoke to the Imperial Government as ours did, and never before was there necessity for speaking as our colony did. In June, 1870, our Government stated that "Her Majesty's Government ought to be apprised without delay that there is a general feeling throughout the Dominion that the United States Government has not adequately discharged its duty on this occasion, and that Great Britain is bound to protect the subjects of Her Majesty in the Dominion by demanding adequate reparation for a most grievous wrong." Strange language was afterwards used, but what was the response? Her Majesty's Government has not failed to place before the Government of the United States the inconveniences which Canada was suffering, and likely to suffer from these hostile preparations on her frontier, and to urge them to counteract by all means in their power such movements." Though they have as yet little official information on the subject, they hope to find that the aid of the Government was loyalty. They would anticipate the views of the authors of these outrages, who are now said to be in the hands of the United States authorities, will receive such condign punishment as this wanton attack upon the peace of a neighbouring and friendly state deserves. It is not often in the history of civilized nations that a country has suffered from an attack so gratuitous and unjustifiable as that which has been made upon the Dominion, and I can assure you that the Queen, together with the Parliament and people of this country, cordially sympathize with the annoyance which it has caused, and admire the spirit with which it has been repelled." There is no allegation there that they had demanded reparation for the past. In July, 1870, our Government stated to the House that the Committee of the Privy Council has already stated their views regarding this outrage, in their minute of the 2nd ult., a copy which they requested your Excellency to transmit to the Secretary of State; and the painful duty is now imposed upon them of requesting your Excellency to express to Lord Granville their unfeigned regret at learning from his dispatch that Her Majesty's Government had the duty of demanding reparation from the Government of the United States, for the grievous outrages to which they have been subjected, have contented themselves with urging that governments to counteract such movements in future by all means in their power; a demand which, no doubt, has already been made on more than one occasion, in 1866, and subsequently without any satisfactory result. The Committee on the Privy Council, in venturing to remonstrate against the communication described by Earl Granville as having been made by the United States Government on the occasion of the late outrage, would beg to refer to His Lordship's own language in which they entirely concur." Earl Russell observed, "It is not often in the history of civilized nations that a

country has suffered from an attack so gratuitous and unjustifiable as that which has been made on the Dominion." To this the Committee of Council feel it their duty to add, that they believe that there is no precedent in the history of civilized nations for a great power such as Great Britain submitting to an outrage on its loyal subjects without making a demand for adequate reparation. The Committee of the Privy Council feel it their duty to express very strongly to Your Excellency for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the deep sense entertained by the people of the Dominion of all shades of party, that they have not received from Her Majesty's Government that support and protection which, as loyal subjects of Her Majesty, they have a right to claim." The Government that used this language is not deserving of censure, but of praise. (Cheers.) In 1870 our Government not only made the protest to which I have referred, but sent Postmaster-General Campbell to England, if possible, to secure peace for us and to secure that the Empire maintain something to which I would particularly call the attention of the House. His first demand upon the Imperial Government was that the Imperial Government should make a demand upon the United States for indemnity for the past and protection for the future; failing that, that the Empire should join with Canada in meeting the losses. I shall quote an extract from his report of his mission, "the Fenian losses were not of our creating, but grew out of real or imaginary wrongs that the Empire had in the past inflicted on Ireland, and we were fighting battles which were not our own, but those of the Empire. We were quite ready as a portion of the Empire to bear our share of these or any other wrongs in which the country might be involved, but it was not fair that we should be allowed to suffer alone all the losses and consequences of the Imperial acts, or policy which were complained of, and I strongly urged that for the past and the future, should any further Fenian troubles arise, the Empire, as a whole should bear the burden of resisting such attacks, and that the Government should contribute as a portion of the Empire. The proposition thus made in 1870, was I believe, looked upon at the time as a fair and reasonable one, and although the report had been published and in the hands of members for some time past, I am not aware that any person has ever found fault with the alternative proposition of the Postmaster-General. The Imperial Government declined the first and has only recently acceded to the second alternative. Our Government earnestly pressed the Fenian question in the hope that the United States would not only make some reparation for the past, but do something towards preventing raids in the future. How were we met? By the Speech of President Grant in December 1870. That speech was made for election purposes. It was an election cry, and many gentlemen from Ontario knew what that meant. (Laughter.) It was made to captivate the ears of those who heard it, and to get them to support the party who gave it. I think that every man in Canada who read that speech did so with feelings of indignation. The speech was a piece of pure poison poured by the Canadian authorities towards the fishermen of the United States, during the past season has not been marked by friendly feeling." I am sure that any man reading the correspondence will see that every effort was made by the Canadian Government to establish friendly feelings with the United States—while endeavouring to protect our fisheries and our own liberties to our neighbours. We passed laws for the protection of our fisheries which we had a perfect right to do. We executed these laws in a manner intended to give the least possible offence to those against whom they were designed to operate. So long as there was any pretence of respecting the fishing system we continued it. When it became plain that the only course was to protect the United States to violate our territorial rights we adopted the policy of entire exclusion. And what do we find in this precious speech of President Grant?

The President intimated that should the authorities of Canada attempt to enforce the act which we had a perfect right to pass for the protection of our own property it would become his duty—to do what? To take such steps as may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizens of the United States. Now what were the "rights" of the citizens of the United States? The only rights they had attempted to exercise up to that time were the right to invade our territory and the right to fish in our waters—the right to make incursions into our country in the west, to shoot down our

people, come to depose our property; the right to come into our waters in the east and take fish whenever they choose. These were the rights which they claimed to be in a position to exercise. (Hear, hear.) I knew of no just rights that were denied them; we were willing to grant them everything to which they were entitled, but they were not willing, while putting forth claims for themselves, to renounce their rights. I have heard the President's words that if we attempted to enforce an act, which we were strictly within our rights in passing, it would be his "duty to take such steps as may be necessary to protect the rights of citizens of the United States." Well, sir, this declaration goes home to England. The people of England, who are accustomed to look at every man as a dignitary, their own rights, and at least the higher and better classes of them—of triokery and chicanery—thought it was an earnest expression of a real intention. They had no idea of what was meant by an "election cry" in America. They thought the President's words were sincere. But thinking so, and receiving his message in that sense, it would, in my opinion, have been much more dignified if their agents had part of their earnestness—they had not themselves opened negotiations with the United States. They had done no wrong; we had done so wrong; we had simply exercised our rights in a way that was perfectly competent for us to do; and that being the case, if the people of the United States had any claim to put forward, it was a wicked one. They had no right to acquire a portion of our territorial rights; they, and not England, should have commenced negotiations to that end. (Hear, hear.) However, we will not quarrel about that, for, after all, the purpose was a laudable one, and although it might have been more dignified to have pursued a different, it was not disrespectful to our people or to England, when they took the course they did. This message then, lead to the negotiations; and here I may say that I thoroughly agree with the Finance Minister when he said that, looking to the correspondence which initiated those negotiations, it was clear that the Fenian question should have been held to have been included in them. It was among the questions that had reflected the friendly relations of the two countries. (Hear, hear.) The letter of the 26th of January, 1871, from Sir Edward Thornton to Mr. Fish, to which reference has so often been made, was the letter which opened those negotiations. It is obvious upon reading it that the statesmen of England were anxious to have a friendly relationship with the government and people of the United States, and that they had had before existed should not be continued, but give way to a better state of things; and the letter proposed that the friendly relations which it was desired to establish should be cemented by a complete understanding between the two nations upon all points of difference between them. How could a complete understanding be come to if there were things that reflected the friendly relations that had given rise to the misunderstandings? The letter is explicit upon this point, for it says that Her Majesty's Government deem it of importance "that a friendly and complete understanding should be come to between the two Governments as to the extent of the rights which belong to the citizens of the United States and Her Majesty's subjects residing in the United States, and as to the extent of the rights which belong to the citizens of the United States on the coast of Her Majesty's possessions in North America, and as to any other questions between them which affect the relations of the United States towards those possessions." Now, at that time there was not only the fishery question but the Fenian question affecting the relations of that country towards the British possessions. (Hear, hear.) The anxiety of the British Government to settle all questions settled which affected the relations. I think that as between nations it is the same as between individuals, the true way to bring about and maintain friendly relations is to do that which will secure the respect of each for the other; if a man or a nation does anything to lower himself in the estimation of others, instead of securing friendly relations, it lowers itself, and just the reverse. I think there is a point to which a Government may go in the desire to secure friendly relations when magnanimity becomes shame, when the Government insults its own honour and the honour of the people it represents, when it degrades itself, by humiliation and makes itself contemptible in the eyes of the power with which it may be at odds. I think that when the English Government reached that point or not, I shall leave to you to judge after a narrative of the facts. To proceed: The proposition on the part of the Imperial Government

please here to refer to a commission, but the whole question of the fisheries. I quite concur in what has been said that it would be absurd to refer a question of interpretation—a pure question of law—to a tribunal composed of men other than lawyers; and when England proposes to refer the whole question it can only be with the idea that the commissioners will weakly dispose of it, not as lawyers upon legal grounds, but as politicians upon political grounds. (Hear, hear.) There as to the St. Lawrence, England had contended—consistently and persistently contended—that that portion of the river which ran between Canadian shores was not a highway in the sense claimed by the United States. She always refused to admit that it was a highway, but we find that these gentlemen have now agreed unanimously to waive that point also. "Her Majesty's Government," Lord Cranville says, "are nevertheless now willing to admit the principle of the navigation of the St. Lawrence being free to the citizens of the United States, subject to such tolls and regulations as may be imposed equally on British subjects." (Hear, hear.) Then, as to the *Alabama*, we are first asked to regret for the escape of the *Alabama* and consequent injury to the commerce of the United States, Her Majesty's Government authorize you to express their regret in such terms as would be agreeable to the Government of the United States, and not inconsistent with the position hitherto maintained by Her Majesty's Government as to the international obligations of neutral nations." Here there is an expression of regret, and then the members of England had always contended that she had done no wrong—that the escape of the *Alabama* could not be attributed to negligence on her part or to a desire to violate her international obligations. If that was the case, where was the occasion for an apology? There was none that I can see; and, owing no apology, it was, in my opinion, the courtesy of England to offer to do so, and that to a people who had refused in a very plain case of the same nature, to make any reparation whatever. Why should England apologise for the escape of the *Alabama*, while the United States were never asked for an apology in regard to the Fenian claims, or if asked, refused to make any apology. (Hear, hear.) The statement of the regret is a statement of refusal when it comes before the Commission, will, in all probability, prejudice our position in the minds of the Commissioners. An expression of regret seems to involve the concession that there is something wrong. England always contended that there was nothing wrong in her conduct, and in maintaining that ground I think she was right. (Hear, hear.) I have given you, Sir, the course of the correspondence and negotiations between Great Britain and the United States, about the necessity of establishing new and improved rules of maritime law. I find it stated in the instructions upon this point, that "it would be desirable to take this opportunity to consider whether it might not be in the interest of both Great Britain and the United States to lay down certain rules of international conduct in regard to the obligations of maritime neutrality, not only to be acknowledged for observance in their future relations, but to be recommended for adherence to the other maritime powers." Here there is a proposition on the part of the British Government to establish new maritime rules for the conduct of Great Britain and the United States, and it is possible that the adoption of these rules by other maritime powers. England at that time could surely have had no intention to be bound by a rule of conduct not in existence when the transactions occurred of which the United States made complaint. I quite agree with the hon. member for Bothwell when he said that the kind of legislation in question in principle it cannot be a prejudicial practice. I have always looked on the law as constituting a rule of conduct in the actions of nations as well as of individuals. But when we speak of the actions of 1869, we do judge of them by the law of 1871. Why should England's rights or England's wrong in 1862 be decided by a rule of law not laid down till nine years afterwards? This, it is true, was done for the purpose of securing peace and apparently for no other purpose. (Hear, hear.) I cannot think that this, under the circumstances, was a justification. Then as to the conclusion of these instructions, it shows the character and powers of these High Commissioners. It will be seen, as pointed out by the hon. member for Peebles, that they were not invested with discretionary power. This is an additional reason why the proposition sought to be enforced by hon. gentlemen opposite as to be

right of any of the Commissioners to withdraw should not for a moment prevail. These Commissioners were appointed and sent to Washington so plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty, with limited powers, and as such were responsible to the Imperial authority. They had no power to act of themselves, they had no freedom of action; and all that they did, or contemplated doing, was referred to the Secretary of State in England. They were the servants to England; England was the master. I am limited instructions. It follows that, if there is anything wrong in the Treaty—anything committed which ought not to have been done—anything omitted which ought to have been inserted—the Imperial Government is alone responsible. The instructions say:—"Her Majesty's Government request that the United States Government, on any particular matter which you may be disposed to agree to should vary materially from the manner of settlement, to which I have informed you Her Majesty's Government are prepared at once to assent, or in case of any disagreement of importance occurring between yourselves and the American High Commissioners, you should at once refer by treaty to the Emperor further instructions." An attempt to hold one of the Commissioners responsible, is open not only to the objection that he was one of five Commissioners, but also to the objection that he was not at liberty to act contrary to the expressed wishes of the authority from whom he derived his commission to act. (Hear, hear.) And here, Sir, I wish to draw your attention, and the attention of the House, to a remarkable fact, which I discovered on looking at the commissions issued upon the appointment of the Commissioners—that fact that there is a difference between the authority given by the Imperial Government to its Commissioners and the authority given by the Government of the United States to those who represented it. The Commissioners essentially differ. The Imperial Commissioners are given "all manner of power and authority to treat, adjust and conclude with the United States any treaty that may tend to the above mentioned end." Full power is thus apparently given to the Commissioners to discuss and determine, subject to the control of the Imperial Government all questions intended by the correspondence to be referred to them. The American Commissioners, on the other hand, the United States to their Commissioners was not in that form, it was in this—"The United States Government appointed certain persons "to be Commissioners on the part of the United States, in a Joint High Commission between the United States and Great Britain, empowering them jointly and severally to meet the British Commissioners, and with them to treat and discuss the whole settlement of the different questions which shall come before the said Joint High Commission." There seems to have been a limitation in the Commission of the United States which was not in the British Commission. The British Commission was to discuss all questions affecting the friendly relations, the Commission to the United States Commissioners was only to discuss such questions as were the subject of the controversy which might bring before the Commission. Afterwards we found what use was made of that limitation by the United States Commissioners.

It paved the way for the subsequent rejection of the Fenian claims. The Commissioners, speaking of the Fenian question, said, among other things we cannot consider it because it has not been referred to us by our Government.

In the letter of the 16th Feb., 1871, from Lord Kimberley to Lord Liagar, we find still further evidence of the desire of England to concede a great many points in order to secure those friendly relations. For instance, in speaking of the Fishery question, it states:—"The exclusion of American fishermen from resorting to Canadian ports, except for the purpose of the repair of vessels and the acquisition, of purchasing stores and of obtaining water, might be warranted by the letter of the Treaty of 1818, and by the terms of the Imperial Act, 59, Geo. 3, cap. 38, but Her Majesty's Government feel bound to state that it seems to them an extreme measure—inconsistent with the general policy of Empire, and they are disposed to concede this point to the United States Government."

An extreme measure, Mr. Speaker, to insist upon the terms of her own bargain for the protection of her own territory! And the English Government expressed a willingness that this should be discussed and settled. This, however, it is said, was done for the sake of securing the much desired friendly relations, but the friendship is not on equal terms. It cannot be reciprocal. (Laughter.)

I do not understand that any objection

been made on the part of gentlemen opposite either to the composition of this Commission, or to the ability, or want of ability, or discretion on the part of any of the Commissioners. This House had an opportunity to pronounce this opinion, before the Hon. Premier went to Washington, on the occasion of the motion of the hon. member for Sherbrooke, and my hon. friend the member for West Durham, on that occasion, used this language:—

"The question was whether we ought to do or say anything which might in the slightest degree embarrass or impede the course of the Administration with regard to the matters upon which they had assumed responsibility. His opinion was that they should do nothing of the kind." So that the House not only approved of the appointment of the Commission, but allowed the Premier of the Government to go by an almost unanimous feeling of the House without any limitation of any kind on his actions, although it was known he was in the minority on the Commission. The Commissioners met at Washington and exchanged Commissions. When they read each other's Commission or not, I do not know. Probably they were under the belief that they met on equal terms. But, Sir, they did not meet on equal terms. While the Commissioners of Great Britain were there to settle all questions, the Commissioners of the United States were there to settle only such questions as were referred to them by their Government. Besides there was this, that while the Treaty as to many of its provisions would be binding on the Government of Great Britain, from the date it was signed it was not binding as to any of its provisions on the people of the United States, till ratified by the Government of that country. Meeting on those terms it was not remarkable that there should be a disagreement between the two classes of Commissioners before they went very far in their deliberations.

Now, what was done? I shall endeavour as briefly and clearly as possible to take up the different questions. First, the *Alabama* question. We find that England, who, in the first instance, had refused to leave the arbitration at all the question of "due diligence," that England who had always maintained that she had used due diligence—we find her Commissioners commencing proceedings with an expression of regret on the part of Great Britain, a regret for the escape of the *Alabama*. Had the United States acknowledged the error of their ways as to the Fenians, I would not greatly object to this expression of regret, because Earl Russell, in the debate in the House of Lords, stated that he had again and again expressed his regret for the escape of the *Alabama*. But why should this expression of regret be brought out so prominently in the Treaty itself?

The people of the United States, by their Commissioners, stated that they looked upon this expression of regret as very satisfactory, as a token of kindness, and the Government (I will not say the people) of that country have since shown their liberality for that by efforts to get enormous damages for consequential injuries.

Some hon. gentlemen have said that they would be very glad if, in consequence of the present complications on this point, the whole Treaty were to fall through. I am not disposed to differ from them. I should be well pleased if Great Britain and the United States were to-day to wipe out the whole thing and begin again. I do not think there is any fear of war, and I think after the experience we now have, that if the Commissioners were to meet again all matters would be settled, and in a manner more satisfactory to us (Hear, hear). That attempt of the Government of the United States to force upon England, notwithstanding England's apparent humiliation, these excessive indirect damages is proof that the Government of the United States take all they can get and are anxious to get a great deal more if they can—while conceding nothing of much corresponding value. I am glad that the Gladstone Government has been compelled by the British people to resist this unreasonable demand. It is full time that concession should stop, and resistance to unwarranted demands begin (Hear, hear).

I consider in this connection the *Alabama* as a *post facto* aggression, to which I have before alluded, very objectionable. Let me give an example of the working of such a vicious rule. During the war between Prussia and France, arms were exported from Great Britain to France. They were exported as articles of commerce. Prussia found fault with Great Britain for these exportations. Great Britain contended that she had a right to sell these arms as she was doing; that there was nothing in International Law to prevent it, and therefore she refused to

mit that she had done wrong. Suppose a difficulty were now to arise between Prussia and England, and England were to say, "It is true that when we sold these arms according to our views of international law there was nothing wrong, but we now admit that it is contrary to the rules as now laid down as to the arms, and we will have our conduct of 1870 judged by the rules of 1872." Where would Great Britain be in an arbitration of that kind? She would be of course in the wrong—not wrong when she did the act, but wrong by the law afterwards laid down for her guidance, not in the future but in the past. (Cheers.) Under such a principle the weaker power will be called upon to submit to the stronger. I do not say that Britain is a weak power. Far be it from me to say so, but she is now under weak counsel. (Hear, hear.)

Some people have argued that we have gained a great deal by the establishment of this rule of "due diligence"—that it will prevent Fenian raids in future. Does it apply to Fenian raids at all? It does not. The rule that is laid down is as follows:—

"That a neutral Government is bound, first, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use."

Secondly, "Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men."

Thirdly, "To exercise due diligence in its own ports or waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties."

It is restricted entirely to the escape of vessels. It has nothing to say to the escape of men. It does not at all apply to the escape of arms or munitions. It is to be consoled with the idea that this *post facto* agreement thus sacrifices of legal principle is at all calculated in the future to prevent Fenian raids. (Hear, hear.)

We find that the Fenian question was brought up. Our Commissioners very properly pressed the Fenian claims as coming within the subjects indicated by Sir Edward Thornton's letter. We saw the answer to that on the part of the United States Commissioners that they were without authority from their Government to consider them. Falling back on the language of Mr. Fish they said that their Commission was only to consider such questions as their Government should refer to them. I really think it would have been better then and there to have broken off the negotiations. I say so because I think that a Government not willing to concede a thing so plain, while they were pressing the *Alabama* claims, was not a Government to be trusted in other negotiations. I should not expect that such a Government would do otherwise than take advantage of us, if possible, in other negotiations. (Hear, hear.)

Why should all the other questions be left unsettled for the sake of this question? If this had been pressed I think all would have been settled; and it would have been better then and there for the British Commissioners, one and all, to have taken their stand and said—this is a matter so plain, according to the principles of international law, that it must be taken into account. If you really desire a settlement of all questions with a view to friendly relations for the future it must be now settled.

If that course had been taken, there would not have been the difficulty that has since arisen about the omission of the Fenian claims and the refusal of the American Commissioner to consider the Fenian claims for reasons given.

The British Commissioners meekly replied that they would not urge further that the settlement of these claims should be included in the present Treaty, and they had the less difficulty in doing so, as a portion of the claims were of a constructive and inferential character."

If the fact that a portion of the Fenian claims were of a constructive and inferential character excluded them from consideration, then the *Alabama* claims should not have gone before the Commissioners.

The *Alabama* and the Fenian claims were both of the same kind—the damage in each case was a damage, direct, and a damage consequential, and if a damage consequential was a ground for rejecting the Fenian claims, I

maintain it was equally a ground for rejecting the *Alabama* claims. (Cheers.)

(Here there was the usual evening roar.) Before the recess, I had been criticizing those portions of the Treaty relating to the Fenian claims, and incidentally referred to the Fenian claims. I pointed out what appeared to me to be the sacrifice of Great Britain had made: first, in her apology or expression of regret to a Government that excluded the Fenian question from consideration; and secondly, in laying down an *post facto* rule of a most objectionable kind.

It may be said that these sacrifices are really of a sentimental character, but Great Britain, in all probability, will be called upon to make sacrifices of a material character also, and that to a very large amount. While, however, I make these criticisms, I do not wish as a Canadian, to be understood as harshly judging the Mother Country. (Hear, hear.) We must not lose sight of the fact, that the sacrifices, whatever their nature, were, in all probability, prompted by consideration for our own country. When we look at the power and magnitude of Great Britain, and her high position among the nations of the world, we cannot but come to the conclusion that these sacrifices were made out of consideration for Canada, which in the event of war, would be the battle ground of the contending powers. Besides as to any material sacrifice that may be made under an award in the *Alabama* matter, we shall not have to contribute a cent. These sacrifices as made are acts of commission.

But there was an omission of which Canada has a right to complain, and which she can overlook, and that is the withdrawal of the Fenian claims. The Imperial Government expressed the hope that the United States Government would loyally carry out its international obligations, and would punish with condign punishment any guilty persons who infringed these international rules. That expression of hope was fruitless. The raid of 1866 was led by a man, who, though arrested, was immediately discharged without trial. The raid of 1870 was led by the same man, and though arrested, was afterwards "adorned." The same man appeared in the raid into Manitoba last year, was arrested and afterwards discharged.

The proposition made by the Postmaster-General to the Imperial Government, was either that they should insist on reparation being made by the United States, or that they should themselves help us to bear the expenditure which we had incurred. The Imperial power consented to the withdrawal of the Fenian question from the consideration of the Commissioners, but it is not correct to say that the claim has been settled forever. There is no settlement as between Great Britain and the United States. The claim still remains open. In the event of another raid, I trust that the Imperial Government will not forget to press the claim and also endeavour to obtain an assurance of security in the future.

To show that there was no settlement as between the Imperial Government and the Government of the United States, it is only necessary to refer to the language of Lord Granville said in June, 1871, in the discussion on Earl Russell's motion:—"He certainly trusted and hoped that Canada would not refuse to assent to that portion of the Treaty which related to her."

At the same time he must express his great regret that our Government had not been able to obtain the consideration of the Canadian claims on account of the Fenian raids from the United States. Her Majesty's Government took the whole responsibility of what had occurred on that subject, and he might frankly say that they were deterred from pressing these claims because they found that insistence upon them would involve the failure of the whole negotiations. Another reason for making this course was that these claims had never been presented by our Government to the United States, and it must be remembered that, although they were not urged, so on the other hand they were not abandoned by this Treaty.

Mr. Gladstone in August, 1871, in the debate on Sir C. Aldrich's motion, said:—"It would have been perfectly fair to say, no doubt, that the Fenian claims should have been included in this great settlement; but it is not to be supposed, because they are not included in the settlement, that they have ceased to exist. They remain in their validity. We are charged with them. It is our duty to see that the claims of Canada are put out of these transactions are not disparaged. If I am asked why these claims are not included in the settlement, I can only say frankly that it is because we

were unable to include them, and because we did not think it right to sacrifice and abandon the whole of these extensive arrangements; because we were unable to bring within their scope that singular comparative insignificant point."

For these reasons Great Britain has agreed to assist us to bear the expenditure to which we were put, and in the form in which we receive this assistance imparts to it a most liberal character; for while the taxpayers of England pay nothing whatever, it is of the greatest possible gain to us. It is not merely the fact that it saves us a large amount of money in borrowing the amount, actually guaranteed, out it enables us to float it; the remainder of the loan we require on much better terms than we otherwise could have done—and in addition to all this, there is a moral support—for it shows that England, so far from desiring that the connection between herself and Canada should cease, desires that it should continue—and she gives to our great enterprises, the building of our Intercolonial Railway, and the enlargement of our canals, both her moral and her material aid.

It will be remembered that the Government were blamed by gentlemen opposite on a previous occasion, for not rendering to the Imperial Government an account for the losses sustained in consequence of the Fenian raids, and the same gentlemen now blame them for obtaining money in compensation for those losses.

No doubt it would have been more satisfactory to us if we could have received some apology from the Government of the United States for the occurrences of the past, and some undertaking that there should be no recurrence of them in the future—but that apology and assurance can only be obtained through the Government of Great Britain—but that Government has declined at present to press our claim, but has decided that we shall not lose thereby.

Our Government in this, as in other things, did all they could, used every exertion to induce Great Britain to press our claim—but, though the claim is closed a between Great Britain and Canada, it is still open as between Great Britain and the United States. The arrangement between Great Britain and Canada is, however, alike honorable to both.

It is objected that we have no guarantee for the future, and no assurance that there may not be a recurrence of the grievances of which we complain. No doubt that the Imperial Government has, in the past, and for reasons I have already stated, been slow to act—but I have not arrived at the conclusion that the Imperial power is in a moribund state. The men who now direct the destinies of the Empire will not do so always. I have still faith that the hearts of the Imperial people are in the right place, and that in the event of a change of Government our safety and our honour will be alike respected and protected.

If, however, gentlemen opposite think that there is no protection in the British flag, the only alternative, in their view, is to seek another flag. We might have the flag of the United States—the Stars and Stripes. (No, no.) Well then, we can have the flag of Great Britain. (No, no.) Well then, we can have the flag of the great Liberal party of Ontario. (Laughter.) If we have the latter, there would be no scarcity of mottoes—"No Popery" for instance; "No Separate Schools," "No Orangemen," "No Coalitions," "No Governments but Grit Governments," "No enlargement of our Canada." (Laughter.) There will be plenty of mottoes for the flag; but I do not think that the people of the Dominion desire it, nor do I think that the people of Ontario will long endure it.

I, however, recognise the propriety of the assertion that may be made, that it is not the Government of Ontario, but the Government of the Dominion, with which we have to deal on the present occasion. There is a vote of censure proposed to be passed on this Government. What is this Government? It is the Government that has made our Dominion what it is to-day. It truly represents the party of progress. They have done more in five years than perhaps any other power has done in fifty years. (Cheers.) Then there is the party of opposition. What have they done? They have opposed everything the Government attempted to do, and while we call our Government the party of progress, we must call the Opposition the party of obstruction. The greater part of what has been accomplished since Confederation has been accomplished in spite of gentleman opposite. (Cheers.)

I now, however, pass to another portion of the Treaty—the navigation of the St. Lawrence. So far as that river has been

do them, and because we
to sacrifice and aban-
these extensive arrange-
are unable to bring within
and comparative insig-

Great Britain has agreed
the expenditure to which
the form in which we re-
imparts to it a most
while the rubeys of
of whatever it is of the
to us. It is not merely
yves us a large amount of
the amount, actually
ables us to float the re-
we require on such a
we otherwise could
dition to all this, there
for it shows that Eng-
that the connection
Canada should con-
the continue and the
interior, the building
Railway, and the can-
als, both her moral and
ered that the Govern-
ment oppose on the
not rendering to the
an account for the
sequence of the Fenian
gentlemen now blame
money in compensation

have been more satis-
fied have received some
ment of the United
ness of the treaty, and
at there should be no
in the future—but that
ance can only be
Government of Great
Britain does not choose
claim, but has decid-
ed thereby.

On other things,
which as in the past,
press our claim—but
need is upon Great
it is still open as be-
the United States.
Great Britain and
allike honourable to

We have no guar-
antee and no assurance
of the cures of the griev-
ance. No doubt that
the has, in the past,
already stated, been
not arrived at the
power in is in the
men who do not do so
pre will not do so. At
that the hearts of
in the right place,
a change of Govern-
ment honour will be
teated.

It is an opinion that
the British flag, the
to their view, is to
at have the flag of the
re and Stripes. (No
can have the flag of
s.) Well then, we
Great Liberal party
.) If we have the
to society of motives
ance; "No Separate
men," "No Coali-
tion," but Grit Govern-
ment of our Canals,"
be plenty of motives
not think that the
serve it,—nor do I
of Ontario will long

the propriety of the
made, that it is not
Government, with which
the present co-
vote of course
this Government.
The Government
Dominion what it is
seems the party of
large more in five
y other power has
sers.) Then there
What have they
doed everything the
do, and while we
party of progress,
upon the party of
object of what has
Confederation has
rights of gentlemen
no another portion
of the river, the

boundary between the two countries there
can be no question as to its being a highway
common to both, and the only way
when the ocean is to be a "highway," and
mutually within Canadian so-
tory.

The people of the United States, always
contended that the St. Lawrence should be a
highway throughout, from its source to the
ocean; and certainly anyone looking at the
map must be impressed with the view
that nature intended it to be the great high-
way of the world.

I should have been better satisfied if the
Imperial Commissioners had acceded to the
proposition of the United States, and simply
admitted that the St. Lawrence is such a
highway, and asked no equivalents. If that
had been done, we should have had a pre-
cedent for the use of such rivers as the Colum-
bia. But conceding the right for what
is called equivalents, prevents its use as a
precedent.

The equivalents spoken of,—the rivers Yukon, Porcupine and Stikine may be very fine
waters, but we do not know anything about
them. I look upon the St. Lawrence as our
Jordan, and I know nothing of the waters of
Damascus (Hear, hear.)

I find reference made, however, to the Treaty
made in 1825, by which apparently we had
as much right to those rivers as we have un-
der the present Treaty. My hon. friend
from Peel contends that by the cession of the
territory from Russia to the United States,
that Treaty was abrogated. I do not quite
see it in that light. It may be so, but it
seems to me that on another ground that
Treaty could not be in force. England al-
ways contended that war between two coun-
tries puts an end to existing treaties. She
has contended that again and again. Since
that Treaty there was a war between Eng-
land and Russia, and therefore, according to
the view maintained by England, that war
must have put an end to the treaties existing
between the two countries. It is not, how-
ever, a matter of very great importance, for,
from all I can learn, the use of those rivers is
in no sense, an equivalent for the use of the St.
Lawrence. There are, however, other equi-
valents. There is the navigation of Lake
Michigan. But it is to be observed that
while we give the use of the St. Lawrence for
ever, we only have the use of Lake
Michigan for a limited time. Then there is
the bonding system, which is of great value
to Canada,—and also the relaxation of the
navigation laws, which I consider a most im-
portant concession. It will be a great ad-
vantage to some parts of Canada. Some of
our railways will benefit very considerably,
and also the shipbuilding interests. The
Northern Railway, the Great Western Rail-
way and the Welland Railway will profit by
it. The privilege is, however, subject to
two checks—first, the use of our canals; and
the second, no export duty on the timber
cut in that part of the State of Maine water-
ed by the River St. John, and exported
from New Brunswick to the United States.
But for this disposition of the St. Lawrence,
whether we approve of it or not, no blame
can be properly imputed to our Government.
The Imperial Government, however, took
this matter entirely into its own hands; and
our Government had nothing whatever to do with
it. It has been already explained that the
cession of the navigation of the St. Law-
rence is of very little practical value without
the use of the canals, and the right to use
the canals can only be exercised with our
consent. I have no doubt that we shall be
very glad to have the canals used by the
Americans as much as possible on the same
terms with ourselves, so that we may derive
the increased revenue that will contribute to
the cost of their construction, and will make
them more profitable to us than otherwise
they would be.

I now come to that portion of the Treaty
more particularly before us—the clauses re-
lating to the Fisheries. These clauses are
subject to our jurisdiction, and it is for us
to decide whether they shall be confirmed.
Let me briefly refer to them.

The 18th clause gives liberty to the Ameri-
can fishermen to obtain fish within the dis-
puted limits.

The 19th gives us the right to fish in
United States waters.

The 22nd provides for the payment of
any difference in value to the country that
may not have as much advantage as the other.
It has been objected that these provisions
are not fair, but I cannot see anything unfair
in them. It is provided that we may fish in
American waters, that Americans may fish
in our waters, and that if there be any differ-
ence in value the difference is to be the sub-
ject of arbitration. I cannot see that any-
thing can be more fair in principle, or more
just, if properly carried out. But in addi-
tion to this, there is another privilege, which

is given to us by the 21st Article, namely,
that for the term therein named, fish and
fish oil shall be admitted into each country
free of duty. I should have been better
satisfied if the reciprocity had gone further,
and if we had coal, salt and lumber free.

The Minister of Justice explained that, in
his opinion, but for the action of this
Parliament in taking off the duties on these
articles last year we should have had Recipro-
city with us as happy. In doing this we
are one of those who voted for the repeal
of the duties last year, I have no such infor-
mation as the Government had. The Govern-
ment were in communication with the Pre-
mier every day, and if it was known to them
that the retention of the duties was essential
to obtain reciprocity, it was their duty to
have said so to the House, and then they
should have risked their position as a Govern-
ment on the disposal of the question. If
the House was to blame, the Government
was greatly to blame.

But the privilege given to the Maritime
Provinces for the sale of their fish, as I un-
derstand it, is of very considerable
value to them. There is an increased
demand for about forty million of people
for their fish. Then the fishermen of the
Maritime Provinces can live more cheaply
than the American fishermen; they can
build their vessels more cheaply, and in ad-
dition to the American market, they will
have a market at their own doors. If, under
such favourable circumstances, our fishmen
are not able to compete with the fishmen
of the United States, I can only say
they are not the men that we, in the West,
take them to be. I have no doubt that they
will be able to profit by the Treaty, and that
is shown by the fact that the Treaty is very
little, if at all, opposed by the gentlemen re-
presenting the Maritime Provinces.

An objection has been made, and urged
again, by members of this House, that
a surrender has been made of our terri-
torial rights. But I fail to see that any
such surrender has taken place. I cannot
see that there is a surrender of territorial
rights now any more than there was in
the Treaty of 1818; or in the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854. Certainly there is a
privilege given to fish in common with
our own people, but even that for a limited
time. During the twelve years that this
privilege will continue, we hope to make
great progress in building up the Dominion,
and we shall then be a power more worthy
of respect than at present, and not so
deserving of the aspersions of the President
of the United States in his annual mes-
sages. We shall then be not only the maritime
power of the world, but one ready and
willing to bear our portion of the responsi-
bility of Empire.

It seems to me, therefore, that the argu-
ments that the fishery clauses are unfair,
and that there has been a surrender of
territorial rights have not been made out. If
the people of the Maritime Provinces are
satisfied, why should Ontario object? The
people peculiarly concerns them, and if they
are satisfied, we, in the West, should also
be so.

There is not only a gain to the Maritime
Provinces however—there is the bonding
system, and there is the relaxation of the na-
vigation laws, which I have already mentioned
and which are benefits to the whole Dominion.

If it is the policy of the Empire that the
Treaty should be accepted,—Canada, as part
of that Empire, should accept it.

I should be better satisfied to see the Treaty
amended, and indeed entirely changed, but
as the Empire decides to ratify it as it is, it
will be very unbecoming in us to resist it.
Canada is not called upon to make any sac-
rifices, but even if she were it would be
her duty to do so under the circumstances.

What value would the Fisheries be to us
without the protection of the Imperial
authorities? They would be of no value
whatever, for we should be unable to hold
them, and we should have no right to ex-
pect support from the Imperial power in
protecting our Fisheries, if we were to fly in
the face of Imperial policy and refuse to ratify
what they consider expedient in the
interests of the Empire.

These are the principal reasons why, in my
judgment, the Fishery clauses should be sup-
ported. There is no reason why nations like
ours should not settle their disputes by the
laws of reason. War is a mere relic of bar-
barism, and I trust the Treaty of Washing-
ton will be for ever a precedent for the
settlement of disputes not only to the
two nations concerned, but also
to the nations of the whole world. (Cheers.)
It is necessary for the welfare of this
country and of the United States that this
or some such Treaty should be adopted.

We have a large part of the continent in
our charge, which it is our duty as well as
our interest to develop and settle. It is to
our interest to invite immigrants from all
parts of the world to come and settle upon
this land of which we are the stewards—to
occupy this part of the American continent
and build up in it a great and prosperous
nation. To them we offer a home, freely
giving away our lands that they may become
prosperous and happy. In doing this we
do not impoverish ourselves, while we en-
rich them who enrich ourselves. There is
with nations as with individuals, a giving
that makes rich, and a withholding that
makes poverty. (Hear, hear.) In improv-
ing the condition of others we improve our
own condition; the more land we give to the
immigrant the richer we become. The land
is of no value except for purposes of settle-
ment. Each emigrant is an addition to
our National power and National wealth.
Such has been the policy of the United States,
such should be the policy of this country.
Emigrants want to come to us and find here
happy homes; but to enable us to give and
them to reap the advantages we offer, we
must have a guarantee of peace. War would
keep them away, and it is our policy, there-
fore, to have peace. For similar reasons,
peace is the true policy of the United States.
I look upon this Treaty as a happy omen of
the future—a happy precedent in the inter-
est of peace. (Hear, hear.) For these rea-
sons, I intend to vote against both of the
amendments that have been proposed, and
for the second reading of the bill. (Hear,
hear.) I wish, before taking my seat, to
make a few remarks upon a subject that has
arisen in the course of this discussion. I was
sorry to hear the attacks that were made upon
the leader of this House and the leader of the
Government; and I was sorry, too, when he
made his speech in moving the bill, that he
thought it worth while to notice attacks that
had been made upon him before his meeting
of Parliament. But, Sir, the honourable
gentleman is human, and it is not to be won-
dered at, that, after having been abused and
vilified for days and months and years—
after having been assailed in regard to this
particular measure with a malignity
and intensity of animosity which
has increased by the fact that his opponents
know his lips must for the time be sealed—
say it is not to be wondered at—he would
have been more than human if he had re-
mained—that he alluded to those charges
upon the floor of this House, where alone he
could properly repel them. (Hear, hear.)

Falling in argument against the hon. gentle-
man, his opponent resorted to abuse, hurling
at him such epithets as "Judas," "Benedict
Arnold," while the hon. member
for Bothwell asserted that he floated on
popular prejudices. Sir, if there is one man
in this House who is more than another above
the popular prejudices of the hour—if there
is one man who more than another would
scorn to avail himself of the opportunities
afforded by the occasion for exciting public
opinion—if there is one man who more than
another is faithful to the true interests of
this great and growing country—that man is
the Premier of the present Government.
(Cheers.) I say so deliberately, I say em-
phatically that it is the feeling of the coun-
try from one ocean to the other. (Cheers.) If
there is one man in this Dominion
better who is entitled to more favourable con-
sideration than another because of great ser-
vices rendered to the country, that man is
the Premier of this country. (Cheers.) If
there is one man who has done more than an-
other to bring about Confederation—if there
is one man who has done more than another
for the success of the Confederation—if there
is one man more than another who has ear-
nestly worked, irrespective of local claims,
party considerations, to make the Union a
reality, who has clung to it through good re-
ports and through evil report, who has stead-
fastly laboured for that great end, while
others upon whom it was equally incumbent
to labour have deserted it—that man, I say,
John A. Macdonald. (Cheers.) He is a
man of whom we all ought to be proud, whether
we consider his great ability, his great
patriotism. It is only party prejudice that
blinds, or affects to blind his opponents to
his merits as a statesman. (Cheers.) We
all remember the feeling of anxiety
that pervaded all classes of the com-
munity when two years ago they lay sick
in bed, and might at any moment
have been called to their fathers. It was
us. His dreaded death was looked upon as
a national calamity—his happy recovery a
cause of national rejoicing—and his continu-
ance among us is now looked upon as a
national blessing. (Cheers.) I am not going,
Sir, to catalogue the virtues of all the mem-
bers of the Government now on their trial

before this House. There are other mem-
bers of the Government entitled to great
praise. There is a fitness in the Govern-
ment which, in the interest of the coun-
try of this country, ought to be made eternal.
(Hear, hear, and laughter.) Our finances
are well managed—our public works are well
managed, and all the Departments of the
Government are carefully and well adminis-
tered. What, Sir, is the result? The whole
country is prosperous. From ocean to ocean
it blossoms like a rose. The whole
people are now contented and satisfied.
They are contented and satisfied because
they are prosperous, and they are prosper-
ous mainly because the right men
are at the helm of our affairs. (Cheers.)

I do not wish to withhold any acknowl-
edgement that is due to hon. gentlemen
opposite. I admit the necessity of an honest
and vigilant opposition. I admit their right
fairly to criticize the conduct of the Govern-
ment—to try, if need be, into every executive
act and to attack criminality if it should be
found in high places, but I deny their right,
if I may be permitted to use the language of
detectives, to "put up jobs"—to impute
criminality where there is none to blame this
Government for the sins of another Govern-
ment, and to asperse the character of our
foremost men, when those men, by their
acts and by their lives, have proved them-
selves to be good and faithful public ser-
vants. I think that the hon. gentlemen
who are now on the Treasury benches are
well qualified for the positions they fill, and
that the true interests of this country—the
welfare and happiness of its people—will be
best served by keeping them in the position
they so worthily occupy. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. TILLEY said he must say that the hon.
gentleman had made a very able and, for
him, a very moderate speech. He must say
of the Government, however, he must at
the very outset repudiate the statement
that had been made by the hon. member
to-day, and yesterday by the member for
Hochelaga, and which had been repeated over
and over again, that the Government had re-
ceded from the position they took in the
despatch of the 25th July. They stood by
that despatch, and it was satisfactory to
know that hon. gentlemen opposite recorded
their entire approval of the sentiments then
expressed. He defied hon. gentlemen to
show any inconsistency on the part of the
Government. In July the Government oc-
cupied the very same position which they
occupied during the negotiations at Washing-
ton, when they protested against the
terms of the Treaty relating to the fisheries.
Later they repeated the protest, and what
more could they do? And now the matter
was before them, and there was the utmost
freedom of discussion. The Government ex-
pressed their dissent from the Treaty. And
why? Because they did not obtain the
reciprocity which was enjoyed under the
old Treaty; because the Fisheries were
changed for free fish and free fish oil, and a
money value of which they did not know the
amount, and also because the Fenian claims
were not settled. These were the objections
taken by the Government, and they were
expressed in language which even the mem-
ber for West Durham admitted was stronger
than what he would have felt himself justified
in using. The same opinion was expressed by
the Government in January; and, as the
member for Gloucester had stated, there was
then no assertion that the Government
would not recommend the Treaty to Parlia-
ment. The Government recognized the diffi-
culties, of an Imperial and a local character,
which might flow from a rejection of the
Treaty, and, in the face of the fact, to re-
move those difficulties, they asked for some
just and proper settlement of the expendi-
ture in repelling the Fenians from the land.
They knew what was the sentiment on the
subject throughout the length and breadth of
the country; and he believed that, if there
had been in absence of such a settlement, it
would have been most difficult to carry the
measure through Parliament. The Govern-
ment had consulted on the matter, and they
considered that, inasmuch as the Imperial
Government assumed the responsibility of
withdrawing the claims on Imperial grounds,
there was some honourable way in which the
difficulty could be solved. The member for
Hochelaga had termed the arrangements
"base, sordid, and disgraceful." He would
suppose that that hon. gentleman was a minor,
and that as such his father had to transact
his business, and that in doing so his father,
either from some oversight, or in con-
sideration of his own interests, found
it necessary to sacrifice those of his son.
Well, suppose the hon. gentleman went

to his father and said "You have assumed this responsibility; now pay me, but you can assist me without putting your hand in your own pocket. Your credit is good; endorse my paper. It will be a sacrifice to you, and it will be a liquidation of my just claims." Would there be anything "mean," "sordid" or "base" in that? Nothing of the kind; and if the Government had not secured some such arrangement they would have been denounced and condemned for neglecting the interests of the Dominion. (Cheers.) The question now was not whether we approved of the Treaty, but whether, in the interests of the Empire and the Dominion it was best to accept or to reject it. He held that a rejection would endanger the relations of the Empire with the neighbouring republic. It was well known that, during the last few years, as well as before 1864, there was a possibility in the enforcement of the Fishery laws, and more than a possibility, of unpleasant relations arising between the two countries. The hon. member for Halifax had spoken of the excitement throughout the United States in connection with the cutting off of the *H. Horton*, and every one knew the anxiety that existed on the other side of the Atlantic in reference to the matter. How much stronger would that feeling have been, had there been any doubt as to the legality of the seizure of this vessel in the first place by the Marine Police. The Imperial Government naturally feel very great anxiety as to the manner in which our rights are enforced. Was it not therefore expedient that the Treaty should be adopted, and so have these dangers ended? The hon. member for Gloucester had spoken of the changes of sentiment with regard to the Treaty since its provisions first became known. That change, however, was not so much on the merits of the Treaty, but in the expediency of adopting it, and he believed an overwhelming majority of the people of the Dominion would now say, "accept." Then, again, would a rejection of the Treaty render the people of the United States more friendly or better disposed to Canada? Would it produce a greater inclination to grant reciprocity? He recollected being at Washington in 1865, when coming in contact with leading men there they told him the Reciprocity Treaty would not be renewed, because, among other reasons, they had an old grudge against Canada for the sympathy she manifested during the civil war, and because they believed the abrogation of the Treaty would bring about annexation. A great part of this feeling, however, had since passed away. The papers laid before Parliament at the request of the hon. member for Sherbrooke, showing as they did, that Canada had faithfully performed, towards the neighbouring republic, all her international obligations during the war, and that the Government of the United States had acknowledged it, tended to produce this result. And every one who read the United States newspapers would see the wonderful and extraordinary change that had taken place since the Treaty was signed at Washington; and if Canada now carried the Treaty into effect, as far as she was concerned, she would remove every vestige of the ill-feeling that formerly existed and that barred the way to reciprocity. There were many in the United States who believed that withholding reciprocity would induce annexation, and he did not hesitate to say that those who expressed themselves in favour of annexation, and those who inclined to independence had, unwittingly, as far as

the latter were concerned, done more to prevent reciprocity than any one else. The Government, individually and collectively, did not approve of the Treaty; but for the sake of Imperial interests, and the sake of maintaining British connection, they were ready to accept it, and so do away with all ideas of annexation. Looking at the financial aspects of the matter, the member for Chateaugay touched the point yesterday—this speech was one of the ablest he ever delivered—in pointing out the liabilities Canada was about to incur. Setting aside the question of the guarantee altogether, he believed that Canada going into the market to raise a loan of \$40,000,000 on her own responsibility, with all questions of dispute between England and the United States arranged, and with an almost certainty of permanent peace, would gain at least one per cent. better terms than if those questions remained open, making a saving on the unguaranteed part of the loan of from \$200,000 to \$300,000 a year; and the Minister of Justice had stated that he was not speaking off the book when he said that, if all the questions were arranged Canada would probably receive a guarantee of \$4,000,000, by transferring the "ratification guarantee to public works; so that the Minister of Finance was justified in stating that there would be a saving in this respect of \$600,000. If the questions in dispute with the United States were amicably settled, there would be no necessity for fortifications, and so a saving might possibly be effected in the militia expense. Then there would be a saving in the marine police; and he believed, taken all these items into consideration, and adding the amount Canada would receive for the excess value of her fisheries—which amount ought to be very large—the financial benefit to Canada represented by the Treaty would amount to \$1,000,000 a year. Without enlarging on the subject, he desired to place this view before the consideration of the House, and he believed the country would say: "Though the Treaty is unfair, you did right under the circumstances. You have saved us a large amount, and given us additional means for the construction of our public works, and you have discharged your duty." He understood the member for Gloucester to charge that an attempt had been made by the Dominion Government to coerce Prince Edward Island, and that police vessels were sent down there to destroy their trade. When the hon. member ventured such an assertion, he did so without any foundation. The vessels that went to Prince Edward Island were Imperial vessels with Imperial officers, and no Dominion vessels were sent at all to the coasts of Prince Edward Island. It being six o'clock, the House rose.

AFTER RECESS.

Mr. TILLEY desired to state briefly the points to which he had referred before six o'clock. He then went through the arguments he had previously used, as to the charge of inconsistency brought against the Government, their action in suggesting the guarantee on account of the Fenian claims, and the withdrawal of those claims by England. He repeated that there was nothing bare or mean in the transaction, and maintained that the Treaty should be accepted on the ground that it would increase the harmony and good feeling between the United States and the Dominion, and would prevent complications between the Imperial and the

United States Governments. He, with most other public men, formerly thought that the Fisheries were the main lever with which the Northern States were to be brought to support reciprocity in the natural products of the two countries, but he had of late changed his mind. It now appears that the fishermen of the Northern States were opposed to the acceptance of our fisheries if in doing so they gave our fishermen a free market in the Northern States. Such being the case, we could not rely upon aid in that direction. The hon. member for Halifax questioned this, and asserted that the fishermen of Massachusetts were being made use of by Ben. Butler to get a bounty for their fish as a price for their support of the Treaty. Ben. Butler was not contending for a bounty; his object was to defeat the Treaty. It was another leading politician from the same section who advocated the giving of bounties, but he appeared to receive but little support. It had been asserted by the member for West Durham that our fishermen would not be in a fair position because the American Government would give bounties. A member of the Government had stated that it was against the spirit of the Treaty to give bounties. He held that the greatest chance of success was in the establishment of kind and friendly relations with the United States. The masses of the country would desire cheap fuel, and would bring influence upon Congress to repeal the duty on coal; and similarly, salt, lumber, and other articles; and looking at the bill before them, he could undertake to say that the rejection of the Treaty would certainly not put Canada in a better position. It was of the utmost importance to Canada that she should be on friendly relations with the United States, in view of the loans they required to raise for the public works they had put their hands to. He was in England in 1861, during the Trent difficulty, and when the delegation, of which he was a member, endeavoured to secure the guarantee for the Intercolonial Railway, they were told by the Messrs. Jarring that there would be great difficulty in selling British North American securities so long as there was danger of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States. They would remember the difficulty they were in at Confederation, when they had a loan of about two and a-half millions in the Bank of Montreal, because Canada could not float her securities, and for a long time Nova Scotia six per cent. securities were in Messrs. Baring's hands unsold, because they could not be disposed of at par. It was not confined to a Government question, but every man throughout the Dominion who owned a pound of Canadian debentures would be affected by it. At this moment Australian 5½ per cent. bonds brought nearly as high a premium as Dominion 5 per cents. Our financial condition could not be better than it is, showing as it will a surplus, during the first five years of Confederation, of over nine millions of dollars. Why is it then that their securities are sought for in preference to ours? Just because in the event of any disturbance of friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, Canada would be the battle-ground, and our trade and commerce paralysed, and our credit damaged financially, and in every way we have a great interest in the establishment of peace. Reject the Treaty and they would have to ask the people of Canada to raise from three-quarters of a million to one million of dollars a year by additional taxation for the public works they were about to undertake. He

did not hesitate to say that, had he been in opposition, and the Government had come down with the same measure submitted by the Government of to-day, he would have taken the ground of his hon. friend, the member for Chateaugay. He would have said as he did, that he did not think the Treaty was what they should have held, but it was better to accept than reject it. He would leave the matter in the hands of the House. He was confident that he could go back to his constituents and defend his vote for the Treaty, better than if he voted against it.

THE VOTE.

On the question being put on Sir John A. Macdonald's motion for the second reading of the Treaty of Washington Bill, it was agreed to on the following division:—

Yves—Messrs. Abbott, Archambault, Auld, Baker, Barthe, B. J. Beaulieu, Bellerose, Benoit, Bertrand, Blanchet, Bolton, Bown, Brousseau, Burpee, Cameron (Governor), Cameron (Fish), Campbell, Carling, Carmichael, Caron, Carter, Carlier, Sir George B. Cayley, Chausse, Coffin, Colby, Crawford (Brookville), Crawford (Leeds), Cumberland, Currier, Deacon, DeLoane, DeLoorne (Provencher), Doolie, Drew, Dugas, Ferguson, Ferris, Galt, Sir Alexander T. Gauthier, Gaudet, Gendron, Gibbs, Grant, Gray, Grover, Hagar, Harrison, Heath, Hinds, Sir Francis, Holmes, Hulton, Houghton, Hurdon, Irvine, Jackson, Jones (Leeds and Grenville), Keeler, Kilham, Kirkpatrick, Lacerte, Langren, Langlois, Lapum, Lawton, Le Vesconte, Ligu, Macdonald Sir J. A., McDonald (Antigonish), McDonald (Lunenburg), McDonald (Middlesex), Masson (Saguenay), Masson (Terrebonne), McCallum, McCallum (Lanark), McDougall (Three Rivers), McGreevy, McKegney, Merritt, Moffat, Morris, Morrison (Niagara), Nathan, Nelson, O'Connor, Pearson, Perry, Beland, Pincusneault, Pope, Poullet, Power, Ross (Champlain), Ross (Dundas), Ryan (King's), Ryan (Montreal West), Savary, Schuch, Scrivener, Shanley, Simard, Smith (Selkirk), Smith (Westmorland), Sprad, Stephenson, Street, Sylvain, Thompson (Carleton), Tilley, Tourangeau, Tremblay, Tupper, Wallace (Albert), Wallace (Vancouver Island), Walsh, Webb, Whitehead, Wilson, Workman and Wright (Ottawa County)—131.

NAYS.—Anglin, Beaudet, Blake, Bodwell, Boursseau, Bowell, Bowman, Brown, Cameron (Huron/Chenal), Connell, Couper, Delorme (St. Hyacinthe), Duran, Fortin, Fortin, Fountain, Gibeon, Goin, Joly, Jones (Dallfax), Kempf, Macdonald (Glengarry), McFarlane, MacKenzie, MacLellan, McEwen, McDougall (Leeds), Munroe, Oliver, Paquet, Pelletier, Pomeroy, Redford, Renaud, Robitaille, Ross (Prince Edward), Ross (Victoria, N. S.), Ross (Wellington), C. E. Ryan, Satchell, Sander, Stirling, Thompson (Haldimand), Thompson (Ontario), Wells, White (Halton), White (East Hastings), Wood, Wright (York, Ontario, N. Y.), Young 68.

ANALYSIS.

	FOR THE BILL.	AGAINST.
Ontario.....	41	34
Quebec.....	45	16
Nova Scotia.....	13	2
New Brunswick.....	10	8
Manitoba.....	3	—
British Columbia.....	6	—
	121	55

MAJORITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

Ontario.....	10
Quebec.....	29
Nova Scotia.....	11
New Brunswick.....	7
Manitoba.....	3
British Columbia.....	6
	66

There were absent thirteen members; vacant seat, one; Speaker, one. Four members from Nova Scotia paired; three from Ontario for the Treaty; two from New Brunswick, and four from Quebec.

say that, had he been in the Government had come the measure submitted by to-day, he would have of his hon. friend, the wounguy. He would have at he did not think the they should have had, but except than reject it. He latter in the hands of the confident that he could go cents and defend his better than if he voted

E VOTE.

being put on Sir John A. for the second reading Washington Bill, it was following division—

Archambault, Ault, Baker, Belrose, Bouché, Brabant, Brouseau, Borge, Cameron, Campbell, Chilling, Car, Carter, Sir George R. Cayley, Crawford (Brookville), Crav, Currier, Daoust, DeLozence, Doobie, Drew, Dugas, Ferguson, Fraser, T. Gaudet, Gray, Grover, Hagar, Harri, Francis, Holmes, Holton, Ho, Jackson, Jones (Leeds and m, Kirkpatrick, Lacerte, La, Lawren, Le Vesconte, Little, Donald (Antigonish), McCon, Donald (Middlesex), Mason, Sou, McCallum, McDougall, Three Rivers, McGraw, Mc, Morris, Morrison (Niagara), Perry, Pearson, Perry, Richard, Poir, Power, Ross (Champlain), Kings, N. B., Ryan (Montréal), Scrivener, Shanly, Simard, Smith (Sorel), Spruce, Stephenson, (Charlot), Tilley, Touran, Wallace (Albert), Wallace, Webb, Whitehead, Willson, (St. Lawrence County)—131.
d, Blake, Bodwell, Bourassa, Cameron (Huron) Chev. A. Cui, H. Hyscithé Dorion, Fortier, Tom, Gault, Joly, Jones (Hill), (Glenn), MacFarlane, Mac, Key, McDougall, (Anfrew), Morrison (Vict. N. B.), Mun, Poir, Power, Redford, Renaud, Edward, Ross (Victoria, N. B.), Rymal, Scatchard, Shi, (Haldimand), Thompson (Ont), White (East Hastings), Ontario, W. R., Young 55.

ANALYSIS.

FOR THE BILL.	AGAINST.
41	34
45	16
13	2
10	3
3	
6	
121	55

THE GOVERNMENT.

10
20
11
7
3
6
66

ent thirteen members;
Speaker, one. Four
a Scotia paired; three
Treacy; two from New
from Quebec.

THE DAILY MAIL

THE MAIL is a first-class Daily Newspaper, published in Toronto and is issued by the "Mail Printing and Publishing Company," Incorporated by Act of Parliament.

IT IS NATIONAL IN ITS AIMS

Founded in its long history and supported in its efforts to make its Canadian representation varied and complete.

ITS COLUMNS

are filled with the latest news from all parts of the world, while its columns are also filled with the most interesting and valuable information.

ABLE CORRESPONDENTS

The MAIL has a large and able staff of correspondents, who are able to report on all the most important events of the day.

THE LOCAL AND FOREIGN DEPARTMENTS

The MAIL has a large and able staff of correspondents, who are able to report on all the most important events of the day.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENT

The MAIL has a large and able staff of correspondents, who are able to report on all the most important events of the day.

THE WEEKLY ADVERTISING

The MAIL has a large and able staff of correspondents, who are able to report on all the most important events of the day.

THE DAILY MAIL.

THE MAIL is a first-class Daily Newspaper, published in Toronto, and is issued by the "Mail Printing and Publishing Company;" Incorporated by Act of Parliament.

IT IS NATIONAL IN ITS AIMS,

Temperate in its Tone, accurate and impartial in its Reports, exact in the Legal Intelligence it supplies; while no pains are spared to make its Commercial Department varied and complete.

ITS COLUMNS

Are furnished with the Latest Telegraphic Reports from ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD; while every movement of any importance that transpires within the Dominion, finds an appropriate record in its pages.

ABLE CORRESPONDENTS

Supply valuable letters from the chief distant points of interest, affording gratifying insights into Social Life and Popular Progress.

THE CHESS, RURAL AND SPORTING COLUMNS

Are features which have attracted marked attention and approval, and are edited by gentlemen who are masters of the subjects on which they treat.

THE LOCAL AND REPORTING DEPARTMENT

Is in careful and experienced hands, and no effort will be wanting to render it a faithful reflex of passing events.

THE MISCELLANEOUS NEWS AND LITERARY SELECTIONS

Are compiled and prepared with special care, with a view of presenting agreeable and varied matter for the general reader and family circle.

THE TYPOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENT

Has been the object of unusual attention, and by the use of the best materials, types and machinery, a sheet has been issued, of which the *Printers' Register*, of London, Eng. (May 6th, 1872), says, "It is the very best Colonial paper we receive."

Though THE DAILY MAIL commenced its career only on the 31st of March last, it has already attained a vast circulation. It is the favourite paper on the Railways, at the Hotels, in the Reading Rooms, and other places of public resort; as well as welcome in the Counting-house and Family Circle, where its bright appearance, well-filled columns, and cheerful aspect, are the subjects of constant satisfaction and approval.

It is issued to Subscribers at \$5 a-year; or can be had at any of the News-dealers at the rate of TEN CENTS A-WEEK.

THE WEEKLY EDITION,

Which has, in the course of two months, attained a circulation of nearly

20,000 COPIES!

Contains a valuable epitome of General News, Political Information, and Commercial Intelligence; while its Literary Department, contributed to by some of the Leading Writers and Novelists of the day, place it in the foremost rank as an entertaining weekly visitor. It comprises thirty-six columns of reading matter, and is published at the very small price of

ONE DOLLAR A-YEAR!

Address,

"MAIL" Office, Toronto.

Toronto, and
Incorporated

; while no pains

every movement of

Life and Popular

are masters of the

passing events.

TIONS

the general reader

NT

et has been issued,
aper we receive."

a vast circulation.
resort; as well as
cheerful aspect, are

ENTS A-WEEK.

Literary Depart-
an entertaining
of

Toronto.